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Abstract 
 
 
The media equation, in its simplest form, is the notion that ‘media equals real life’. 
More broadly, the media equation explores the manner in which people tend to react 
to computers socially and naturally. Media equation researchers have theorised that 
people’s tendency to treat computers socially is largely an automatic and unconscious 
process, and predominantly agree that the cause of the media equation is 
mindlessness. However, to date, no empirical evidence has been found showing a link 
between mindless processing and media equation behaviour. 
 This thesis builds upon existing media equation research with the aim of 
empirically evaluating the mindlessness explanation of media equation behaviour. 
Laboratory-based experimental research is used to explore the relationship between 
experience with computers, mindlessness, and media equation behaviour. The 
potential for experience with computers to covary with media equation behaviour is 
explored, as mindlessness has been shown to increase among those who are more 
familiar with a task. Four studies are conducted as part of the thesis. 
 The first study establishes that a media equation pattern of response will be 
shown by an Australian sample, and that the methodologies being employed are 
consistent with those used in previous media equation research. Moreover, a 
relationship between experience with computers and media equation behaviour is 
found. Participants of high experience, but not low experience, react positively to 
flattery from a computer. This evidence of a link between experience with computers 
and media equation behaviour provides initial empirical support for the mindlessness 
explanation of the media equation. 
 The second study provides further support for the link between experience 
with computers and the tendency to treat computers as though they are human. The 
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results show that participants of high experience respond to being placed on a team 
with a computer, while participants of low experience do not. The first two studies 
empirically support the mindlessness explanation of media equation behaviour. 
However, they do not provide direct evidence of mindlessness as a cause. 
 The third study was designed to gather more direct evidence of mindlessness 
covarying with media equation behaviour. Previous research has shown that positive 
mood leads to mindlessness, and negative mood to the opposing state of mind, 
mindfulness. The results of the third study show that participants in a positive mood 
are more likely to apply gender stereotypes to a computer than participants in a 
negative mood. This link between positive mood and media equation behaviour 
provides further empirical support for mindlessness as the cause of the media 
equation. 
 The final study was designed to overcome some of the shortcomings of the 
third study, and provide more direct empirical investigation of the link between 
mindlessness and the media equation. By varying the cues displayed by the computer, 
the final study attempted to test whether reminding participants of the true nature of a 
computer would lead to a reduction in the tendency to react to the computer as though 
it were human. The results of the final study were inconclusive and more complicated 
than expected. The findings are discussed in detail in chapter 6. 
 The studies conducted provide domain specific findings that have implications 
for software design. The thesis reveals the moderating impact of experience on the 
tendency to treat computers socially and, moreover, provides initial empirical support 
for the mindlessness explanation of the media equation. The research conducted 
significantly progresses knowledge of the appropriate methodologies required for 
further exploration of the potential causes of media equation behaviour.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction –Evaluation of the Cause of the Media Equation 
Increasingly, digital devices and particularly computers are being designed with the 
ability to display human-like characteristics. Media equation research has shown that 
the presence of human-like cues in the digital environment can lead users to react to 
computers as though they are human, for example, responding positively to flattery 
from computers or applying stereotypes to computers. These developments represent 
a double-edged sword in that, on the one hand, they potentially offer the user a more 
comfortable, familiar and rich environment (for example, users may come to develop 
a friendship-like bond with their virtual tutor), but on the other hand, these 
developments open the possibility of the user being led to react in inappropriate or 
undesirable ways (for example, coming to trust a virtual salesperson when such trust 
is unwarranted). An understanding of why and when users will treat computers as 
though they are human will facilitate the design of the most rich and positive user 
environment possible, and simultaneously help in the prevention of potential abuse of 
peoples' preparedness to react socially to computers. 
Reeves and Nass conducted a series of studies in which they began exploring 
the tendency of people to react in a social manner towards computers (for a review, 
see Reeves & Nass, 1996). The studies coalesced into a program of research known as 
the Computers as Social Actors paradigm (CASA). The CASA program led to the 
discovery of the media equation; the notion that "media equals real life" (where media 
can be defined as digital technology including computers and televisions). This initial 
work by Reeves and Nass has developed into a field of research broadly referred to as 
the media equation. The strict definition of the media equation (“media equals real 
life”) has since been refined into the idea that people treat computers (and other 
digital devices) as though they are real people and places. It is widely theorised that 
the cause of the media equation is a state of mindlessness. Mindlessness, a concept 
developed by Langer (Langer, 1989; Langer & Imber, 1979; Langer & Weinman, 
1981) is a state of mind characterized by an over-reliance on categories and 
distinctions drawn in the past, and in which the individual is context-dependent and, 
as such, is oblivious to novel (or simply alternative) aspects of the situation. 
Media equation research has been successfully conducted in a variety of 
 2 
settings and the media equation has been shown to apply across a range of 
psychological and sociological theories. Media equation studies are generally 
conducted via the following steps: find a social psychology or sociology theory that 
refers to the relationship between humans, substitute a computer for one of the 
humans in the original statement of the theory, run an experiment in a manner 
consistent with the original research (but with a computer substituted for a human), 
and assess whether human participants react to the computer in the current study in a 
manner similar to the way participants in the original study react to other humans. 
Studies using this methodology have shown that people will treat computers as 
though they were real people and places in terms of similarity attraction, 
complementarity, consistency attraction, gain/loss theory, social facilitation, 
reciprocity, praise and criticism, flattery, politeness, apologetic feedback, assignment 
of roles, social identity, stereotyping, self-serving bias, emotion theory, active 
listening, balance theory, humour, social dialogue, the effect of distance, and affinity 
through agreement (see Chapter 2 for details of these studies).  
With respect to the causes of the media equation effect, researchers have 
empirically and theoretically ruled out explanations such as anthropomorphism - 
humans mistakenly believe that the computer is actually human (Nass & Moon, 2000; 
Nass, Moon, Fogg, Reeves, & Dryer, 1995; Nass & Steuer, 1993; Nass, Steuer, 
Henriksen, & Dryer, 1994; Nass, Steuer, Tauber, & Reeder, 1993) and the ‘computer 
as proxy’ - humans are actually reacting to the programmer or designer of the 
software or computer (Nass & Moon, 2000; Sundar & Nass, 2000). In terms of 
anthropomorphism (strictly defined as the mistaken belief that the computer is 
actually a real person) Nass and colleagues point out that participants are experienced 
computer users with a tertiary level of education who are unlikely to suffer from a 
social or psychological deficiency leading them to think the computer is human (Nass 
& Moon, 2000; Nass, Moon, Fogg, Reeves, & Dryer, 1995; Nass & Steuer, 1993; 
Nass, Steuer, Henriksen, & Dryer, 1994; Nass, Steuer, Tauber, & Reeder, 1993). 
Moreover, when debriefed, participants in media equation studies insisted that they 
would never exhibit the behaviours they had shown in the studies (see Nass & Moon, 
2000 for a review). With respect to the notion that participants respond to computers 
as proxies, Sundar and Nass (2000) conducted a series of studies in which they 
compared two theoretical models. The first model is the computer as medium model 
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(CAM) in which the computer is the medium through which people make attributions 
about and towards the programmer or designer. The second model is the computer as 
source (CAS) model in which individuals respond to the computer as a source in 
much the same way that they respond to another human being as a source. Sundar and 
Nass (2000) found consistent empirical support for the CAS and not the CAM model 
which strongly challenges the ‘computer as proxy’ explanation for the media equation 
findings. Beyond these specific results, the general findings across media equation 
studies argue against a ‘computer as proxy’ explanation. Firstly, when questioned, 
participants stated that they did not have a human in mind, such as a programmer, 
during the interaction. Secondly, in studies involving multiple computers, participants 
indicated that they thought the different machines were programmed by the same 
person but they reacted towards the machines differently (see Nass & Moon, 2000 for 
a review). 
Media equation researchers have theorised that people's tendency to treat 
computers as though they are real people or places is a function of responding to 
computers mindlessly (E. Lee, 2003; Mishra et al., 1999; Nass & Moon, 2000; Nass, 
Steuer, Henriksen, & Dryer, 1994). Langer (1989; , 1992) argues that mindlessness 
leads to conscious attention to only a subset of contextual cues. The attended cues 
trigger scripts and expectations that focus attention towards certain information and 
away from other (potentially relevant) information (Langer, 1989, 1992). Media 
equation researchers point out that modern computers offer a variety of cues that 
suggest humanness, for example; they use words for output, they offer interactivity 
(responses based on multiple prior inputs), and they fill roles (e.g., tutor, telephone 
operator) traditionally filled by humans (Moon & Nass, 1996b; Nass, Steuer, 
Henriksen, & Dryer, 1994). From the perspective of mindlessness, these cues are 
enough to trigger categorisation of computers as social actors. According to the 
mindlessness explanation of the media equation, this categorisation, in turn, often 
leads people to respond to computers in a social and natural way.  
In sum, the media equation has been demonstrated in a variety of scenarios. It 
has been empirically shown that the media equation is not the result of 
anthropomorphism or treating the computers as a proxy. It is theorised that the media 
equation results from mindless processing. While the majority of research has focused 
on ways in which the user environment can be improved, some consideration has also 
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been given to how people’s tendency to treat computers socially could be undesirable 
in certain situations. Researchers have examined, for example, the design of interfaces 
that encourage gambling (Fogg, 1998), the potential for fraud or misrepresentation in 
e-commerce environments (Heckman & Wobbrock, 2000), and the potential 
instantiation of negative stereotypes (Mishra, Nicholson, & Wojcikiewicz, 2001).  
While the nature of the media equation has been researched in detail, the 
question of why the media equation occurs has only been addressed theoretically. 
Stemming from the question of 'why' are important questions regarding 'when' the 
media equation effect will and will not be displayed. That is, under what conditions 
are people more or less likely to treat computers as though they are real people or 
places? No experiments to date have directly manipulated when the media equation is 
likely to be displayed.  
Two behaviourally-based research methodologies were identified as being 
useful for exploring the causes of the media equation. Firstly, the state of mind of 
computer users can be manipulated such that they are either in a mindless or mindful 
state and their subsequent reactions towards computers assessed. Secondly, the cues 
presented by computers can be altered to suggest a greater degree of ‘computerness’ 
and the impact on the tendency to behave socially towards the computer monitored.  
Experimental methods deployed in a laboratory setting are most appropriate 
for addressing the current gap because of the degree of control required to accurately 
test whether mindlessness is the cause of media equation patterns of behaviour and 
the ability to limit or rule out alternative explanations. Specifically, lab-based 
experimentation should facilitate both the manipulation of the state of mind of users 
and the manipulation of the cues presented by the computer. The resulting impact on 
the tendency to respond to the computer socially can then be assessed. This 
methodology should give direct insight into when a media equation pattern of 
response is more or less likely.  
The overall goal of the current research is to explore the cause of the media 
equation. Specifically, the research seeks to empirically evaluate the mindlessness 
explanation of media equation behaviour. It is expected that two ancillary questions 
can also be explored: when are people more or less likely to show a media equation 
pattern of response, and how can the tendency to show a media equation pattern of 
 5 
response can be increased or decreased?  
The primary method employed was laboratory-based experimental research. 
Firstly, a study was conducted to confirm that a media equation pattern of response 
could be obtained. This study served dual purposes. It was important, 
methodologically, to establish that the findings of others could be replicated using the 
resources available. Moreover, the study was significant theoretically, as cultural 
differences in terms of media equation behaviour have been found and to date, no 
media equation research has been conducted with Australian samples. Attention was 
also directed towards whether or not the tendency to display a media equation pattern 
of response varies with particular demographic factors (e.g., age, gender, degree of 
experience with computers). A correlation between key demographic factors and the 
tendency to show a media equation effect could provide useful information in terms 
of identifying the cause of the media equation. It was hypothesised that experience 
would covary with the tendency to display a media equation pattern of response, as 
more experienced people are more likely to be in a mindless state when interacting 
with the computer. Finally, research was conducted aimed at directly testing the 
mindlessness explanation for the media equation as the applicability of the 
mindlessness explanation has implications for when media equation behaviour is less 
or more likely to occur. 
1.1 Thesis Overview 
Chapter 2 presents an extensive review of all previously undertaken media equation 
research. Individually, each of these studies provides insight into particular aspects of 
interface design and human computer interaction. Considered holistically, these 
studies provide clear evidence that people respond to computers (and electronic 
interfaces) as though they are real people or places in a variety of situations. That is, 
when interacting with computers, people apply a myriad of the social rules that they 
have learnt to apply in human-human interactions. 
The question of source orientation is also discussed in chapter 2, that is, 
towards which part of the computer are users applying a notion of self; the machine, 
the window, distinct voices, or some combination of these factors? The research that 
has led to the refinement of the media equation, the potential moderators of the media 
equation, and the evidence contrary to the media equation are reviewed. In depth 
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consideration is also given to the existing explanations for the media equation 
findings. The chapter concludes with analysis of the manner in which 
anthropomorphism and the ‘computer as proxy’ explanations have been discredited, 
discussion of the argument that media equation findings are due to demand 
characteristics, and detailed exploration of the theory behind the mindlessness 
explanation for the media equation.  
Chapter 3 describes the first empirical study conducted as part of the thesis. 
The study consisted of a replication of earlier work conducted by Fogg and Nass 
(1997b) in which participants were shown to react to flattery from computers as they 
would to flattery from humans. Importantly, the results replicated those of the original 
researchers, showing that the methodologies being employed were consistent with 
those of previous research, and that the media equation effect extends (at least in this 
instance) to Australian participants. The study was also designed to explore the 
question of whether any key demographic factors relate to the tendency to show a 
media equation pattern of response. Clear evidence was found of a link between 
users’ experience and their tendency to react positively to flattery from a computer. 
This finding represents the first reported empirical evidence of a demographic 
characteristic moderating media equation behaviour. Specifically, people with greater 
experience with computers responded positively to flattery from the computer, but 
people with less experience with computers did not. The implications of this finding 
in terms of explanations for the media equation are explored.  
On the basis that the aforementioned flattery study is the first published 
research to show a clear empirical link between experience and a media equation 
effect, a second study was conducted to explore whether the link could be replicated 
in a different setting. Chapter 4 describes this second study, which was an extension 
of research conducted by Nass, Moon and Fogg (1995; , 1996). Nass and colleagues 
explored the possibility that people would form team relationships with computers in 
a manner consistent with the formation of team relationships amongst humans. The 
second study provided further support for the moderating effect of experience on the 
media equation in that participants of high experience with computers, but not low 
experience, were more likely to treat the computer as though it was human. The 
nature of this effect was not as originally hypothesised, but is consistent with the 
notion of people responding socially towards computers. Specifically, people placed 
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on a team with a computer reacted negatively towards the computer, indicating that a 
‘Black Sheep Effect’ (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988) was likely occurring. 
The link between high experience and the tendency to exhibit a media 
equation effect, established in the first two studies, is consistent with the mindlessness 
explanation of the media equation. As the mindlessness explanation has been explored 
only theoretically in previous research, the third study, discussed in Chapter 5, 
attempted to empirically evaluate the notion that mindlessness is the cause of the 
media equation. Specifically, Study 3 was designed to test whether people in a 
mindless state would differ in their reactions towards the computer in comparison 
with people in a mindful state, such that people in a mindless state would show a 
greater tendency towards a media equation effect than people in a mindful state. 
Based on prior research, the degree of mindful- or mindless-ness of participants was 
manipulated by changing their mood. Evidence that people in a positive mood are 
more likely than people in a negative mood to respond to the computer as though it 
were human would be consistent with the mindlessness explanation of media equation 
effects.  
 Previous media equation research has shown that people will apply gender 
stereotypes towards computers (Nass, Moon, & Green, 1997). Study 3 was designed 
to replicate this research and extend it by moderating the tendency to stereotype the 
computer as a function of mood. The results supported the link between mindlessness 
and the media equation pattern of response among female participants but not among 
male participants. This disparity across gender is most likely due to the mood 
manipulation having a greater impact upon females than males. Thus, Study 3 
provides some support for a link between mood and the media equation, and on the 
basis of previous research (linking mood and mindlessness) can be seen as supporting 
the theorised link between mindlessness and the media equation.  
 Given the lack of effect found for male participants, the value of exploring 
how experience interacts with mindlessness, and in the interest of further extending 
the finding of a link between mood, mindlessness and the media equation, a final 
study was conducted. Study 4, discussed in chapter 6, was designed with the aim of 
more directly empirically evaluating the link between mindlessness and the media 
equation. To this end, the study involved manipulation of the cues presented by the 
computer so that participants were exposed to either a standard computer interface or 
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an interface designed to remind the user that they were dealing with a computer (and 
not a person). The study was a partial replication of Study 1, in that participants were 
either exposed to flattery from the computer or given no feedback.  
The results of Study 4 were more complicated than anticipated. In line with 
the previous studies, low experience participants did not show a media equation 
pattern of behaviour in response to flattery from the computer. However, high 
experience participants who were exposed to cues reminding them they were dealing 
with a computer, in comparison with participants who were not so reminded, reacted 
more positively to flattery from the computer. This finding is contrary to the 
mindlessness explanation for the media equation. It is speculated that this finding 
could be an unexpected result of the combination of the flattery manipulation with the 
cues manipulation. Alternatively, it may be that attempting to remind users that they 
are dealing with a computer, by altering the cues displayed does not affect the 
tendency to show a media equation pattern of response. This interpretation of the 
results raises the question of alternative explanations for the media equation, which 
are considered in the final chapter. 
 The final chapter draws together the results of the four studies and considers 
what is known and where further exploration is required. Essentially, it can be 
concluded that experience is a moderator of the media equation such that high 
experience computer users are more likely to treat the computer as though it were 
human than are low experience users. Along with the findings in Study 3, which show 
that under certain conditions, mood moderates the tendency to gender stereotype 
computers, this finding is in line with the mindlessness explanation of the media 
equation. However, the results of the final study raise the possibility that automatic 
processing, and not mindlessness, accounts for people’s tendency to treat computers 
like real people and places. The distinction between mindlessness and automatic 
processing has implications in terms of when a media equation pattern of response 
will be shown, and these are discussed in detail.  
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Chapter 2 
The major aim of the thesis is to explore and seek empirical evidence for the causes of 
the media equation. Before undertaking empirical exploration of the causes of media 
equation behaviour it is necessary to fully review the existing media equation 
literature. The current chapter begins with a review of the methodologies and findings 
of previous research as well as consideration of the ensuing software design 
implications. This initial review provides the foundation for a more substantive 
exploration of the conceptual and theoretical issues that arise. In particular, the second 
part of the chapter (from section 2.2 onwards) comprises a discussion of the theorised 
causes of the media equation and research directed towards empirically evaluating 
these causes. Consideration is also given to alternative explanations for the media 
equation (demand characteristics, the computer as proxy and anthropomorphism). The 
review is conducted with a view to situating the research conducted as part of the 
thesis. 
Literature Review - The Media Equation and Mindlessness 
Based on research showing a tendency for people to react in a social manner towards 
computers, Nass and colleagues (Nass & Steuer, 1993; Nass, Steuer, Tauber, & 
Reeder, 1993) began a program of research known as the Computers as Social Actors 
(CASA) paradigm. The CASA paradigm was further developed by Nass, Reeves and 
colleagues and led to the formulation of the media equation (Reeves & Nass, 1996). 
The media equation is based around the idea that people respond socially to 
computers. In its simplest form the media equation can be stated as ‘media equals real 
life’; more broadly, it is the concept that people’s interactions with televisions, 
computers and new media are fundamentally social and natural (Reeves & Nass, 
1996). Media equation studies all follow a similar research process. The process is as 
follows: 
     a) pick a social science finding (usually social psychology or sociology) which 
concerns behaviour or attitudes towards humans;  
     b) substitute ‘computer’ for ‘human’ in the statement of the theory, for example, 
‘people like people that flatter them’ becomes ‘people like computers that flatter 
them’ (Fogg & Nass, 1997b) 
     c) replicate the methodology of the social science study but replace one or more 
humans with computers 
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     d) determine if the social rule still applies (Nass, Steuer, & Tauber, 1994). 
Studies testing a variety of social science findings for their applicability in 
human-computer interaction have supported the media equation. Individually, the 
studies each provide insight into particular aspects of interface design and human-
computer interaction. The added advantage of these design insights is that they draw 
on pre-existing expertise. Because the findings leverage users’ pre-existing 
knowledge of social and interpersonal relationships, they often suggest means by 
which users can automatically become experts regarding how particular media or 
interfaces work. Moreover, these findings reveal how users can be made more 
comfortable or led to experience greater positive affect while using a particular device 
or interface (Reeves & Nass, 1996). More broadly, media equation research is 
relevant to the fields of persuasive computing (Fogg, 1998, 1999, 2003), affective 
computing (Picard, 1997), embodied conversational agents (Cassell & Bickmore, 
2003), e-learning and pedagogical agents (Baylor, 2002). 
Understanding peoples’ tendency to respond socially to computers is 
important not only due to the potential to design more understandable and enjoyable 
interfaces. As computers become more affectively and socially capable, the potential 
for unethical uses of such technology increase (Fogg, 1998, 2003; Heckman & 
Wobbrock, 2000; Mishra, Nicholson, & Wojcikiewicz, 2001; Nofz & Vendy, 2002). 
A socially adept interface could be used, for example, to encourage gambling or to 
foster unwarranted trust. Social interactions with computers can lead to both positive 
and negative outcomes for users, and thus, it is important that an understanding is 
developed of when and why social reactions are likely to occur. 
The first part of this chapter reviews research conducted on the media 
equation. The research is categorised according to the social science literature upon 
which it draws, and specific regard is given to the methodologies employed and the 
software design implications suggested by the findings. The remainder of the chapter 
considers the overall implications of the findings, the question of source orientation 
(to which part of the computer do users tend to attribute individual agency), 
refinements of the media equation, potential moderators of media equation behaviour, 
evidence contrary to the media equation, alternative explanations for the findings and 
the theorised causes of media equation behaviour. 
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2.1 Review of Media Equation Research 
Much of the research conducted around the media equation draws on literature from 
the field of social psychology. Much media equation research has been conducted 
and, as a means of simplifying the literature review, the media equation research has 
been broken down into the areas of social psychology upon which it is based. 
Simplifying the literature in this way leads to the following categories: traits, 
including similarity attraction, consistency attraction, gain/loss theory and social 
facilitation; social rules and norms, including reciprocity, flattery, politeness, 
apologetic feedback, the assignment of roles and the social rules regarding praise and 
criticism; identity, including social identity theory and group formation, stereotyping 
and self-serving biases; and communication, including emotion theory, active 
listening, balance theory, smalltalk and more anecdotal theories. This chapter reviews 
media equation research according to this categorisation as well as considering some 
additional research that falls outside these categories; specifically, the effect of 
humour in interfaces, the effect of distance and the creation of a sense of affinity 
through agreement. 
2.1.1 Traits 
Similarity Attraction versus the Complementarity Principle 
One of the strongest and most consistent findings in psychological research is that 
perceptions of similarity increase attraction between people (R. Smith, 1993). One 
area in which similarity has been shown to be related to attraction is personality 
(Duck, 1973; Neimeyer & Mitchell, 1988). People tend to be more attracted to others 
whom they perceive as having a personality similar to their own. In contrast, support 
has also been found for a competing hypothesis – the complementarity principle, 
which suggests that people will tend to behave in complementary ways in their 
interpersonal interactions and seek out others who elicit complementary behaviour 
from them (Cramer, 1994; Leary, 1957; Nass, Isbister, & Lee, 2000; Sullivan, 1953).  
Nass and Lee (K. Lee & Nass, 2003; Nass & Lee, 2000, 2001) found support 
for the existence of similarity attraction between humans and computers. Their 
experiments involved users accessing web sites that had been made for the purposes 
of the study (either a book buying website with reviews or an online auction site with 
descriptions of the products). The websites included synthesised computer voices 
describing the products contained on the pages (either the book reviews or product 
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descriptions). The synthesised voices were manipulated to suggest either introversion 
or extroversion on the part of the speaker (research has shown that certain 
paralinguistic speech characteristics are associated with introversion and extroversion, 
see Nass & Lee, 2001, for a review). As expected, extroverted users1 showed a 
preference for extroverted synthesised speech and introverted users showed a 
preference for introverted synthesised speech. Users were also more willing to engage 
in purchasing if the voice was similar to their own personality. 
Nass, Moon and colleagues found similar results for the submissive / 
dominant component of personality with text based human-computer interactions 
(Moon & Nass, 1996a; Nass, Moon, Fogg, Reeves, & Dryer, 1995). In these studies, 
participants were asked to complete the desert survival problem, a problem-solving 
task in which participants rank a series of items according to their perceived 
importance in a desert survival situation. Participants performed an initial ranking of 
the items and then interacted with a second computer, providing information and 
confidence ratings for each of their rankings. The second computer, in turn, provided 
its own ranking, information and confidence rating for each item. Upon completion of 
the interaction with the second computer, participants were given an opportunity to 
make a final ranking of the items and asked to fill out a questionnaire that assessed 
participants’ ratings of both the computer and the interaction itself (this methodology 
has been employed by many media equation researchers and will hereafter be referred 
to as the desert-survival task methodology). The text displayed by the second 
computer (i.e., the computer with which participants exchanged rankings) was 
manipulated to convey either submissiveness or dominance (this manipulation 
involved changing the phrasing of the text displayed by the computer, the computer's 
confidence ratings, and the interaction order, see Nass & Lee, 2000 for details). In line 
with the similarity attraction hypothesis, submissive participants showed a preference 
for submissive computers and dominant participants showed a preference for 
dominant computers2 (this preference extended to satisfaction ratings for the 
interaction). 
                                                
1 Participants were classified as introverted or extroverted based on their responses to a short form of 
the Myers-Briggs Type indicator and Wiggins personality tests. Participants with the most consistent 
and extreme scores on both scales participated in the study. Unless otherwise mentioned, levels of 
introversion and extroversion were measured in this way for all studies reviewed in this chapter. 
2 Participants were classified as dominant or submissive according to their responses to a subscale 
(masculinity) of the Bem Sex Role Inventory. The masculinity subscale of the Bem Sex Role Inventory 
has been shown to correlate very highly with other measures of interpersonal dominance (Wiggins and 
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In contrast with the aforementioned studies, Isbister and colleagues (Isbister & 
Nass, 2000; Nass, Isbister, & Lee, 2000) found evidence of attraction based on 
complementarity (rather than similarity). Participants completed the desert survival 
problem using pencil and paper and then exchanged information regarding their 
rankings with an on-screen computer character. The onscreen character was presented 
as a still image with a text bubble containing its comments. The extroversion or 
introversion of the character was manipulated verbally (by changing the phrasing of 
the text it presented) and non-verbally (in terms of the postures it displayed). Contrary 
to previous research, extroverted participants showed a preference for the introverted 
character, and introverted participants preferred the extroverted character (participants 
rated the complementary computer character as more likeable and more fun). 
The issue of when attraction due to similarity or complementarity is more 
likely to occur is largely unresolved in the social psychology literature (see Dryer & 
Horowitz, 1997; White & Hatcher, 1984 for further discussion). Hence, it is difficult 
to reconcile the media equation research showing support for attraction based on both 
similarity and complementarity. Viewed holistically, the research is inconclusive 
regarding whether people are more likely to be drawn to similar or complementary 
computer personalities. 
 Although further research is needed to determine the exact conditions under 
which participants will prefer similar and complementary personalities in computers 
and interfaces, it is clear that designers need to be aware that the personality 
characteristics conveyed by computers can interact with user personalities and impact 
upon the user’s affective experience.  
Consistency Attraction 
Consistency attraction is the tendency for people to prefer others who behave in a 
consistent manner to those who behave in an inconsistent manner. Fiske and Taylor 
(1991) theorise that this is due to the fact that people who are consistent require less 
cognition and are more predictable during interactions with others. On the basis of 
this theory, Nass and colleagues (Moon & Nass, 1996a; Nass, Isbister, & Lee, 2000; 
                                                                                                                                       
Broughton 1985 cited in Nass, Moon, Fogg, Reeves, & Dryer, 1995). Unless otherwise mentioned, 
levels of submissiveness and dominance were measured in this way for all studies reviewed in this 
chapter. 
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Reeves & Nass, 1996) predicted that users would show a preference for computer 
characters and interfaces which showed a consistent personality. 
In the first study (Nass & Lee, 2000, 2001), users displayed a preference for 
websites in which the levels of extroversion and introversion suggested by the text 
description of items were consistent with the levels of extroversion and introversion 
suggested by the synthesised voices used for the verbal descriptions (the study 
incorporated the web-site methodology described above). In addition to the preference 
effects, participants were more persuaded by messages in which the personality 
imbued in the text was consistent with the personality of the voices. In the second 
study, (Moon & Nass, 1996a; Nass, Isbister, & Lee, 2000) participants interacted with 
a character displaying introversion and extroversion both verbally and non-verbally 
while completing the desert survival problem (the study employed the desert-survival 
task methodology, described above). Preference was shown for characters whose 
verbal (phrasing of text) and non-verbal (posture) characteristics were consistent. 
Participant’s behaviour was also more influenced by consistent characters than 
inconsistent characters, such that participants who interacted with a consistent 
character tended to change their rankings of items in the desert survival problem more 
than participants who interacted with an inconsistent character. 
The main finding of the above studies is that consistency in terms of 
personality across text, voice and posture increases user preference for interfaces and 
characters, and leads to greater user persuasion. When the goal is to maximise the 
likeability or persuasive power of an interface, designers should be careful that all 
personality cues employed convey a consistent message. In particular, designers 
employing speech and voice should be careful that the paralinguistic personality cues 
match those embedded in the text. Similarly, designers using agents need to inform 
the design of their animation with knowledge of body language so that what an agent 
is saying is consistent with the messages they are sending non-verbally. 
Gain/Loss Theory 
The gain/loss theory of interpersonal attractiveness suggests that individuals will be 
more attracted to others who initially dislike them and then come to like them, than to 
others who consistently like them (Aronson & Linder, 1965; Sigall & Aronson, 1967). 
Extending this to the idea of personality change, Moon and Nass (1996a; , 1996b) 
theorised that people will be more attracted to individuals who change from dissimilar 
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personality behaviour to similar personality behaviour over time. Moon and Nass 
tested this theory using personality change exhibited by computers. Participants were 
required to complete the desert survival problem for 10 items. They then interacted 
with a computer, exchanging information and confidence ratings for each item. 
Subsequently, participants completed the desert survival problem for a different 10 
items and interacted with the same computer, again exchanging information and 
confidence ratings for each item. Finally participants were given an opportunity to 
make a final ranking of both sets of items and were required to complete a 
questionnaire assessing the computer and the interaction. The dominance and 
submissiveness displayed by computers was manipulated across the first and second 
interaction session so that for some participants, the computer became similar to 
themselves (e.g., for a dominant participant, the computer was submissive during the 
first interaction and dominant during the second interaction). For other participants it 
became dissimilar (e.g., for a dominant participant, the computer was dominant 
during the first interaction and submissive during the second interaction). For the 
remaining participants, the computer remained consistently similar or dissimilar. 
Consistent with the hypothesis, participants interacting with computers that became 
more similar to themselves over time rated the computer as more attractive and the 
interaction as more satisfying than participants in other conditions (i.e., participants 
who interacted with a consistently similar computer, consistently dissimilar computer, 
or a computer that became dissimilar to themselves over time). 
The major design implication of the current study stems from the fact that 
users prefer a computer that adapts to their personality to one that is consistently 
similar to their personality. Hence, there may not be a strong need for designers to 
have knowledge of the personality of their target audience members ahead of time. 
Rather, if markers of personality can be obtained from users while they are interacting 
with a computer, and the computer can adapt to become more similar to the user over 
time, then maximal positive affect towards the computer can be elicited. 
Social Facilitation 
Triplett (1898, cited in R. Smith, 1993) observed that people cycled faster when paced 
by a car than when alone, and faster when in a competition with others than when 
paced by a car. Triplett hypothesised that the presence of others has an energising 
effect on performance. Allport (1920, cited in Vaughan & Hogg, 1995) termed this 
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phenomenon social facilitation, and showed that it extended to the mere presence of 
others. Zajonc and Sales (1966) expanded the theory to include the concept of drive, 
suggesting that the arousal associated with the presence of others has an energising 
effect on the dominant response such that performance will improve when the 
dominant response is the correct one and deteriorate when the dominant response is 
the incorrect one. While there is some debate about which specific conditions are 
required to elicit social facilitation responses, it is generally agreed that social 
facilitation effects will result when a social actor is present and indicates an intention 
to monitor another’s work. 
Rickenberg and Reeves (2000) supposed that the research regarding social 
facilitation could be applied in human-computer interactions. Specifically, they 
hypothesised that when attempting a difficult task on a computer, users will perform 
more poorly when a computer agent is monitoring them, than when the computer 
agent ignores their actions or is absent (a decrease in performance was hypothesised 
because for a difficult task the dominant response is likely to be poor performance). 
Rickenberg and Reeves also tested the applicability of research regarding people’s 
locus of control. Research (see Rickenberg & Reeves, 2000 for a review) has shown 
that people with an external locus of control (i.e., those who believe they have little 
control over what happens to them) have a greater tendency to be influenced by social 
stimuli in their environment, and to modify their behaviour according to the responses 
and evaluations of others, than people with an internal locus of control (i.e., those who 
believe they have a large amount of personal control over what happens to them). 
Thus, Rickenberg and Reeves further hypothesised that the negative impact of a 
monitoring agent on performance would be far more pronounced for participants with 
an external locus of control than for participants with an internal locus of control. 
Participants were required to complete difficult web-based tasks under one of 
three conditions: in the presence of an agent who appeared to closely monitor them 
(i.e., looking at them, looking at the work they were doing, taking pictures and writing 
notes); in the presence of an agent who was idle (i.e., the character mainly read a 
book, did not look at them and ignored their actions); and in the absence of any agent. 
As predicted, participants were more anxious in the presence of a monitoring agent 
than when in the presence of an idle agent or when no agent was present. This effect 
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was most pronounced for participants with an external locus of control3. Moreover, 
participants who performed the task in the presence of a monitoring agent performed 
worse than participants in either the idle agent or no agent condition. Interestingly, 
participants in the monitoring agent condition indicated greater trust of the web site 
content than participants in either the idle agent or no agent conditions. 
The study implies that when implementing an animated character, designers 
need to consider carefully what the character does and how it presents itself. The 
study suggests that the presence of animated characters can increase arousal, but it 
should be noted that this effect is not necessarily bad. Increased arousal in certain 
situations can be useful (e.g., in a learning environment, increased arousal could 
prevent boredom). However, designers need to be aware that when users are 
attempting difficult tasks, a character that appears to watch what the user is doing can 
cause the user to perform poorly and feel anxious. 
2.1.2 Social Rules and Norms 
Reciprocity 
In the context of the social norm that ‘we should treat others the way they treat us’, 
there is a great deal of research showing that if people receive a favour from others 
they feel obligated to reciprocate (Vaughan & Hogg, 1995). Often when people in 
need get help they feel indebted to those who helped them, and will actually return the 
favour in some form or another. The evidence suggests that this reciprocation norm is 
very powerful and applicable across all human cultures (Cialdini, 1993).  
Nass and colleagues have conducted a series of studies (Fogg & Nass, 1997a; 
Nass & Moon, 2000; Takeuchi, Katagiri, Nass, & Fogg, 1998, 2000) aimed at 
exploring whether people will feel indebted to a computer that provides a benefit, and 
subsequently reciprocate to that computer. The methodology for these experiments 
incorporated two tasks; in the first task the computer provided help to the participant 
and in the second task the participant was given an opportunity to help either the same 
computer (which helped them previously) or another computer. For the first task, 
Fogg and Nass (1997a) used an ostensible web searching activity in which the 
computer either provided useful information (‘high help condition’) or mediocre 
information (‘low help condition’). Takeuchi, Katagiri and colleagues (Takeuchi, 
                                                
3 Locus of control was measured using Rotters (1966) Locus of Control Scale.  
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Katagiri, Nass, & Fogg, 1998, 2000) used the desert survival problem for the first task 
and had the computer provide useful information for selecting items (‘high help 
condition’) or irrelevant information (‘low help condition’). In both studies, the 
second task (where the participant has the opportunity to help the computer) was a 
colour perception task in which the user helped the computer by ordering colour 
palettes according to their perceived brightness. The more palettes they chose to 
order, the more help they were considered to be giving to the computer. In both 
studies, strong support was found for the idea that people will act according to the 
norm of reciprocity when interacting with computers. Under conditions of high help, 
when given the opportunity to reciprocate to the same computer which helped them, 
participants completed more palette orderings (Fogg & Nass, 1997a; Takeuchi, 
Katagiri, Nass, & Fogg, 1998, 2000), devoted more time to the palette ordering task 
(Fogg & Nass, 1997a), perceived themselves as devoting greater effort to the task 
(Takeuchi, Katagiri, Nass, & Fogg, 1998, 2000), made fewer mistakes while 
completing the task (Fogg & Nass, 1997a), and experienced more positive affect 
while completing the task (Fogg & Nass, 1997a; Takeuchi, Katagiri, Nass, & Fogg, 
1998, 2000) than participants exposed to the low help condition or participants given 
the opportunity to reciprocate to a different computer to the one that helped them. 
Cultural Dimension of Reciprocity 
The studies mentioned above were all conducted using American samples. Nakane 
(1970, cited in Takeuchi, Katagiri, Nass, & Fogg, 2000) has shown that in a 
collectivist culture (such as Japanese culture) people usually associate with others on 
a group-oriented basis and their behaviour is influenced by considerations of one’s 
affiliating groups. In contrast, people in an individualist culture (such as American 
culture) associate with each other on a more individual-oriented basis with group 
considerations playing a less significant role (Triandis, 1990, cited in Takeuchi, 
Katagiri, Nass, & Fogg, 2000). Takeuchi and colleagues (Takeuchi, Katagiri, Nass, & 
Fogg, 1998, 2000) theorised that Japanese participants would behave in a different 
manner to American participants under conditions designed to facilitate reciprocity. 
To test this theory, they repeated the study described above (with the desert survival 
problem as the first task and the colour perception task as the second task) using a 
Japanese sample. Under conditions of high help, when given the opportunity to 
reciprocate to the same computer that helped them, Japanese participants experienced 
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increased positive affect. However, contrary to the findings for American participants, 
Japanese participants performed more reciprocal acts under conditions of high help, 
irrespective of whether they were responding to the same computer which helped 
them or responding to a different computer.  
Based on these findings and the literature around collectivist and 
individualistic cultures, Takeuchi and colleagues (Takeuchi, Katagiri, Nass, & Fogg, 
1998, 2000) theorised that Japanese participants had conceptually grouped the 
computers involved in the study, and responded reciprocally to the group rather than 
to individual computers4. To test this theory, they altered the methodology used 
previously to include the notion of computer groups (operationalised by using 
Macintoshes and PCs). Thus, participants had the chance to reciprocate to the same 
computer which helped them (obviously a member of the same group), a different 
computer to the one which helped them, but that was a member of the same group 
(Mac or PC), or a different computer to the one which helped them, but that was a 
member of a different group. Supporting the hypothesis that Japanese participants 
exhibit reciprocal behaviour which is directly influenced by the collectivist nature of 
their culture, participants performed significantly more reciprocal acts (rating of 
colour palettes) when the second computer was from the same group as the first 
computer (irrespective of whether it was the same machine which helped them) than 
they did when the computer was from a different group. 
Reciprocal Self-Disclosure 
The norm of reciprocity has been shown to extend to acts of self-disclosure (Dindia, 
Fitzpatrick, & Kenny, 1997; Joinson, 2001; see also Moon, 2000 for a review). 
Although people are generally reluctant to disclose personal information to people 
with whom they are not close, they will engage in intimate self-disclosure with 
another (irrespective of closeness) if they receive prior self-disclosures from that 
person. Moon (2000) conducted a study exploring whether people would engage in 
reciprocal self-disclosure with a computer. 
Participants in the study were interviewed by a computer on a variety of topics 
under one of three conditions. In the no-reciprocity condition, the computer asked the 
participant questions in a straight-forward manner (e.g., “What has been your biggest 
                                                
4 In the aforementioned studies, the computers were located in the same room and were sitting next to 
each other. The only difference between the computers was the colour of the desktop background. 
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disappointment in life?”). In the reciprocity condition, the computer first provided 
some self-disclosing information about itself (e.g., “This computer has been 
configured to run at speeds up to 266mhz. But 90% of computer users don’t use 
applications that require these speeds. So this computer rarely gets used to its full 
potential. What has been your biggest disappointment in life?”)5. To control for the 
fact that the reciprocity condition involved much lengthier communication from the 
computer than the no-reciprocity condition, the control condition involved 
communication from the computer of the same length as the reciprocity condition, but 
without any ‘disclosures’ (e.g., “You are now ready for the next question in this 
interview …. etc.”). Providing support for the idea that participants will engage in 
reciprocal self-disclosure when interacting with computers, the responses of 
participants in the reciprocity condition were higher in intimacy (measured in terms of 
depth and breadth) than responses in either the no-reciprocity or control conditions. 
In general, these reciprocity findings suggest that for software aimed at 
encouraging behaviour change in users (e.g., programs for fighting addictions, 
weight-loss software, safety tutorials) the norm of reciprocity may be very helpful. 
Similarly, programs with the goal of eliciting disclosures from the user (e.g., 
therapeutic programs, tax packages) may well be more successful if they engage in 
self-disclosure themselves. There is also evidence to suggest that users who conform 
to the norm of reciprocity while interacting with computers are likely to experience 
increased positive affect. The findings regarding the cultural aspect of the norm of 
reciprocity highlight the need for awareness of inter-cultural differences in norms and 
social rules in interface design. 
Praise and Criticism 
Nass and colleagues (Nass & Steuer, 1993; Nass, Steuer, Henriksen, & Dryer, 1994; 
Nass, Steuer, Tauber, & Reeder, 1993) reviewed the literature on attributions 
regarding the self and others and chose a variety of social rules which human beings 
apply regarding praise and criticism: ‘praise from others is more valid than praise 
from self’, ‘praise of others is friendlier than praise of self’, ‘criticism of others is less 
friendly than criticism of self’, and ‘a person who criticises others is smarter than a 
person who praises others’ (see Nass, Steuer, Henriksen, & Dryer, 1994 for more 
                                                
5 The computer never made comments that implied it had emotions, feelings, attitudes or motivations, 
nor did it ever refer to itself as “I”.  
 21 
detail). Nass and colleagues were interested in exploring whether users would apply 
these social rules regarding praise and criticism when interacting with computers.  
Participants were informed that they would prepare for a test with the 
assistance of a computerised tutoring session. Initially participants were involved in a 
tutoring session in which they were presented with facts on various topics. After 
reading each fact, participants indicated how much they knew about the fact. 
Ostensibly, how much the participant knew about the fact determined how many more 
facts they would be presented with, on that particular topic. In reality, all participants 
were presented with the same facts. Following the tutoring session, the computer 
administered a multiple-choice test on the topics that had been tutored. When the test 
was completed participants were instructed to wait for an evaluation of the tutoring 
session. The evaluation was provided by the computer (this methodology has been 
employed by a variety of media equation researchers and will hereafter be referred to 
as the ‘tutor/tester/evaluator’ methodology). In the ‘praise’ condition the computer 
largely described its own performance favourably; in the ‘criticism’ condition the 
computer largely described its own performance negatively (e.g., “This computer 
failed to provide useful facts for answering this question. Therefore, this computer 
performed poorly”). Finally, participants completed an evaluation (on paper) of the 
tutoring, testing and evaluation sessions. Participants in the ‘praise’ condition (where 
the computer largely praised itself) thought the computer performed better than 
participants in the ‘criticism’ condition (where the computer largely criticised itself). 
Furthermore, participants in the ‘praise’ condition thought the test was fairer and 
more difficult than participants in the ‘criticism’ condition.  
To test the generalisability of the specific social rules regarding praise and 
criticism listed above, Nass and colleagues conducted a second study in which 
participants did not necessarily hear praise or criticism from the same computer which 
tutored them. Specifically, they were exposed to either a computer that evaluated its 
own performance positively, a computer that evaluated another computer’s 
performance positively, a computer that evaluated its own performance negatively, or 
a computer that evaluated another computer’s performance negatively. The findings 
of the first study were replicated and the social rules regarding praise and criticism 
were found to apply. That is, computers that praised other computers were considered 
to have been friendlier and to have offered more valid evaluation than computers that 
praised themselves. Computers that criticised their own performance were considered 
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friendlier than computers that criticised the performance of another computer, and 
computers that criticised were judged to be more intelligent than computers that 
praised. 
These findings imply that self-praise can be very useful when designing 
interfaces or agents – a computer that praises itself is likely to be judged more 
positively than one that does not. Moreover, when considering situations where one 
part of the computer can make an attribution about another, it is worth considering the 
social rules regarding praise and criticism. For example, if a help system is made to 
seem separate from the program to which it refers, and the help system praises the 
program while offering assistance, the end result may be that the program is seen to 
be more effective (as a function of the social rule that praise from others is more valid 
than praise from self). 
Flattery 
Research on flattery (see Fogg & Nass, 1997b, for a review) reveals four common 
findings: targets of flattery tend to believe that flatterers speak the truth, flattery 
creates positive affect in the target (even when targets judge the content to be 
inaccurate), targets like those who flatter them, and targets judge the performance of 
those who flatter them more favourably. To test whether the effects of flattery 
between humans apply to human-computer interactions, Fogg and Nass (1997b) 
conducted a study in which participants were flattered by a computer. 
Participants were told they would be working with the computer to play a 
guessing game. As part of the game, the computer asked the participant to help refine 
the game’s algorithm by suggesting a question that the computer could use in order to 
perform more effectively in the future. After the participant suggested a question, the 
computer provided feedback to the participant according to one of three conditions. 
Participants in the ‘sincere praise’ and the ‘flattery’ condition received positive 
feedback; however, participants in the ‘sincere praise’ condition were told the 
feedback from the computer was the result of a comparison with the work of hundreds 
of previous players of the game, whereas participants in the ‘flattery’ condition were 
told that the computer’s feedback was random and thus, unrelated to the quality of 
input they provided. The third condition was a ‘generic feedback’ condition in which 
participants were simply exposed to a message that directed them to begin the next 
round. 
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Supporting the idea that humans respond similarly to flattery from computers 
as they do to flattery from other humans, significant differences were found between 
responses from participants in the ‘flattery’ and ‘generic feedback’ conditions and 
between responses from participants in the ‘sincere praise’ and ‘generic feedback’ 
conditions. Moreover, no significant differences were found between responses from 
participants in the ‘flattery’ condition and responses from participants in the ‘sincere 
praise’ condition. Participants in the ‘flattery’ and ‘sincere praise’ condition reported 
greater positive affect, reported more feelings of power, perceived their own 
performance to have been better, enjoyed the interaction more, were more willing to 
continue working, and evaluated the computer’s performance more highly than 
participants in the ‘generic feedback’ condition. In other words, participants 
responded in the same manner to positive feedback from the computer, regardless of 
the accuracy of the feedback. 
In terms of software design implications, it seems likely that computers 
(software interfaces or agents) that praise users regularly, irrespective of whether the 
praise is warranted, are likely to be far better received. Praise may be of particular 
value in educational software because the potentially resulting increased enjoyment, 
perseverance and feelings of self-worth are likely to contribute to the learning 
experience. These findings, regarding positive feedback, are particularly relevant 
given that almost all messages currently generated by computers are negative (i.e., 
error messages).  
Politeness 
People have been found to obey politeness norms when responding to questions from 
others. Specifically, it has been shown that when asked for an evaluation, people will 
respond more positively if the person being evaluated asks the question than if a third 
party makes the inquiry (Finkel, Guterbock, & Borg, 1991). For example, a politician 
seeking feedback about their own performance will receive far more positive 
responses from people if they, themselves, ask people about their own performance 
than if a third party asks the same people about the politician’s performance. 
Moreover, people feel more constrained in their responses when a person asks for an 
evaluation directly than when they are asked by a third party. As a result, responses to 
a third party tend to be more varied than responses made directly to the person who is 
being evaluated (Kiesler & Sproull, 1986). 
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Using the ‘tutor/tester/evaluator’ methodology (described above) Nass, Moon 
and Carney (1999) explored whether people would apply politeness norms when 
interacting with computers. When evaluating the ‘tutor’ computer, participants 
completed the evaluation either on the ‘tutor’ computer, on a different computer, or 
on a paper questionnaire. As expected, participants who evaluated the ‘tutor’ 
computer’s performance on the ‘tutor’ computer gave more positive responses of a 
less varied range than participants who performed the evaluation on a different 
computer or on paper. 
 Focussing on another aspect of politeness, Parasuraman and Miller (2004) 
were interested in exploring whether the degree of ‘interruptiveness’ and ‘impatience’ 
displayed in an interface would impact on the user’s attitudes towards the interface. 
Humans who show a lack of patience, and humans who tend to interrupt, are generally 
perceived less positively than those who are more polite. Parasuraman and Miller 
wished to test whether similar behaviours on the part of computers would also lead to 
negative reactions. Moreover, they sought to explore how such impoliteness 
interacted with more objective indications of reliability (would politeness compensate 
for poor reliability, and would impoliteness decrease the benefits of good reliability?) 
Participants in the study interacted with a flight simulator and were required to 
perform two tasks. During the performance of the tasks, the flight simulator advised 
participants of other issues occurring during the simulation in either a polite (patient 
and non-interrupting) or impolite (impatient and interrupting) manner. The flight 
simulator was also made to appear reliable (providing more correct advice) or 
unreliable (providing less correct advice). Parasuraman and Miller found that, 
irrespective of the reliability of the simulator, participants performed more effectively 
when interacting with the polite simulator than the impolite simulator. Thus politeness 
was found to compensate for poor reliability. Moreover, participants displayed greater 
trust of the simulator and its advice when it was polite. 
In a similar vein, Wang, Johnson, Rizzo, Shaw and Mayer (2005) drew on 
Brown and Levinson’s (1987) politeness theory as a means of understanding how 
human tutors teach effectively. Drawing on observations concerning the manner in 
which effective tutors communicate with students, Wang and colleagues designed a 
polite virtual tutor. Participants in the study interacted with either ‘polite’ or ‘direct’ 
versions of the virtual tutor. Students who worked with the polite tutor experienced 
greater self-efficacy than students who worked with the direct tutor. Moreover, 
 25 
students working with the polite tutor correctly solved 10% more difficult problems 
than students working with the direct tutor. Thus, Wang and colleagues were able to 
show that polite behaviour shown to be effective in human-human teaching was also 
effective when a computer performed the tutoring.  
Peoples’ tendency to apply politeness norms to computers has implications for 
software design. Computers that behave politely have been shown to improve users’ 
affective states, their degree of trust in the interface and their performance. Although 
further research is needed to confirm the possibility, it also seems likely that when 
computers behave in an impolite manner, people are likely to be offended. In general, 
interfaces should be designed to interact with users with maximal politeness. It is 
difficult to conceive of any disadvantages that arise from polite communication, and 
the benefits are likely to be extensive. The studies highlight, in particular, the benefits 
in terms of learning environments, but it seems reasonable to assume that advantages 
could also be realised in simpler ways, such as error messages phrased in a polite 
rather than an abrupt manner. The findings also highlight issues surrounding the use 
of computer-based surveys, for example, help programs that seek feedback regarding 
their own performance, and websites with feedback questionnaires regarding site 
usability. Such surveys are likely to result in falsely positive feedback. Respondents 
are likely to perceive the evaluation tool as part of the evaluation target, and hence, 
respond politely. Finally, it is worth noting that polite behaviour has been shown to 
compensate for low reliability. In situations where designers of software are unable to 
avoid a certain degree of unreliability, ensuring that the software exhibits politeness is 
likely to alleviate the problems associated with low reliability. 
Apologetic Feedback 
Akgun, Cagiltay and Tzeng (2005) noted that apologetic statements in human-human 
interaction are important in terms of reducing frustration and maintaining the 
relationship between two people. Based on the positive effects of apologetic 
statements among humans, these researchers sought to explore the effect of apologetic 
statements from computers in human-computer interaction. To this end, participants 
in a lab-based study were asked to play 10 rounds of a word guessing game. In each 
round participants were given clues by the computer and allowed up to 10 
opportunities to guess the correct word. Participants were given feedback each time 
they guessed correctly, each time they guessed incorrectly and at the end of each 
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round if they were unsuccessful. A round ended after participants made 10 incorrect 
guesses. The study had two conditions, apologetic and non-apologetic feedback. In 
both conditions, participants were given the same feedback for correct guesses. For 
incorrect guesses, participants in the apologetic feedback condition received an 
apology from the computer, were told their answer was incorrect and were asked to 
try again; whereas participants in the non-apologetic feedback condition were simply 
told their answer was incorrect and asked to try again. Similarly, at the end of a round, 
participants in the apologetic feedback condition received an apology from the 
computer regarding the fact that the clues provided were not very helpful and were 
asked to play another round; whereas participants in the non-apologetic feedback 
condition were simply asked to play another round of the game. Questionnaire 
measures at the conclusion of the word game revealed that participants in the 
apologetic feedback condition felt more respected and comfortable, and felt that the 
computer was more sensitive to their feelings than participants in the non-apologetic 
feedback condition. Thus, Akgun and colleagues were able to show that the effects of 
an apology from a computer are congruent with the effects of an apology from 
another human. 
The design implications that stem from research on apologetic feedback are 
most obvious in situations where unexpected, unplanned or unwanted events occur on 
the computer. It seems likely that error messages that concede fault on the part of the 
computer and go so far as to apologise for the fault are likely to engender positive 
affect in the user than the standard error messages that simply report a failure in the 
system. Beyond this, a broader interpretation of what constitutes an error opens 
further opportunities for improving the user experience. For example, help systems 
that fail to provide the user with useful help would most likely be perceived more 
positively if they acknowledged and apologised for their failure to provide assistance. 
Assignment of Roles 
Petty and colleagues (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981) found that people tend to 
assume that others labelled as ‘experts’ or ‘specialists’ produce output of a higher 
quality. Nass, Reeves and Leshner (1996) sought to test whether the same attributions 
would be made by people when they interacted with media, specifically televisions. 
To test this theory they conducted a study in which participants interacted with either 
two specialist televisions (one labelled ‘news TV’ and the other labelled 
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‘entertainment TV’) or one generalist TV (labelled ‘news/entertainment TV’). 
Participants either watched news footage on the ‘news TV’ and entertainment footage 
on the ‘entertainment TV’, or watched both news footage and entertainment footage 
on the ‘news/entertainment TV’. As expected, although all participants viewed 
exactly the same footage, participants in the specialist condition rated the news as 
more important, informative, disturbing and interesting, and the entertainment as 
funnier and more relaxing, than participants in the generalist condition. Moreover, 
participants in the specialist condition liked the clips more, and rated them as being 
higher quality than participants in the generalist condition. Thus, when televisions 
were assigned specialist roles, people made the same attributions to the media that 
they would normally apply to humans who had been assigned specialist roles. 
Future research is needed to test if the findings regarding specialisation and 
assignment of roles replicate when computers are labelled as specialists. It seems 
likely that similar findings would result as computers are similar in many ways to 
televisions and, as the research reviewed in this chapter shows, many other social 
attributions are made to computers. Such findings would highlight the value of 
specialisation of computers, software, interfaces and agents. For example, the 
tendency for some software programs to be designed to achieve multiple tasks may 
lead to the programs being perceived as less effective than programs, which focus on 
a particular task. Similarly, different agents associated with different tasks may be 
perceived as more useful than one agent that interacts with the user across tasks 
throughout the interface, particularly if the specific agents dedicated to different tasks 
are labelled as experts in those tasks. 
2.1.3 Identity 
Social Identity Theory 
 Social identity theory posits that people strive to maintain and enhance their self-
esteem, which is seen to comprise two components: a personal identity deriving from 
a person’s traits and personal relationships, and a social identity which is that part of 
the self-concept that is derived from group memberships (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). 
When a social identity becomes salient, self-definition, self-perceptions, attitudes and 
behaviours become homogeneous and in-line with the ingroup norms and 
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stereotypes6. Specifically, research has shown that people perceive themselves to be 
more similar to other ingroup members, are more likely to act cooperatively with 
other ingroup members, feel a stronger need to agree with group opinion and perceive 
ingroup messages to be of higher quality (see Nass, Fogg, & Moon, 1995 for a 
review). Moreover, judgments concerning outgroup members become homogeneous 
and reflective of stereotypes about the outgroup, and behavioural strategies that 
produce intergroup comparisons in favour of the ingroup, and therefore the self tend 
to emerge (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995; Vaughan & Hogg, 
1995).  
Research has shown that social identity can be manipulated using very 
minimal cues. One robust finding is that merely categorising people can cause them to 
identify with this minimal category which leads to competitive intergroup behaviour 
(Vaughan & Hogg, 1995). Similarly, Mackie (1986) showed that a sense of group 
interdependence (the knowledge that the group’s performance as a whole is important 
for the individual), can lead to participants behaving in line with their social identity.  
Nass, Fogg and Moon (1995; , 1996) conducted a series of studies exploring 
whether, and under what conditions, people would affiliate with a computer in a team 
relationship, and to what outcomes such affiliations would lead. In the first study, 
participants were placed in either a ‘team’ or ‘individual’ condition, and required to 
complete the desert survival problem. In the ‘team’ condition, participants were told 
they were part of the ‘blue team’ and that they would interact with a teammate called 
the ‘blue computer’ (identity manipulation). In addition participants in the ‘team’ 
condition were told that they would be evaluated as a team with the computer 
(interdependence manipulation). In the ‘individual’ condition, participants were told 
that they would be interacting with the computer but that they would be working as an 
individual – a blue individual working with a green computer (identity manipulation). 
In addition, participants in the ‘individual’ condition were told that they would be 
evaluated on the basis of their individual work alone (interdependence manipulation). 
The study found that people who work in teams with computers display the same 
sorts of attitudes and behaviours as people working in teams with other humans. 
Specifically, compared with participants in the ‘individual’ condition, participants in 
the ‘team’ condition perceived themselves as more similar to the computer, perceived 
                                                
6 An ingroup can be defined as any group a person perceives themselves to belong to and an outgroup 
can be considered to be any group a person does not perceive themselves to belong to. 
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themselves as more cooperative, perceived themselves as more open to influence, 
thought the computer’s information was of higher quality, found the computer’s 
information to be friendlier and were more likely to conform to the computer’s 
suggestions. 
The first study showed that people will affiliate with groups, but as the 
identity and interdependence manipulations were not applied orthogonally, it was not 
possible to tell whether both are required for the affiliation effects. Nass and 
colleagues (1995; , 1996) conducted a second study using the same methodology, but 
with identity and interdependence manipulated independently. The results suggested 
that interdependence, but not identity, is important for creating a sense of affiliation 
between humans and computers. Irrespective of the manipulation of identity (i.e., 
whether or not participants were told they were on the same team as the computer) 
participants who were made to feel interdependent (i.e., participants who were told 
that they would receive the same evaluation as the computer they interacted with) 
perceived themselves to be more in a team relationship with the computer, perceived 
themselves as more similar to the computer, perceived themselves as more 
cooperative, perceived themselves as more open to influence from the computer, felt 
the information from the computer was of a higher quality, felt the information was 
more friendly and changed their rankings more than participants who were not made 
to feel interdependent. 
These first two studies focused on the use of minimal cues to create a sense of 
social identity; more recently, research has focused on the impact of existing groups 
on social identity effects. Lee and Nass (1998) explored the effects of social identity 
based on the ethnicity of computer agents. A sample of Korean participants was 
exposed to a computer agent that was ostensibly either Korean (ingroup) or Caucasian 
(outgroup). Participants were presented with a series of choice-dilemma situations 
that they were required to read to the agent7. The agent gave their decision and the 
reasons for the decision. Subsequently, the participant completed a paper 
questionnaire regarding their perceptions of the agent’s decision, the quality of the 
agent’s arguments and their own decision regarding each of the choice dilemma 
situations. The results confirmed that the apparent ethnicity of a computer agent 
would affect the attitudes and behaviours of a user in line with the predictions of 
                                                
7 Choice-dilemma situations are hypothetical situations in which an individual has to choose between 
two courses of action, one of which has the potential for both greater benefit and greater harm. 
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social identity theory. That is, participants who interacted with an ingroup agent, 
compared with participants who interacted with an outgroup agent, thought the agent 
matched their own opinions more often, perceived the agent to be more socially 
attractive, perceived the agent to be more trustworthy, and agreed with the decisions 
of the agent more often. 
The finding that people will affiliate with computers in a team relationship 
suggests a means by which users can be made to feel far more positive about their 
interactions with computers. In many ways, users are dependent upon computers in 
task-oriented situations. Simply making this existing interdependence more obvious 
to users may lead to users making social identity based attributions which will result 
in increased positive affect towards computers. The findings with respect to ethnicity 
once again highlight the importance of cultural considerations when building agents 
and interfaces. Any agent with characteristics of a particular ethnicity will likely lead 
to increased productivity and positive affect for users of the same ethnicity, but may 
have a negative impact for users of other ethnic backgrounds. 
Gender Stereotypes 
Gender stereotypes have been shown to be far reaching and well entrenched across a 
variety of cultures (Vaughan & Hogg, 1995). One well established component of 
gender stereotyping is the belief that men possess more instrumental attributes and 
fewer expressive attributes than women (Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, & 
Rosenkrantz, 1972). Nass, Moon and Green (1997) conducted a study to assess 
whether machines embedded with minimal gender cues would generate gender-based 
stereotypic responses related to the aforementioned belief. They tested for the 
application of three specific gender stereotypes: ‘evaluation from males is more valid 
than evaluation from females’, ‘males in dominant roles are assertive and 
independent, females in dominant roles are pushy and bossy’, and ‘women know 
more about subjects typically regarded as feminine, and men know more about 
subjects typically regarded as masculine’. 
The study employed the ‘tutor/tester/evaluator’ methodology described in 
section 2.1.2. The gender of the voice used by both the tutoring computer and the 
evaluating computer was varied across conditions. Both male and female participants 
applied all three gender stereotypes to the computers. Male-voiced evaluator 
computers were rated as more friendly and competent than female-voiced evaluator 
 31 
computers (confirming the first two stereotypes). Male-voiced tutor computers were 
perceived as more informative about computers compared with female-voiced tutor 
computers, whereas female-voiced tutor computers were perceived as more 
informative about love and relationships compared with male-voiced tutor computers 
(confirming the third stereotype). Thus, Nass, Moon and Green (1997) were able to 
provide initial evidence of the application of gender stereotypes to computers. 
Noting that Nass, Moon and Green (1997) employed recordings of human 
voices for their operationalisation of computer gender, Lee, Nass and Brave (2000) 
sought to conduct a more conservative test of gender stereotyping of computers by 
using synthesised computer voices. Lee and colleagues reasoned that computer 
generated speech should be a consistent reminder to participants that they were 
dealing with a computer. Moreover, any potential confusion resulting from the 
computer speaking with a human voice (in terms of participants potentially orienting 
to the human who provided the recording used on the computer) would be removed. 
Participants were asked to work on hypothetical social choice-dilemma situations with 
the computer. The computer presented the choice-dilemma on the screen and then 
presented an argument (using computer generated synthesised speech) for one of two 
possible actions. Participants then indicated which of the two possible actions they 
recommended. In line with gender and social influence research among humans (see 
Eagly, 1983, for a review), Lee and colleagues found that participants accepted the 
male-voiced computer’s suggestions more than those of the female-voiced computer. 
Moreover, participants assigned more ‘masculine’ attributes (assertion, ambition, 
dominance and independence) to the male voice than the female voice, even though 
both voices presented identical content. 
Lee (2003) sought to extend the research conducted by Nass, Moon and Green 
(1997) and Lee, Nass and Brave (2000) by assessing whether gender stereotypical 
reactions to computers would occur in response to modalities less inherently social 
than voice. Lee operationalised computer gender using animated characters and aimed 
to explore whether gender stereotyping would occur in the absence of voice and also 
whether gender stereotyping would extend beyond attitudes and into behaviour. Based 
on human-human research showing that people conform more to the opinions of 
males regarding stereotypically male tasks, and more to the opinions of females 
regarding stereotypically female tasks, Lee conducted a study in which participants 
completed a trivia quiz with the aid of an animated agent. Participants answered quiz 
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questions and were then exposed to the animated agent’s suggested answer and given 
the opportunity to change their original answer (having been told that the computer 
would not necessarily be correct). Participants worked with either a male or female 
animated agent and were quizzed on either a stereotypically male (sports) or a 
stereotypically female (fashion) topic. In line with the equivalent research conducted 
among humans, Lee found that participants conformed (in terms of changing their 
response to match the computer’s suggested answer) more to the male agent when the 
topic was sports, and more to the female agent when the topic was fashion. In 
addition, male participants were less likely than women to conform to the computer’s 
suggestion when the topic was sports and women were less likely than men to 
conform to the computer’s suggestion when the topic was fashion. Thus, Lee was able 
to show that people’s application of gender stereotypes to computers could be cued by 
the physical appearance of animated agents, and extended beyond attitude and into 
decision-making behaviour. 
The findings have obvious implications for interfaces that incorporate voice or 
agents. It is very difficult to create a voice or an agent that is gender neutral, and thus 
when such tools are included in an interface, they are likely to elicit gender 
stereotypes from users. Designers need to be aware of the stereotypes surrounding 
gender and the potential interactions between the tasks conducted with the software 
and the gender of the voice or agent employed; for example, software designed to 
teach users about computer hardware would most likely be perceived differently, 
depending on any indications of gender included.  
Self-Serving Bias 
Research has shown that people tend to attribute their successes to internal factors and 
take credit for them personally, and attribute their failures to external factors and 
disown them (often blaming others) – that is, people exhibit a self-serving bias 
(Fletcher & Ward, 1998). Both similarity and a feeling of control can mitigate the 
tendency to engage in a self-serving bias (see Moon & Nass, 1998 for a review of the 
research). Specifically, people who perceive each other to be similar will give each 
other more credit for successful outcomes and share the responsibility for failure to a 
greater extent, and people will assume more responsibility for outcomes when they 
feel they are in control. 
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Moon and Nass (1998) conducted a study assessing whether people would use 
a self-serving bias when interacting with computers, and whether the extent to which 
they used the self-serving bias would be affected by how similar they felt to the 
computer and how much they felt in control. Participants (classified as either 
dominant or submissive) interacted with dominant or submissive computers (giving 
the similarity manipulation) and completed the desert survival problem using the 
methodology detailed in Nass et al. (1995, described in section 2.1.1). Participants 
completed the desert survival problem then discussed each item and its ranking with 
the computer. The participants’ sense of control was manipulated by instructing them 
that, based on the results of a coin toss, either the participants’ or the computers’ final 
ranking for the desert survival problem would be submitted and evaluated. During an 
evaluation session, a second computer gave a highly positive or a highly negative 
evaluation (of either the participants’ or the computers’ final ranking). The results 
were in line with the predictions drawn from the literature. When the outcome was 
negative, participants who worked with a similar computer were less likely to blame 
the computer and more likely to blame themselves compared with participants who 
worked with a dissimilar computer. When the outcome was positive, participants 
working with a similar computer were more likely to credit the computer and less 
likely to credit themselves than participants working with a dissimilar computer. 
Participants who were given more control of the outcome (i.e., their own final 
rankings were evaluated) tended to make more internal attributions, regardless of 
whether the outcome was positive or negative. 
The results of the study suggest different means by which users can be 
encouraged to take greater responsibility for outcomes when working with computers. 
Specifically, making computers more similar to their users will lead to less blaming of 
the computer for negative outcomes and more sharing with the computer 
responsibility for positive outcomes. Similarity between computers and users could be 
created for example, through the incorporation of language (on the part of computers) 
that matches the personality of the user (e.g., in terms of extroversion/introversion). 
Giving users a great sense of control will similarly lead to less blaming of the 
computer for negative outcomes but will lead to less sharing with the computer 
responsibility for positive outcomes. Thus, when the goal is for the user to feel good 
about something they achieved on their own, then a strong sense of user control may 
be of value, whereas when the goal is for the user to feel good about achieving 
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something together with the computer a sense of similarity with the computer is likely 
to be helpful. 
2.1.4 Communication 
Emotion Theory and Active Listening 
Although levels of usability have improved, computer interactions still very often 
leave users feeling frustrated. Klein, Moon and Picard (Klein, Moon, & Picard, 1999) 
were interested in exploring whether computers could be designed to alleviate the 
frustration they had caused. People experiencing frustration engage in emotion 
regulation as a means of mediating the intensity of the feeling (R. Smith, 1993). One 
method of emotion regulation used by people is ‘venting’; that is, expressing the 
feelings one is experiencing. Another means by which frustration can be reduced is by 
communicating with someone who exercises ‘active listening’. ‘Active listening’ 
involves the provision of sincere non-judgemental feedback to the emotionally upset 
person, particularly regarding the emotions being experienced (Klein, Moon, & 
Picard, 1999).  
To test the effectiveness of such techniques when a computer employs them, 
Klein, Moon and Picard conducted a study in which two levels of frustration were 
implemented. Participants in the ‘delay’ condition experienced significant seemingly 
random delays while playing the game, while participants in the ‘no delay’ condition 
experienced no such delays. After playing the game, participants were required to 
complete a questionnaire that incorporated one of three different emotion regulation 
conditions. In the ‘ignore’ condition, participants were asked no questions about their 
emotions and weren’t given any means of reporting problems with the game. In the 
‘vent’ condition, participants were able to give open-ended responses describing 
delay-related problems they noticed as well as the associated emotional state they 
experienced. In the ‘affect support’ condition, the computer engaged in active 
listening and expressed both sympathy and empathy. In this manner, Klein and 
colleagues were able to simulate forms of emotion regulation normally experienced in 
human interaction. Finally, participants completed a paper questionnaire regarding 
their feelings during the whole experience. Behavioural, but not self-report measures8, 
                                                
8 The authors suggest that the lack of support from self-report data is in line with the findings of other 
emotion theorists who argue against the reliability of self-report data. 
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suggested that the ‘affect support’ condition led to a reduction in negative feelings for 
users. Specifically, users who worked with a computer that engaged in active listening 
played the game for significantly longer than users who were either given the 
opportunity to vent, or whose emotions were ignored. 
The above findings present a strong argument for considering user’s potential 
emotional states during the design process, as users whose emotions were 
acknowledged showed far more continued interest in the software than users whose 
emotions were ignored. Where the goal is for the user to feel positive about the 
interaction, there may be great value in simply enquiring about the user’s emotional 
state and responding to it. Moreover, the results suggest that the implementation of 
such a system need not be complicated or expensive. Similarly, when designers are 
aware that a product will not perform perfectly, there is likely to be great value in 
providing a feedback mechanism to users that allows them to vent. For example, after 
a program crashes, current operating systems generally offer users the opportunity to 
submit a report containing technical details about the error. There is likely to be value 
in supplementing such technical reports with an opportunity for users to express their 
displeasure regarding the incident. 
Balance Theory 
Nakanishi, Nakazawa, Ishida, Takanashi and Isbister (2003) sought to explore rules of 
human-human communication that could be applied in a human-computer setting as a 
means of improving user experience. Balance Theory suggests that people prefer to 
have harmoniously aligned attitudes towards a third party or object (Heider, 1958). 
For example, if two people both dislike a third party they are more likely to feel in 
balance with one another. Another rule of communication is that, in conversation, a 
person’s degree of power within a particular group can be gauged by assessing how 
much they ‘hold the floor’ during conversations. A person who maintains a higher 
degree of control over an interaction will tend to have more influence (Ng, 2001). 
Nakanishi and colleagues were interested in exploring whether the principles of 
Balance Theory and the influence associated with controlling an interaction would 
remain applicable during human interactions with an embodied conversational agent. 
To test this theory, Nakanishi and colleagues employed an agent that interacted with 
two people who were meeting for the first time in a virtual environment. The results 
confirmed the applicability of the two human-human based theories to human-
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computer interaction. Participants favoured agents that agreed with them in terms of 
opinions about the other person, and the effectiveness of the agent was found to be 
maximised when it more actively mediated the conversation between the two 
participants. 
These findings highlight the value of an agent that agrees with the user. People 
are likely to respond more positively to an agent that confirms their opinions. This 
would be a remarkably simple addition to make to the design of agents in computing 
environments. Moreover, an agent that controls an interaction is likely to have greater 
influence upon users. It seems likely that agents that are more assertive in terms of 
managing conversational space and turn taking will be more persuasive. In virtual 
environments including multiple human users, an agent is likely to be perceived more 
positively if it actively engages with the individual users, rather than waiting for users 
to initiate contact.  
Social Dialogue – Smalltalk 
Based on a theory of interpersonal relationships developed by Svennevig (1999), 
Bickmore and Cassell (2001) noted that human-human relationships often develop 
through the reciprocal exchange of information, beginning with relatively non-
intimate topics and gradually progressing to more personal and private topics. 
Specifically, the development of new relationships often occurs through the use of 
‘smalltalk’ - defined as any talk in which interpersonal goals are emphasised and task 
goals are either non-existent or de-emphasised. To test whether the benefits of 
smalltalk in human-computer interaction mirrored those known to be present in 
human-human interaction, Bickmore and Cassell developed a real-time, multimodal, 
life-sized embodied conversational agent. The agent, named REA, guided participants 
through a simulated home purchase interview, with REA playing the part of a real-
estate agent and participants taking the role of someone seeking to purchase property. 
Participants were exposed either to a version of REA that employed smalltalk 
(smalltalk condition) or to a version that used only task-oriented dialogue (task 
condition) during the interaction. Participants’ reactions to REA varied greatly as a 
function of their personalities. In general, introverts reacted more positively to REA in 
the task condition, and extroverts reacted more positively to REA in the smalltalk 
condition. This pattern of results extended to feelings of trust, how well participants 
perceived REA to know them, enjoyment of the interaction, satisfaction with the 
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interaction, the perception of the interaction as being natural and perceptions of 
REA’s credibility. Svennevig’s theory does not discuss the relative utility of smalltalk 
across personality types in human-human interactions; however, it seems feasible that 
the pattern of results found in Bickmore and Cassell’s research (whereby extroverts 
prefer smalltalk and introverts prefer its absence) would be similar to that found in 
human-human interaction. 
These results have broad implications for any situation in which there is 
sustained interaction between the system (or an agent) and a user. Particularly in 
situations where it is important that the user trust the agent or system, the use of small 
talk to help develop the human-computer relationship may be of great use. Even for 
short-term relationships, such as one-off online purchases, there is likely to be value 
in designing systems that are able to put the user at greater ease, through smalltalk. It 
is important to note, however, that whether smalltalk will have a positive or negative 
impact is dependent on the personality type of the user and thus, designers would 
need to be able to employ such techniques based on an understanding of the user’s 
personality. 
Anecdotal Evidence: Party Host Behaviour 
Isbister and colleagues (Isbister, Nakanishi, Ishida, & Nass, 2000) noted that virtual 
meeting spaces generally provide very little social context (e.g., cultural backgrounds, 
group memberships and other aspects of social identity) to users. In many ways, this 
situation is similar to the real-life experience of attending a party at which one knows 
few others. In such situations, the host of the party often tries to find a safe common 
topic for their guests, particularly when they notice that conversation is lagging. 
Isbister and colleagues were interested in designing an assistant for human-human 
interaction in a virtual meeting space that mimicked this behaviour. Specifically, the 
agent was designed to pick up on silence in a conversation, provide help in the form 
of a new conversation topic, and then fade into the background allowing the 
conversation to move forward. 
The utility of the agent was tested in a situation with very little social context; 
a 3-D virtual meeting space in which Japanese participants were meeting American 
participants for the first time. Three interaction conditions were implemented; ‘one-
on-one’ in which no agent was present, ‘safe agent’ and ‘unsafe agent’. The ‘safe 
agent’ condition involved the agent suggesting topics of conversation that were 
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inherently safe and comfortable for both cultures (e.g., movies, music, the weather), 
whereas in the ‘unsafe agent’ condition, the agent suggested more potentially 
awkward and difficult topics (e.g., money, politics, religion). Compared with a 
situation in which no agent was present, American participants found the agent that 
presented safe topics to be of value; their opinion of their own behaviour was higher, 
their opinion of their conversation partner was higher, and their opinion of the typical 
Japanese person was higher. In contrast, Japanese participants had a generally lower 
opinion of the experience with the ‘safe agent’; they rated their own behaviour less 
favourably, their opinion of their conversation partner was mixed, and their opinion of 
the typical American person was lower than when no agent was present9. 
Additionally, a comparison of the safe and unsafe agent revealed that awkward topics 
don’t necessarily provoke negative outcomes. Although there were more pauses in the 
presence of the unsafe agent (compared with the safe agent), both groups of 
participants found the conversation stimulated by the ‘unsafe agent’ more interesting. 
In line with many of the studies reviewed earlier, these findings highlight the 
need for cultural awareness when designing interfaces and agents. An effective agent 
would most likely need to be designed with a specific cultural group in mind or with 
the ability to adapt to the cultural group with which it is interacting.  However, with 
these cultural specificities in mind, the results show that a social interface agent can 
be used to facilitate successful communication. Moreover, in certain situations, an 
agent that promotes discussion of more provocative topics could be of value. 
2.1.5 Other Media Equation Research 
Humour 
Research has shown that non-offensive humour can be of benefit in the workplace 
(see Morkes, Kernal, & Nass, 1998 for a review). However, to date, very little work-
oriented software contains attempts at humour (perhaps because it is considered likely 
to detract from task-efficiency). Morkes, Kernal and Nass (1998) conducted a study 
assessing whether humour within a task-oriented computer environment would have 
the same benefits as in the workplace. Participants completed an initial ranking of 
items for the desert survival problem. They then exchanged rankings and comments 
                                                
9 The authors speculate that the differing reactions to the safe agent across culture is possibly a function 
of the fact that the agent spoke English. As a result, Japanese participants may have felt that the agent 
was aligned with the American participant. 
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about the items with a computer. During the interaction, participants in the humour 
condition received five comments containing humour from the computer, while 
participants in the control condition did not receive any humourous comments. All 
participants then made a final ranking of the items and completed a paper 
questionnaire. Compared with participants in the control group, participants exposed 
to humour from the computer liked the computer more, smiled and laughed more, 
made significantly more jokes to the computer and behaved in a more sociable 
manner towards the computer. There were no differences across conditions for task 
time, perceived task time or effort. 
These findings show that humour can contribute positively to user affect when 
interacting with an interface. Moreover, it seems that humour can be used in a way 
that does not detract from task focus or efficiency. The findings are also relevant to 
the design of agents; suggesting that agents that use humour are likely to result in 
increased sociability and liking from users. 
The Effect of Distance 
In interpersonal interaction, people exhibit geographical biases on a regular basis. 
Generally, people favour those that share their geographical location (M. Johnson, 
1989; Latane, 1981; Nahemow & Lawton, 1975; Segal, 1974). Moon (1998) 
conducted a series of studies exploring how distance affects users’ attitudes and 
behaviour during an interaction with a computer. In the first study, three distance 
manipulations were used. Participants in the ‘non-networked’ condition were told that 
the questions they were being asked originated from the computer in front of them, 
participants in the ‘near’ condition were told the questions were originating from a 
networked computer located in a city several miles away, and participants in the ‘far’ 
condition were told the questions were originating from a networked computer 
located in a city several thousand miles away. Participants completed the Balanced 
Inventory of Social Responding, which gives two subscales; impression management 
and self-deceptive enhancement. The impression management subscale measures the 
tendency to over-report desirable behaviours and under-report undesirable ones, 
providing a measure of deliberate response distortion or dishonesty. The self-
deceptive enhancement subscale measures overconfidence in one’s judgments and 
rationality. Increased distance was found to have a negative effect on honest 
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responding – as the perceived distance to the surveying computer increased, the 
amount of dishonesty in responses increased.  
In the second study, two distance manipulations were used. Participants in the 
‘near’ condition were told they were interacting with a networked computer located 
several miles away, and participants in the ‘far’ condition were told they were 
interacting with a networked computer several thousand miles away. Participants 
completed the desert survival problem on paper, then interacted with the computer 
(either near or far) and discussed their own and the computer’s ranking of the items. 
Subsequently, participants made a final ranking of the items and completed a 
questionnaire. Participants in the ‘near’ condition changed their rankings to be similar 
to those made by the computer significantly more than participants in the ‘far’ 
condition. Moreover, participants in the ‘near’ condition rated the information the 
computer gave as being of a higher quality than participants in the ‘far’ condition. 
The findings regarding response distortion have implications for situations in 
which data is collected over the internet (e.g., job applications, research surveys). If 
users know the computer with which they are interacting is a long distance away, the 
data collected may be less reliable. Furthermore, where the goal is to persuade users, 
for example in advertising, knowledge that the message is originating from a great 
distance may result in users being less convinced. However, given that users often 
don’t know the location of the computer they are communicating with, it may be that 
designers should focus on creating the perception of close proximity, through factors 
such as local references and local domain names. 
Affinity through Agreement 
Byrne and colleagues (Byrne & Griffitt, 1969; Byrne, Griffitt, Hudgins, & Reeves, 
1969) conducted research showing that people tend to favour the opinions of others 
who have made the same decision as they have. Takeuchi and Katagiri (1999b) 
explored the possibility that this tendency would extend to human interactions with 
computers. Participants were required to interact with three distinct agents in a 
problem-solving task. One agent acted as a ‘presider’ while the other two agents 
outlined a problem. In the first phase of the study, the ‘presider’ agent asked the 
participant for their opinion on a problem. Then one agent (the ‘agreeable’ agent) 
expressed agreement with the participant. This process was repeated four times. In the 
second phase of the study, both the previously ‘agreeable’ agent and the other agent 
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(the ‘neutral’ agent) expressed an opinion regarding a problem, and the participant 
was given the opportunity to support either opinion. This process was repeated five 
times. Participants completed both phases of the study three times and were then 
asked to complete a questionnaire. Participants in the study showed a preference for 
the ‘agreeable’ agent in terms of supporting the ‘agreeable’ agent’s opinion more 
often than the neutral agent’s opinion in the second phase of the study10. 
The findings highlight the value of an agent that agrees with a user’s 
decisions. When the goal is for the user to benefit from useful suggestions from the 
computer (e.g., suggestions for a solution to a problem the user faces, tips for using a 
program more efficiently, or advice on healthy behaviour, such as dieting and 
exercise), an agent that has previously agreed with the user is likely to result in greater 
uptake of the computer’s suggestions.  
2.1.6 General Design Implications 
Each of the studies discussed have specific design implications; however, overall, the 
studies show that people often treat computers (and other media) in a social manner.  
It seems that people’s reactions towards media are often constrained by social and 
natural rules, and also, that people react towards media as though they expect the 
media to obey social and natural rules. These social and natural rules are well 
described in the social science literature. Thus, designers are in a position to use the 
existing literature to gain insights into the existing social rules and, in turn, use 
knowledge of these social rules to inform their design.  
Many designers and developers have taken advantage of knowledge of the 
media equation to improve their products. These applications of the media equation 
include leveraging the general principle that people will apply the same social rules to 
computers as they do to humans, and also incorporating specific media equation 
findings. For example, media equation research has been applied to the design of 
electronic sales assistants (Arafa & Mamdani, 2000), healthcare software (Bickmore 
& Picard, 2004), recommender systems (Carenini, Smith, & Poole, 2003; Zimmerman 
& Kurapati, 2002), virtual real-estate sales agents (Cassell & Bickmore, 2003), 
general software design principles (Cooper, 1999), voice enabled web systems 
                                                
10 Takeuchi and Katagiri conducted a second study in which the ‘agreeable’ agent was replaced with a 
‘disagreeable’ agent (that is, the agent challenged the participant’s opinions in the first phase of the 
study). No preference was found for the neutral agent over the disagreeable agent. 
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(Duggan & Deegan, 2003), guidelines for the use of technology in courts (Feigenson 
& Dunn, 2003), socially interactive robots (Fong, Nourbakhsh, & Dautenhahn, 2003), 
graphical interface design (Karsvall, 2002), answering machines (Lakshmipathy, 
Schmandt, & Marmasse, 2003), agents for air traffic control systems (Miller, 2004), 
educational technology (Mishra & Hershey, 2004; J. Smith, 2003), sales messages 
(Moon, 2002), agents in ambient intelligent environments (Nijholt, 2003; Nijholt, 
Rist, & Tuijnenbreijer, 2004), web-based agents (Prendinger & Ishizuka, 2001, 2003) 
and affectively aware computers (Riseberg, Klein, Fernandez, & Picard, 1998). 
2.2 Source Orientation 
The findings from a variety of media equation studies suggest that people are 
implicitly or unconsciously applying a notion of self or individuality to the computer. 
This leads to the question: Do users apply notions of self to individual boxes, 
individual windows, distinct voices or some combination of these factors? Two 
studies have specifically addressed these issues. The notion of self is inherent in the 
studies regarding politeness (described in section 2.1.2) in which participants show a 
tendency to conform to politeness norms when interacting with computers (Nass, 
Moon, & Carney, 1999; Takeuchi & Katagiri, 1999a). Participants have been shown 
to give more positive and less varied responses when a particular computer asks about 
its own performance than when a second computer asks about the first computer’s 
performance.  
Takeuchi and Katagiri (1999a) employed the ‘tutor/tester/evaluator’ 
methodology described above (see section 2.1.2) in which participants are tutored on 
a set of facts, tested, then asked to evaluate the tutoring session. The conditions were 
varied such that participants in condition A were tutored, tested and evaluated in the 
same window (on the same computer), participants in condition B performed their 
evaluation in a new window (different to the tutoring and testing window) on the 
same computer, participants in condition C performed the evaluation on a different 
computer (to the computer on which they performed tutoring and testing), and 
participants in condition D performed the evaluation on paper and the tutoring and 
testing on a computer. In the evaluation session, participants were asked about their 
feelings regarding the interaction itself (how useful, informative, meaningful and 
helpful it was) and also their feelings towards the computer (how grateful and capable 
they felt as a result of the interaction).  
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Thus, assuming that participants would comply with the norms of politeness, 
Takeuchi and Katagiri were able to test whether people would assign a notion of self 
to the computer (the tangible hardware unit) or to windows on the computer. If norms 
of politeness led participants to be more positive about the tutoring session any time 
the evaluation took place in a different window (i.e., conditions B, and C) compared 
with the same window (i.e., condition A) then support would be found for the idea 
that participants were applying a notion of self to individual windows. If, however, 
participants were more positive about the tutoring session when the evaluation took 
place on a different computer (i.e., condition C) than when the evaluation took place 
on the same computer (whether in the same or a different window, i.e., conditions A 
and B) then the results would suggest that participants were applying a notion of self 
to the visible and tangible hardware units; that is, the computers themselves. The 
results, in terms of feelings about the interaction, indicated that people attribute the 
individuality of a computer not to individual windows but to the computer itself11. 
Participants indicated that the computer had been more useful, informative, 
meaningful and helpful when the evaluation took place on the same computer that had 
tutored them compared with when the evaluation took place on a different computer. 
Participants were not significantly more positive about the interaction when 
evaluation took place in a different window to tutoring, suggesting that participants 
did not attribute a notion of self to individual windows. 
 Just as the notion of self is integral to the norms of politeness, it is also 
essential to the social rules surrounding praise and criticism. Studies on praise and 
criticism have shown that people will apply to computers the following social rules; 
performance evaluations from others are more accurate than performance evaluations 
of self, praise from others is friendlier than praise from self, and criticism of self is 
friendlier than criticism of others (Nass & Steuer, 1993; Nass, Steuer, Henriksen, & 
Dryer, 1994; Nass, Steuer, & Tauber, 1994; Nass, Steuer, Tauber, & Reeder, 1993, 
see section 2.1.2 for a review). Nass and Steuer (1993) used these findings and the 
‘tutor/tester/evaluator’ methodology to assess whether people applied a notion of self 
to the computer itself, or to distinct voices on the computer. All participants were 
tutored on one particular computer and tested on another particular computer. The 
evaluation phase involved a computer (rather than the participant, as in the 
                                                
11 No significant differences were found in terms of feelings about the companion. 
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aforementioned Takeuchi and Katagiri study) providing an evaluation of the tutoring 
session. Three two-level conditions were implemented during the evaluation phase; 
participants heard an evaluation in either the same voice as was used in the tutoring 
session or a different voice (‘same voice’ / ‘different voice’), participants heard an 
evaluation from either the same computer as was used in the tutoring session or a 
different computer (‘same computer’ / ‘different computer’), and participants heard 
either praise or criticism of the tutoring session (‘praise’ / ‘criticism’). The levels of 
each condition were varied orthogonally. 
In terms of the first social rule, ‘performance evaluations from others are more 
accurate than performance evaluations from self’, ‘different voice’ participants 
(compared with ‘same voice’ participants) perceived the evaluation session to be 
more accurate and perceived the tutor’s actual performance to be more similar to the 
evaluation given. With respect to the second social rule, praise from others is 
friendlier than praise of self, participants who heard a positive evaluation of the 
tutoring session from the same voice that gave the tutoring session perceived the 
evaluation to be less friendly than participants who heard a positive evaluation of the 
tutoring session in a different voice. In terms of the third social rule, criticism of self 
is friendlier than criticism of others, participants who heard a negative evaluation of 
the tutoring session from the same voice that gave the tutoring session perceived the 
evaluation to be more friendly than participants who heard a negative evaluation of 
the tutoring session from a different voice. No differences were found for any of the 
social rules between participants tutored and evaluated on the same computer and 
participants tutored and evaluated on different computers. Thus, in contrast to 
Takeuchi and Katagiri’s (1999a) findings, Nass and Steuer’s (1993) findings from the 
present study suggest that people attribute a notion of self to distinct voices as 
opposed to the computer itself. 
The two aforementioned studies appear to contradict one another; the first 
suggests that users attribute notions of self not to distinct windows but to the units of 
hardware themselves (Takeuchi & Katagiri, 1999a), and the second suggests that 
users attribute notions of self not to the units of hardware, but to differing voices 
(Nass & Steuer, 1993; Nass, Steuer, Tauber, & Reeder, 1993). One possibility is that 
people use a kind of hierarchy for attributing notions of individuality or self, such 
that, different computers indicate distinct ‘selves’ more than different windows, but 
different voices indicate distinct ‘selves’ more than different computers. A study 
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incorporating all three manipulations simultaneously (i.e., computers, windows and 
voices) is required to test this theory. Another possibility is that the differing findings 
result from the differences in the studies themselves. The first study examined the 
impact of the politeness norms and the second examined social rules regarding praise 
and criticism. It is possible that the differing attributions of self are a function of the 
theoretical domains within which they are tested. Finally, it is possible the differing 
results are due to cultural differences regarding the attribution of self, as the first 
study involved a Japanese sample and the second study involved an American 
sample12.  
2.3 Refining the Media Equation 
In its simplest form, the media equation can be stated as ‘media equals real life’; 
however, more broadly, the media equation refers to the idea that people’s 
interactions with televisions, computers and new media are fundamentally social and 
natural (Reeves & Nass, 1996). The research reviewed to this point is based on the 
process whereby social science methodologies are replicated in the context of human-
computer interactions. The findings derived from this process do not provide support 
for the simple form of the media equation; that is, that ‘media equal real life’. Rather 
the findings tend to show that peoples’ attitudes and behaviours when interacting with 
computers follow the same pattern as evidenced in social science findings. People’s 
social responses to computers are often dichotomised in media equation research – 
people are considered to either display a social response to computers or not. It is 
more useful to think of peoples’ social responses to technology in terms of a 
continuum (Morkes, Kernal, & Nass, 1999). In some situations, people are likely to 
show a stronger social response to humans than to computers. Obviously, the basic 
tenet of media equation research, that people respond socially and naturally to 
computers, is not challenged by this idea. Rather, the implication is that additional 
useful information regarding the degree of social responses can be gained when 
studies are conducted exploring exactly how people's social reactions to humans and 
computers may differ.  
Because of differences between the original social science research and the 
majority of media equation studies conducted (in terms of participant population, 
                                                
12 Research has shown that cultural differences occur within the media equation; for example, Takeuchi 
and colleagues’ work on the cultural dimension of reciprocity (see section 2.1.2). 
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experimental situation and manipulations), the nature of any equivalence between 
human-human interactions and human-computer interactions cannot be assessed via 
the previously discussed media equation research. To examine the exact extent of 
similarity between human-human interactions and human-computer interactions, 
studies must be conducted in which the situation, the procedures, and the measures 
are identical for both a group of participants interacting with a computer and a group 
of participants interacting with another person. To ensure consistency across 
conditions, participants in both groups should believe they are interacting with either 
the person or computer via their own computer. That is, participants in the first group 
should believe they are using a computer to communicate with another computer, 
whereas participants in the second group should believe they are using a computer to 
communicate with a person (Morkes, Kernal, & Nass, 1999). Studies employing this 
methodology have been used to assess the degree of similarity in social reactions to 
computers and humans. 
The first study (partially described in section 2.1.3) involved Korean 
participants reading choice-dilemma situations to an ingroup (Korean) or outgroup 
(Caucasian) member who was either a computer agent (Human-Computer Interaction 
or HCI condition) or ostensibly a person communicating via video conference 
software from another room (Computer Mediated Communication or ostensible CMC 
condition) (E. Lee & Nass, 1998). Participants listened to the agent or person’s 
arguments and decision regarding the dilemma and then completed a questionnaire. 
Supporting the idea that people react to computers in a social way, participants 
indicated a number of intergroup attitudes and behaviours towards computer agents 
that were predicted based on the social psychological literature regarding human-
human intergroup interactions. However, although participants generally showed the 
same tendencies toward ingroup or outgroup computer agents (HCI condition) as they 
did toward ingroup or outgroup people (ostensible CMC condition), the degree or 
extent of specific attitudes and behaviours tended to differ. For example, participants 
in both the HCI and the ostensible CMC condition felt that the ingroup interactant 
(agent or partner) matched their own opinions more than the outgroup interactant, but 
participants who believed they were interacting with an ingroup person attributed 
more attitude similarity to the interactant than participants who thought they were 
interacting with an ingroup agent. Similarly, participants in both conditions agreed 
more with the decisions of ingroup interactants than outgroup interactants; however, 
 47 
the participants who thought they were interacting with an ingroup person showed 
less conformity than participants who believed they were interacting with an ingroup 
computer. 
A second study that assessed the degree of similarity in social reactions to 
computer and humans was conducted by Morkes and colleagues (Morkes, Kernal, & 
Nass, 1999) regarding the effects of humour in task-oriented computer applications (a 
description of the study is presented in section 2.1.5). Participants were required to 
complete the desert survival problem and exchange rankings and comments via their 
own computer with either another computer (HCI condition) or (ostensibly) another 
person via computer (ostensible CMC condition). Participants in the humour 
condition were exposed to humourous comments (supposedly from either the 
computer or person with whom they were exchanging rankings) and participants in 
the control condition were not. In line with the findings of the previous study, 
participants showed very similar reactions across the HCI and CMC conditions. 
Participants who believed they were interacting with a computer and participants who 
believed they were interacting with a person rated the interactant as equally 
humourous, likeable, and cooperative and made equal numbers of jokes to the 
interactant. However, participants in the ostensible CMC condition (who believed 
they were interacting with a person), compared to the HCI condition, showed greater 
mirth during the interaction, made more sociable comments and spent more time 
performing the task. 
Shechtman and Horowitz (2003) also conducted a study in which they 
compared people's behaviour when interacting with a computer with people's 
behaviour when (ostensibly) interacting with another human via the computer. Based 
on the principles of Interpersonal Theory (a psychological approach to interpersonal 
dynamics), the study was designed to compare the extent to which people emphasised 
relationship goals (for example, setting and maintaining the tone of the conversation, 
the extent to which the interaction is friendly, polite etc). All participants engaged in a 
text-based discussion with their partner (either the computer program or ostensibly 
another person). Using discourse analysis, the authors found that all participants 
emphasised relationship goals to a certain degree, but when participants believed they 
were interacting with another person they showed significantly more behaviour 
associated with emphasising relationship goals than when they believed they were 
interacting with the computer. This finding is consistent with the refined version of 
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the media equation (that people respond socially and naturally towards computers). 
However, alternative explanations for Shechtman and Horowitz's findings arise as a 
function of the experimental procedure they employed.  
Firstly, all participants were tested in pairs. Co-participants were minimally 
introduced, seated back to back to fill out consent forms, were read aloud the 
instructions, then worked in the same room to formulate initial rankings and then were 
read aloud their final instructions. At that point, participants were taken to separate 
rooms. Thus, participants in the human-partner condition had a degree of familiarity 
with their interaction partner (having met them and spent time in the same room 
undertaking the same task); whereas, participants in the computer-partner condition 
had no contact with their interaction partner at all until beginning the discussion phase 
of the study. It is plausible that this difference in degree of familiarity had an impact 
on the extent to which participants engaged in the emphasis of relationship goals in 
conversation, such that participants with a greater degree of familiarity with their 
partner felt more comfortable engaging in relationship goal-related behaviours. 
Secondly, the authors report that in order to keep all characteristics of the 
interaction consistent across conditions, participants experienced a delay between 
sending a piece of communication to their partner and receiving a response back. For 
those participants who believed they were interacting with another person, this 
maintained the illusion that their partner was taking the time to read and respond. 
However, for those participants who believed they were interacting with the 
computer, this delay would have been less likely to make sense. Shechtman and 
Horowitz (2003) describe that participants reported in debriefing that they thought 
this delay was due to technical issues. An awareness of such technical issues could be 
expected to prevent any potential media equation effect that would have occurred. It 
seems highly likely that presenting cues that remind the user that they are interacting 
with a piece of technology (in this case, delays due to technical issues) would result in 
the 'breaking' of the media equation effect13. 
Thirdly, there is a difference in the degree of mediation across the two 
conditions. In the human-partner condition, participants entered their communication 
                                                
13 This alternative explanation for Shechtman and Horowitz’s (2003) findings is based on an 
understanding of the mindlessness explanation for media equation effects. Section 2.7 and Chapter 6 
provides extensive detail on the nature of this explanation. Briefly, if media equation responses result 
from the tendency to mindlessly react to human-like cues presented by the computer, then cues that 
remind participants that they are interacting with a tool/machine could be expected to decrease the 
tendency to react to the computer as though it were a human. 
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into their computer, which transferred the data to another computer, from which their 
partner read the information. In the computer-partner condition participants entered 
their communication directly into the computer and thus, communicated directly with 
their interaction partner. Greater equivalence across conditions would have been 
achieved by having the participants in the computer-partner condition enter their data 
into a computer which would ostensibly communicate with a second computer, in 
another room, which would respond (see Morkes, Kernal, & Nass, 1999 for an 
example of this methodology). It is possible that the greater emphasis of relationship 
goals in the communication of participants in the human-partner conditions was a 
result of trying to establish a connection across a more mediated or complicated 
communication channel. Similarly, the difference may have resulted from the fact that 
participants in the human-partner condition were communicating with an entity that 
was physically further away than participants in the computer-partner condition (a 
human being in another room versus a computer in the same room). This greater 
distance may have caused a desire to more overtly establish a relationship with their 
communication partner. 
The aforementioned studies all show a difference in the degree of a particular 
social reaction depending on whether interaction partners are considered to be human 
or computer. These differences are largely a matter of degree, in that, the same 
general pattern of response is present in both the ostensible CMC and HCI condition, 
but more of the behaviour is exhibited in the ostensible CMC condition. Recently, 
research has been conducted in which participants showed a qualitative behaviour 
difference across conditions (Jettmar & Nass, 2002). That is, the reaction of 
participants in the HCI group, while social was of a different nature to that of 
participants in the ostensible CMC group. 
Jettmar and Nass (2002) found evidence of a qualitative difference between 
participants who believed they were interacting with a computer and participants who 
believed they were interacting with another person while exploring the effects of 
adaptive interfaces. Adaptive interfaces dynamically modify based on knowledge of 
the current states, goals, and environments of the individual user. Participants were 
required to interact with a computerised adaptive testing (CAT) interface. CAT 
interfaces adjust the difficulty level of the content being tested based on user's 
previous performance (correct answers lead to items becoming more complex, while 
incorrect answers lead to the task becoming easier). Participants were led to believe 
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either that they were interacting with a computer (HCI), or a human (CMC), that 
would select the test items. Half of the participants in each condition were told that 
the test items were selected at random (‘random’ condition) and half were told that the 
test items would be selected based on their previous performance (‘adaptive’ 
condition). Based on the social psychology literature on behavioural adaption and 
presence effects, two competing hypotheses were tested. According to social 
facilitation theory, people with high confidence for the task will perform better when 
being monitored (in this case, by the adaptive software) than when they are alone, 
while people with low task confidence will perform less well when being monitored 
than when alone, because of stress brought on by the fear of performing badly in front 
of others. In contrast, the 'choking' hypothesis suggests that users with high task 
confidence will perform less well when being monitored by the adaptive software as a 
result of fear and stress stemming from the fact that performing well will lead to 
harder questions. Low task confidence participants, on the other hand, would perform 
better when being monitored by the adaptive software as a result of the expectation 
that the software will help them (if they answer incorrectly, the software will provide 
less challenging questions). In the CMC condition, the results were consistent with 
the social facilitation explanation, while in the HCI condition the results were in line 
with the 'choking' hypothesis.  
This finding represents the first unambiguous evidence of a clear difference in 
the way people react to computers and to other humans. It is important to note that 
this finding is not counter to media equation theory. Jettmar and Nass were testing 
competing social psychological theories and found that one applied in the HCI 
condition and another in the CMC condition. Participants still responded as though 
the computer was a social actor in the HCI condition (by choking), but the nature of 
their reaction differed to that of participants who believed they were interacting with 
another human being. Future research is necessary to confirm that social responses to 
humans and computers differ within the framework of behavioural adaption and 
presence effects. It would also be interesting to assess whether the difference is a 
function of the perceived expertise of the interaction partner. It is plausible that the 
different social reactions to the human and computer interaction partner occurred as a 
function of the belief that one or the other was better able to select appropriate 
questions in the 'adaptive' condition. To test this possibility, Jettmar and Nass' study 
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would need to be replicated with methodological or statistical control for perceived 
expertise of interaction partner. 
In sum, the simple version of the media equation, that ‘media equals real life’, 
is not supported by the available evidence. The media equation has been refined to the 
idea that people respond socially and naturally to computers and other media. There is 
little evidence to support the idea that people will respond in exactly the same manner 
to a human and a computer in a particular interaction. Empirical findings to date 
suggest that people will respond to computers in a manner qualitatively similar to the 
way in which they respond to other humans, but that a quantitative difference exists 
such that people will often respond more socially to humans than to computers. Thus, 
strictly speaking, the refined version of the media equation is not actually an equation.  
However, it would be confusing and counterproductive to refer to the phenomena by 
another name. The term media equation will be used in the remainder of the thesis to 
refer to the tendency of people to treat computers and other media as though they 
were social actors i.e., people’s tendency to respond to computers socially and 
naturally. 
2.4 Potential Moderators of the Media Equation 
Myriad media equation studies have been conducted, and people have been found to 
treat computers socially in a wide variety of settings. To date, very few studies have 
reported any individual differences among participants in terms of the tendency to 
treat computers as though they are human. Reeves and Nass (1996) suggest that 
people respond to media similarly, regardless of age, gender, culture, education level 
or degree of experience with technology. 
There is some evidence to suggest different responses to technology as a 
function of culture (Takeuchi, Katagiri, Nass, & Fogg, 1998, 2000), and also gender 
(E. Lee, 2003). However, in both cases, the distinctions that arise mirror those that 
would be expected in human-human interactions (i.e., a difference in terms of 
reciprocity norms between individualistic and collectivist cultures, and differing 
levels of conformity by males and females to arguments about stereotypically male or 
stereotypically female topics). Thus, the differences are not disparities in the tendency 
to show a media equation pattern of response, but rather, are differences that exist in 
human-human interaction which are accordingly reflected in human-computer 
interaction. 
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In contrast, some evidence of experience with computers as a moderator of the 
media equation has been found. Takeuchi and Katagiri (1999a), in a study designed to 
assess whether people attribute notions of self to individual computers or individual 
windows, found evidence of experience interacting with their dependant measures. 
Takeuchi and Katagiri used the ‘tutor/tester/evaluator’ methodology (described in 
section 2.1.2) and found evidence of one interaction with experience and one main 
effect of experience. No post-hoc analyses of the interaction are reported. However, 
interpretation of the means suggests that inexperienced users were less positive about 
the tutoring session than experienced users when tutoring and evaluation occurred on 
the same computer, and inexperienced users were more positive about the tutoring 
session than experienced users when tutoring and evaluation occurred on different 
computers. The main effect reported indicated that inexperienced users were more 
positive than experienced users in their ratings of the computer. 
Takeuchi and Katagiri’s findings suggest that there may be some relationship 
between experience and the manner in which people treat computers socially. 
However, the operationalisation of experience used in the study prevents any clear 
conclusion being made regarding the existence of a relationship between experience 
and media equation behaviour. No empirical measure of experience was used in the 
study. Experienced participants were described as having had extensive programming 
experience and having completed at least one course involving computer architecture. 
Inexperienced participants were described as habitual users of computers, but only to 
read email messages or to access the World Wide Web. These descriptions imply that 
two distinct cohorts were involved in the study: one group who had studied in an 
information technology related field and one group who had not undertaken such 
study. Thus, the possibility that the moderating impact of experience found was due to 
some other characteristic that differed between the two cohorts cannot be dismissed.  
Takeuchi and Katagiri are the only researchers to report a moderating impact 
of experience on media equation behaviour. However, the lack of other reported 
evidence of a link between experience and media equation behaviour does not 
necessarily indicate that no such link exists. There is no evidence in the existing 
literature of research exploring whether experience moderates media equation 
behaviour. Where experience is discussed in the existing literature, it is mentioned as 
evidence of media equation behaviour not being limited to novice or inexperienced 
computer users (e.g., Nass, Steuer, & Tauber, 1994). These arguments are not based 
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on quantitative measures of experience but rather on the activities undertaken by 
participants: typically, experience with word processing and email (Fogg & Nass, 
1997b; Morkes, Kernal, & Nass, 1998; Morkes, Kernal, & Nass, 1999; Nass, Fogg, & 
Moon, 1995; Nass, Fogg, & Moon, 1996; Nass, Moon, & Carney, 1999; Nass, Steuer, 
Henriksen, & Dryer, 1994; Rickenberg & Reeves, 2000). To properly address the 
question of the potentially moderating impact of experience on media equation 
behaviour, future research needs to employ direct, empirical measures of experience. 
2.5 Evidence Contrary to the Media Equation 
A fuller comprehension of the media equation effect can be developed by also 
considering research that contradicts the media equation. Research identifying 
situations in which people do not respond socially towards computers provides insight 
regarding the scope and boundaries of the media equation effect. Unfortunately, only 
a small number of studies contradicting the media equation have been published and 
these studies suffer from methodological limitations. 
2.5.1 Small Computers 
Goldstein, Alsio, and Werdenhoff (2002) conducted a study with the goal of further 
exploring the tendency of people to be polite towards computers. Twenty-five users 
undertook a usability evaluation in which they each performed seven tasks with one 
of four PDAs or a smart phone. The researchers were interested in whether a 
politeness effect would result when using small computers. Specifically, they 
hypothesised that when participants evaluated a small computer that was in close 
proximity to them while they were completing the evaluation, they would be more 
polite (and hence, rate the device more positively) than when the small computer was 
absent. This manipulation was operationalised by having 11 users answer a paper and 
pencil evaluation of the computer while the computer was lying in front of them 
(device present) and 14 users complete the same evaluation in a room separated from 
the lab in which the usability tasks were completed (device absent). The paper and 
pencil evaluation consisted of eleven nine-point scales that allowed participants to 
rate the device on different attributes and a two-row table with the headings 'likes' and 
'dislikes', where participants could write their opinions.  
The authors found no significant differences in responses to the questionnaire 
scales between conditions. However, when controlling for participants objective 
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performance (that is how many of the tasks they successfully completed using the 
computer), Goldstein and colleagues found a significant interaction between the 
number of likes and dislikes and whether the computer was present or absent. When 
objective performance was controlled for, the number of likes decreased and the 
number of dislikes increased in the computer present condition; whereas, the number 
of likes increased and dislikes decreased in the computer absent condition. This result 
is contrary to what would be expected if a politeness effect were occurring. Based on 
these results (the lack of effect for the scale measures and the contrary pattern of 
results when controlling for objective performance), Goldstein and colleagues 
concluded that people are not polite to small computers, and thus, that the media 
equation does not extend to small computers.  
Based on a review of media equation theory, Goldstein and colleagues identify 
what they perceive to be shortcomings of the previous research conducted on 
politeness with computers, and thus with the media equation in general. Goldstein and 
colleagues argue that the original politeness experiment suffered from insufficient 
statistical evidence to support the claims being made. They point out that while 
Reeves and Nass report more polite responses (in the hypothesised condition) on 20 
out of the 22 attributes presented in a questionnaire, that this may not imply statistical 
significance. Goldstein and colleagues’ claim is presumably based on an 
interpretation of the section on politeness in Reeves and Nass' book, 'The Media 
Equation' (Reeves & Nass, 1996). Reeves and Nass make the point that their book is 
written in a form that is designed to be understandable and accessible to a range of 
people. Although the comments in Reeves and Nass' book made about the statistics 
performed in support of the politeness study are arguably vague, it is made clear that 
analyses were performed and a statistically significant difference was found. Reeves 
and Nass direct readers interested in more detailed information on their research to 
other, more detailed, publications in which scales are derived and specific statistically 
significant differences are reported. To this end, there is detailed statistical support for 
the politeness effect provided in Nass, Moon and Carney (1999) which reports a series 
of statistically significant differences across two studies.  
Goldstein and colleagues also suggest that rather than exhibiting politeness to 
computers, participants might be responding as a function of the quality of their own 
performance whilst working with the computer. It seems unlikely that in a series of 
studies with participants randomly assigned to conditions, performances would 
 55 
consistently and systematically vary across conditions in a way that would lead to the 
results found. Regardless, Nass, Moon and Carney (1999) directly tested for this 
possibility by ensuring that all participants were given identical feedback regarding 
which questions they got right and which they got wrong and found that the politeness 
effect still arose. 
Based on their own results, Goldstein and colleagues conclude "people are not 
polite towards small computers, quite contrary to the postulations of the media 
equation" (Goldstein, Alsio, & Werdenhoff, 2002, p. 95). This conclusion can be 
taken as two assertions; a) that the results reported by Goldstein and colleagues 
support the conclusion that people are not polite towards small computers, and b) that 
such findings are contrary to the postulations of the media equation. The first 
assertion, that the results reported suggest that people are not polite to small 
computers is greatly weakened by certain characteristics of the study. As Goldstein 
and colleagues acknowledge, they were unable to control for the number of correctly 
solved tasks, and hence, some of the conclusions drawn were based on data from a 
single participant. Moreover, potentially confounding variability was present in the 
study as a result of both the use of several different computers, and a heterogeneous 
user group. Finally, the statistical techniques employed by Goldstein and colleagues 
were arguably not suitable, given certain characteristics of the sample and the data set. 
One analysis reported by Goldstein et al., was a comparison of average evaluative 
ratings as a function of number of correctly solved tasks. In some cases, these 
averages were based on the data of a single participant, making them a meaningless 
measure. The MANCOVA conducted by Goldstein and colleagues is the most 
convincing evidence presented for the conclusion that people are not polite to small 
computers. However, the dependent variable (number of dislikes and likes reported by 
participants) is potentially flawed. Goldstein and colleagues did not control for the 
total number of opinions (likes plus dislikes) produced by each respondent. Thus, a 
respondent who lists 5 dislikes and 5 likes is over-represented in the analysis 
compared with a person who only lists 1 dislike and 4 likes. If any coincidental 
confounding occurred between task performance and overall number of opinions 
given, then the results of the MANCOVA would be completely unrepresentative. 
Aside from the flaw in the dependent variable used, there is evidence to suggest that 
the MANCOVA would be susceptible to violations of certain pre-requisite 
assumptions, as a function of the small sample size (N = 25). Specifically, no checks 
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on homogeneity of variance-covariance, multivariate normality, or outliers are 
reported. The results of a MANCOVA are not trustworthy if any of the 
aforementioned assumptions are violated when testing a small sample. 
The second assertion (that Goldstein and colleagues findings are contrary to 
the postulations of the media equation) is weakened by the fact that the findings 
themselves are questionable. However, even if the pattern of findings reported was 
strong and unambiguous, the conclusion that they run contrary to, and weaken, the 
media equation is not warranted. The first issue is whether Goldstein and colleagues 
were actually testing for a politeness effect. The original media equation research on 
politeness conducted by Nass and colleagues was based on the social psychological 
phenomenon of interviewer-based bias. Interviewer-based bias is essentially the bias 
that results (due to politeness) when Person A is asked by Person B to evaluate Person 
B. Person A is likely to give a more positive response in this situation (in order to 
avoid offending Person B) than if Person A provides their evaluation of Person B to a 
third party. Tests of the media equation require evidence that a particular effect would 
occur in a human-human interaction equivalent to the human-computer interaction 
being studied. Thus, Goldstein and colleagues’ findings can only be considered 
challenging to the media equation if Person A would show a bias when a third party 
asked them to fill out a questionnaire about Person B, while Person B was somewhere 
nearby. The argument made by these researchers is that their manipulation is 
equivalent to the situation in which a third party is standing next to Person's A and B, 
and Person A is asked for their opinion of Person B within earshot of Person B. This 
argument assumes equivalence between being asked in conversation for your opinion 
of a co-located entity, and being asked to fill out a questionnaire about a co-located 
entity. In Goldstein and colleagues’ paper, there is no reference to research on human-
human interactions resulting in a politeness effect when filling out a questionnaire in 
the presence of the target of that questionnaire. Moreover, research by Nass, Moon 
and Carney (1999) on politeness has shown that completing a paper and pencil 
questionnaire in the presence of the target of the questionnaire does not result in a 
politeness effect. Nass and colleagues compared people's responses when completing 
an evaluation on the same computer, a different computer, or on paper in the presence 
of the computer. As hypothesised, Nass and colleagues found that people showed a 
politeness effect when completing the evaluation on the same computer that was 
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being evaluated, but not when the evaluation was performed on a different computer 
or on a paper and pencil questionnaire. 
Irrespective of these issues with the research conducted, there is the question 
of whether a tendency to fail to be polite to small computers represents a challenge to 
media equation theory. As Goldstein and colleagues point out,  
"It is not mandatory that people treat small computers the same way as they do 
large ones. Whereas it is customary for small children to behave politely towards 
other adults, adults are not always polite to small children. Here their behaviour 
may change regarding politeness. Small children could be regarded as rule-
breakers and are constantly taught how to behave correctly by adults, who 
sometimes employ very harsh methods in order to obtain obedience. Could it be 
that adults treat these small devices as small children that they do not necessarily 
have to be polite towards?" (p. 10) 
Goldstein and colleagues conclude that if this line of reasoning is correct, the media 
equation does not apply to small computers. However, the media equation does not 
state that people tend to treat computers as though they are adults; rather, it suggests 
that people tend to treat computers as social actors. No assertions are made about the 
characteristics of said social actors. Indeed media equation research has shown that 
people respond differently to computers that behave like males as opposed to females 
(Nass, Moon, & Green, 1997), extroverts as opposed to introverts (Nass & Lee, 2000, 
2001), and submissive versus dominant personalities (Moon & Nass, 1996a, 1996b; 
Nass, Moon, Fogg, Reeves, & Dryer, 1995). Thus, evidence that people treated 
computers differently as a function of whether the computers behaved as though they 
were adults versus children, and specifically, that people treated computers that 
presented child-like cues as though they were children, would in fact be support for 
the media equation. 
2.5.2 Children as Participants 
Given the lack of media equation research conducted with children, Chiasson and 
Gutwin (2005) sought to directly evaluate whether children would treat computers as 
though they were human. Specifically, Chiasson and Gutwin replicated media 
equation research on flattery (Fogg & Nass, 1997b) and team formation (Nass, Fogg, 
& Moon, 1995; Nass, Fogg, & Moon, 1996) with young, rather than adult, 
participants. To ensure the tasks were not too arduous for children, both studies were 
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scaled back in terms of length and the dependant measures employed. Based on their 
results, Chiasson and Gutwin conclude that the media equation does not apply to 
children. However, close inspection of the methodologies employed and the specific 
findings of the studies, weaken this conclusion considerably. 
Chiasson and Gutwin report that flattery did not have a significant effect on 
children for any of the measures employed. However, marginally significant results in 
the expected direction were found for half the measures employed. Moreover, as the 
researchers acknowledge, the pattern of response displayed by children across all 
measures was as would be expected according to media equation theory. Thus, for the 
flattery study, children showed the expected pattern of results, but the findings did not 
reach statistical significance. One possible explanation for the lack of strength of the 
effect is the use of scaled back measures and methods. It may be that the 
operationalisation of the feedback condition and the measures of attitude were 
weakened as a function of being scaled back. Alternatively, it seems likely that only 
some of the children who participated in the study were aware of the feedback 
manipulation. As Chiasson and Gutwin state  
“…it was clear that children spent less time reading the computer’s feedback 
as the guessing game went on. They were enthusiastic about playing the game, 
and they soon realized that the feedback messages were not essential to 
moving forward. Several participants only glanced at the message and then 
pressed the ‘OK’ button to go to the next question” (Chiasson & Gutwin, 
2005, p. 836).  
The pattern of results shown for the flattery study makes greater sense in light of this 
observation. If only some of the children participating in the study were attending to 
the feedback manipulation, then results that trend in the appropriate direction, but do 
not reach significance, should be expected. 
With regard to the team study, Chiasson and Gutwin report that children 
changed significantly more answers in response to the computer’s suggestions in the 
team condition than in the individual condition. For subjective measures of attitudes, 
children did not show any significant difference across conditions, but as per the 
flattery study, marginally significant results were found for half the measures 
employed. Thus, children showed the expected pattern of results, but the findings only 
sometimes reached statistical significance. This pattern of results could again be a 
function of the scaled back methodologies and measures employed. However, a more 
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obvious explanation stems from the manner in which Chiasson and Gutwin replicated 
the original research. In the original research, Nass and colleagues, (1995; , 1996) 
conducted two studies. In the first study, manipulations of identity and 
interdependence were combined, and an effect of team membership with computers 
was found. In the second study, Nass and colleagues manipulated identity and 
interdependence orthogonally, and found that interdependence, but not identity, led to 
effects of team formation. However, in their own study, Chiasson and Gutwin 
employed only the identity manipulation used in the original research. Thus, a strong 
media equation effect in response to the identity manipulation should not have been 
expected. 
In sum, the question of whether children show media equation behaviour in 
the same manner, or to the same extent, as adults, remains open. Chiasson and 
Gutwin’s research is inconclusive. This ambiguity is unfortunate as the question of 
whether or not children will show a consistent media equation pattern of response has 
relevance in terms of whether the design implications that flow from the media 
equation can be applied in the design of children’s software.  
2.6 Unsupported Explanations for the Media Equation 
The predominant explanation for media equation behaviour is mindlessness 
(discussed in section 2.7). However, a variety of alternative explanations for media 
equation findings have been proposed. The three major arguments put forward centre 
around the operation of demand characteristics, the ‘computer as a proxy’ explanation 
and anthropomorphism. Demand characteristics are the clues that participants pick up 
about the nature of an experiment and how they are supposed to behave (Orne, 1962). 
The ‘computer as a proxy’ explanation refers to the idea that when an individual 
responds socially to a computer they are, in fact, responding to the machine as a 
human artefact. That is, the machine is merely a medium that embodies the responses 
of the producer or programmer (Nass & Moon, 2000). Anthropomorphism describes 
peoples’ mistaken belief that computers are essentially human, thus their behaviour 
when responding socially to computers reflects ignorance, psychological dysfunction, 
or social dysfunction.  
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2.6.1 Demand Characteristics 
Demand characteristics in media equation studies could potentially arise from 
either the experimental situation, the questionnaires used to assess participants’ 
responses or the labelling of computers with titles that suggest humanness. The 
argument for demand characteristics as an explanation for the media equation claims 
that the computers in media equation experiments behave in an unusually social 
manner, which leads participants to believe that they are being implicitly asked to 
pretend they are in a social situation, and to forget that they are interacting with a 
computer (Nass & Moon, 2000). This argument is weakened greatly by the following 
characteristics of the media equation studies conducted:  
- in many of the studies the computer interface was text based, preventing the 
inclusion of any methods of exhibiting overly social behaviour,  
- sophisticated input modalities (e.g., speech recognition) were not employed,  
- the computers never made personal references to themselves (i.e., they did not 
refer to themselves in the first person) nor personal references to the participants 
(e.g., the computers did not refer to participants by name or any other identifying 
characteristic),  
- the computers did not imply that they had emotions or experienced affect,  
- cover stories were always employed such that the ostensible purpose of the 
experiment was distinctly non-social (e.g., decision making tasks), and  
- in most, if not all, media equation studies, the experimenter behaved consistently 
across conditions and interacted with participants only at the beginning and end of 
the experimental session, minimising any conscious or unconscious 
communication of demand characteristics (Nass & Moon, 2000).  
Within measurement instruments, questions concerning the performance of the 
computer, the performance of the participant, and the participants’ affective reaction 
to the interaction cannot be argued to encourage a social response in and of 
themselves. Additionally, in media equation studies, researchers have aimed to create 
measures that did not suggest human traits or characteristics. Moreover, certain 
studies show an effect beyond subjective questionnaire measures, extending to 
objective behavioural measures (see Fogg & Nass, 1997a; Moon, 2000 for examples). 
The strongest argument against demand characteristics as an explanation for the 
media equation is that much of the time, participants were unaware of the social 
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responses they were expected or theorised to provide (e.g., consistency attraction, 
attribution errors, self-serving bias, reciprocal self-disclosure). Moreover, in many of 
the experiments conducted as part of the media equation research, norms regarding 
appropriate behaviour would have countered the media equation effects obtained 
(e.g., gender and ethnic stereotyping, self-serving biases) (Nass & Moon, 2000).  
Although the argument that media equation findings are a result of demand 
characteristics is easily refuted, it does serve to highlight certain key features of well-
designed media equation experiments. Computers in media equation studies should 
never make reference to themselves or identify participants personally, and should not 
imply that they are experiencing affect or are socially able. Experimenters conducting 
media equation studies should always behave consistently, and wherever possible 
they should be unaware of the hypotheses being tested and/or the order in which 
conditions are run. Finally, questionnaires should always be constructed in a manner 
that avoids any suggestion of social or emotional ability or awareness on the part of 
the computer. 
 2.6.2 Computer as Proxy 
Sundar and Nass (2000) conducted two studies aimed at testing the explanation that 
people respond socially to computers because they are treating the computer as a 
proxy, and are actually responding to the computer programmer (or some other 
human involved in the construction or creation of the computer or interface). The 
researchers constructed two theoretical models to explain people’s social responses to 
computers. The first model is the computer as medium (CAM) model in which the 
computer is the medium through which people make attributions about and towards 
the programmer, the second model is the computer as source (CAS) model in which 
individuals respond to the computer as a source in much the same way that they 
respond to other human beings as a source. Thus, support for the CAM model would 
indicate that the ‘computer as proxy’ explanation was correct, while support for the 
CAS model would refute the idea that people exhibiting a media equation response 
were treating the computer as a proxy for the programmer.  
To test which model was more appropriate, Sundar and Nass used the 
‘tutor/tester/evaluator’ methodology described above (see section 2.1.2). In the first 
study, participants were either told that they would be interacting with a computer 
(CAS condition) or that they would be interacting with a programmer via the 
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computer (CAM condition). At the conclusion of the study, participants completed a 
paper questionnaire assessing their interaction with either the computer or the 
programmer. Sundar and Nass theorised that if people were treating computers as a 
proxy then there would be no difference between the two conditions; if, however, 
people treat computers as a distinct source then people would respond differently 
across conditions. Supporting the CAS model of human-computer interaction, 
significant differences were found between conditions for the four dependent 
measures. Participants who were told they were interacting with a computer, 
compared to participants told they were interacting with a programmer, found the 
tutoring session friendlier, perceived the tutor to be more playful, found the tutor to be 
more effective, and felt that the style of teaching and evaluation used was more 
similar to their own. 
Sundar and Nass noted a potential shortcoming of their first study, which was 
that a programmer represents only one possible kind of person to which participants 
could be considered to be orienting via the computer. They point out that participants 
might have been reacting as a function of their perceptions of real-world 
programmers, and that the unnaturalness or novelty of interacting with a programmer 
might have affected participants’ reactions. To address these shortcomings and extend 
the generalisability of the findings, the second study was conducted. The second study 
replicated the first study, but with the CAS condition referring to a ‘tutor’ instead of a 
programmer. Thus, participants in one condition were told they were interacting with 
a computer via the terminal they were using (CAS condition), and participants in the 
other condition were told they were interacting with a (human) tutor via the terminal 
they were using (CAM condition). The second study used the same dependant 
variables with the addition of a measure of affect experienced during the interaction. 
Supporting the CAS model and inconsistent with the CAM model, differences were 
found between conditions for four of the five dependent measures. Participants who 
were told they were interacting with a computer, compared with participants told they 
were interacting with a human tutor, found their interaction partner more friendly, 
playful and effective, and found the interaction to be less exciting. No difference was 
found for the measure of similarity of tutoring style. The results from both studies 
support the CAS model and are inconsistent with the CAM model. Thus, the findings 
strongly challenge the computer as a proxy explanation for media equation findings. 
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Beyond these specific results, the general findings in media equation studies 
also argue against a ‘computer as proxy’ explanation. Firstly, the vast majority of 
participants in media equation studies indicate (both spontaneously and when 
questioned) that they did not have a human, such as a programmer, in mind during the 
interaction. Secondly, participants in the studies involving multiple computers 
indicated that they thought the same person wrote the programs on the different 
computers. Given that participants indicated that they thought the programs were all 
written by the same person, if they were treating the computer as a proxy for the 
programmer then one could expect them to behave in the same way towards each 
computer. However, participants in many media equation studies have shown 
different behaviours and attitudes towards different computers (for examples, see 
Fogg & Nass, 1997a; Nass, Moon, & Carney, 1999; Nass, Moon, & Green, 1997).  
2.6.3 Anthropomorphism 
Media equation researchers (Nass & Moon, 2000; Nass, Moon, Fogg, Reeves, & 
Dryer, 1995; Nass & Steuer, 1993; Nass, Steuer, Henriksen, & Dryer, 1994; Nass, 
Steuer, Tauber, & Reeder, 1993) argue that anthropomorphism is not an explanation 
for media equation responses. Anthropomorphism is an ambiguous term that has 
associated with it a variety of related but distinct definitions (Nass, Steuer, Henriksen, 
& Dryer, 1994). General definitions of anthropomorphism (e.g., “an interpretation of 
what is not human or personal in terms of human or personal characteristics” 
("Merriam Webster Online Dictionary", 2004)) are arguably accurate descriptions of 
the process that occurs when people exhibit a media equation response. However, 
such definitions do not provide an explanation of the process’ cause. What is being 
argued against in the media equation literature is a more complete definition of 
anthropomorphism, which encompasses an explanation for the process; that is, the 
thoughtful sincere belief, resulting from social or psychological deficiency (since the 
object is not human), that the object has human characteristics. Nass and Steuer (Nass, 
Steuer, Henriksen, & Dryer, 1994) point to children who believe that people live 
inside televisions and adults who believe computers have feelings as examples of this 
form of anthropomorphism. This definition of anthropomorphism was the 
predominant explanation for social responses to technology prior to media equation 
research (Nass & Moon, 2000). Nass and colleagues (Nass & Moon, 2000; Nass, 
Steuer, Henriksen, & Dryer, 1994; Nass, Steuer, Tauber, & Reeder, 1993) argue that 
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the pattern of responses exhibited in media equation research can less ambiguously be 
described as being ethopoeic. Ethopoeia involves a direct response to an entity as 
human while knowing that the entity does not warrant human treatment or attribution 
(Nass & Moon, 2000; Nass, Steuer, Henriksen, & Dryer, 1994; Nass, Steuer, Tauber, 
& Reeder, 1993).  
Anthropomorphism (thus defined) as an explanation of media equation 
findings is weakened greatly by a number of characteristics of the media equation 
studies that have been conducted. In particular, the participants in most of the studies 
were experienced computer users with a tertiary level education. It seems highly 
unlikely that a majority of these participants suffered from a social or psychological 
deficiency which led to them believing that computers are actually human. Moreover, 
when debriefed, participants in many media equation studies insisted they would not 
respond socially to a computer and strongly denied that they would ever exhibit the 
behaviours they had actually shown in the studies (Nass, Fogg, & Moon, 1996; Nass 
& Moon, 2000; Nass, Steuer, Henriksen, & Dryer, 1994). Such denials are 
inconsistent with the idea that the participants actually believe that computers are 
essentially human.  
Whether the term anthropomorphism or ethopoeia is used to describe the 
process being discussed is partly a semantic issue. The important distinction to make 
is whether humans are argued to actually believe that the computer is human 
(anthropomorphism) or to respond as though the computer is human while at the same 
time knowing such responses are not appropriate (ethopoeia). It is clear that 
participants in media equation studies do not believe that the computer is actually 
human. Thus, anthropomorphism is not an explanation for media equation behaviour. 
While ethopoeia is a more accurate description of the process (i.e., people treat the 
computer as though it were human but know that such treatment is not warranted), it 
does not explain why the behaviour occurs. That is, ethopoeia is an accurate 
description of media equation behaviour, but it is not an explanation for media 
equation behaviour. 
In discussing the anthropomorphism explanation of media equation findings, 
Nass and Moon (2000) also draw a useful distinction between anthropomorphism and  
‘cherished objects’. The notion of ‘cherished objects’ refers to situations in which 
individuals have become emotionally attached to an object (such as a computer) and 
focus on its ability to engender certain feelings or attitudes, for example, naming 
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one’s car and talking to it. Like anthropomorphism, the idea of people reacting to 
cherished objects does not explain media equation findings. Participants in media 
equation studies had no history with the computers with which they worked, and 
therefore no basis for an emotional attachment.  
2.7 Mindlessness 
There is generally a lack of support for demand characteristics, anthropomorphism 
and computers as a proxy as explanations for media equation findings. The prevailing 
accepted explanation for media equation behaviour is mindlessness. Mindlessness is a 
state of mind characterised by an over-reliance on categories and distinctions drawn in 
the past, and in which the individual is context-dependent, and thus, oblivious to 
novel, or alternative, aspects of the situation (Langer, 1992). The mindlessness 
explanation of the media equation argues that computer users interact with the 
computer in a mindless state, the computer displays certain cues that suggest 
humanness and, as a result of mindless processing, people react to these cues by 
treating the computer as though it were human. The mindlessness explanation differs 
from the anthropomorphism and ‘computer as proxy’ explanations in terms of 
whether people’s behaviour is assumed to be consistent with their beliefs. Inherent in 
both the anthropomorphism and the ‘computer as proxy’ explanations is that 
individuals’ social responses to technology are consistent with their beliefs about the 
technology: the computer is treated like a person because it is either perceived to be or 
perceived to represent a human being. In contrast, the mindlessness explanation 
suggests that peoples’ responses to computers are not necessarily consistent with their 
beliefs, as they react to the computer based on a certain subset of cues that lead to 
responses that may not be the most appropriate. To date, there is no empirical support 
either for or against the mindlessness explanation of media equation behaviour (Fogg, 
2003).  
The remainder of the chapter is devoted to an in-depth theoretical exploration 
of the mindlessness explanation of the media equation. Firstly, a detailed review of 
mindlessness theory and research is undertaken. The cues that suggest humanness on 
the part of computers are then explored. The reasons that such cues might be linked to 
particular scripts and expectations are discussed. And finally, the theoretical validity 
and implications of the mindlessness explanation for media equation behaviour are 
explored.  
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2.7.1 Definitions of Mindfulness and Mindlessness 
The fields of social and cognitive psychology include many examples of people 
engaging in minimal information processing. There is widespread agreement that 
people can perform seemingly complex tasks with very little active mental 
involvement (Langer, 1989). Abelson and Langer (1972) argued that most semantic 
information in a social interaction never reaches consciousness; instead, social 
cognition is governed primarily by minimal structural cues activating standard 
behaviour scripts. From these basic premises Langer and colleagues developed the 
concept of mindlessness and the opposing state, mindfulness. 
Mindfulness is defined as a state of openness to novelty in which the 
individual actively constructs categories and distinctions (Langer, 1992). It is a 
flexible state of mind in which the individual is actively engaged in the present and 
thus, notices new things and remains sensitive to context. (Langer, 2000). It does not 
matter whether the new things being noticed or the distinctions being drawn are 
important, as long as they are novel to the individual. It is the process of drawing 
these distinctions that keeps the individual situated in the present (Langer & 
Moldoveanu, 2000). In sum, mindfulness can be considered to be made up of the 
following components: openness to novelty; alertness to distinction; sensitivity to 
different contexts; implicit, if not explicit, awareness of multiple perspectives; and 
orientation in the present (Sternberg, 2000). 
Mindlessness is essentially the absence of the attributes of mindfulness 
(Sternberg, 2000). It is a state of reduced attention in which the individual becomes 
reliant on categories and distinctions drawn in the past. This leads the individual to 
become context dependant and, thus, oblivious to novel or alternative aspects of the 
situation (Langer, 1992). In other words, the individual is responding to an already 
cognitively constructed environment, as opposed to engaging in the active 
construction of the current environment with an awareness of any nuances or 
differences to previous environments (Chanowitz & Langer, 1981). Thus, in a 
mindless state, much of the present environment is unexamined by the individual 
(Langer, Chanowitz, & Blank, 1985). Mindless processing leads to behaviour that is 
governed by rules and routines, regardless of the immediate circumstances (Langer, 
1989; Langer & Moldoveanu, 2000). The individual becomes constrained by 
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previously created categories that are inevitably behaviourally limiting (Langer, 
1989). 
2.7.2 Evidence of Mindless and Mindful Processing 
Empirical evidence of mindless behaviour was first provided by Langer and Abelson 
(1972) in a study on helping behaviour. Participants in the study were asked by a 
distressed stranger (a confederate) for help with either mailing a package or making a 
phone call. The structure of the help request was varied so that it was either ‘victim 
oriented’ or ‘target oriented’. The content of the help request was identical in both 
cases, but the order in which the information was presented to the participant was 
varied. In the ‘victim oriented’ condition, the confederate opened with a statement 
designed to trigger empathic behaviour (e.g. “my knee is killing me.”). In the ‘target 
oriented’ condition, the confederate opened with a statement designed to trigger 
behavioural obligation (e.g., “Would you do something for me?”). Compliance with 
the request was measured and although identical information was presented in both 
conditions, victim-oriented requests occasioned significantly greater helping 
behaviour than target-oriented requests. The results are interpreted as showing that 
mental scripts can dictate behaviour in social interactions. When processing 
mindlessly, certain scripts are more readily activated than others (in this case, a 
‘victim oriented’ script was shown to be more easily triggered than a ‘target oriented’ 
script). 
Langer and colleagues built on this research by attempting to show that not all 
social interaction is defined by mindless behavioural scripts. Specifically, they began 
exploring which contextual factors would shift conscious awareness to minimal 
structural cues (mindlessness), and which contextual factors would lead to a more 
complete awareness of available information (mindfulness). To this end, Langer and 
Imber (1979) examined the effects of overlearning on the availability of information 
to conscious awareness. The authors hypothesised that, with greater familiarity, tasks 
become increasingly inaccessible to consciousness. They further hypothesised that 
people without conscious access to how a task is completed would be more vulnerable 
to aspects of their environment. 
To explore these hypotheses, participants were trained, in the first phase of the 
study, to translate English sentences into a coded format in one of three conditions. 
Participants were exposed to either moderate learning, in which they practiced 
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translating two sentences, overlearning, in which they practised translating six 
sentences, or a ‘no practice’ condition in which they did not receive any training. In 
the second phase of the study, participants were assigned to one of three social 
interaction scripts and asked to undertake a task that involved finding hidden objects 
in a picture. The social interaction scripts were varied such that some participants 
were asked to perform as the ‘boss’ and other participants were asked to perform as 
the ‘assistant’. The remaining participants were not exposed to a social interaction 
script (control condition). In the third phase of the study, participants were asked to 
translate a single sentence from English to the coded format. 
After completing the final sentence translation, participants were asked to list 
all of the steps in the coding process that they could recall. Participants who had not 
practiced the task, and overlearning participants (who had undertaken the most 
practice – 6 sentences) recalled significantly fewer coding steps than the participants 
in the moderate practice group (who had undertaken a moderate amount of practice – 
2 sentences). Thus, as hypothesised, participants in the ‘overlearning’ condition 
recalled fewer coding steps than participant in the ‘moderate’ learning condition, 
showing that with greater familiarity tasks become increasingly inaccessible to 
consciousness.  
Langer and Imber had further hypothesised that people without conscious 
access to how a task is completed (shown to be participants in the ‘no practice’ and 
‘overlearning’ conditions) would be more vulnerable to aspects of their environment 
(such as the labels applied to participants in the second phase of the study). The speed 
and accuracy of the final sentence translation was measured. In line with the 
hypothesis, participants in the ‘no practice’ and ‘overlearning’ conditions were 
affected by the labels assigned to them. Specifically, participants who had been 
assigned the ‘assistant’ script were significantly slower and less accurate than 
participants who had been assigned the ‘boss’ script and participants who had not 
been assigned any script. This pattern did not extend to participants in the moderate 
learning condition (who displayed conscious access to the steps in the task). In sum, 
Langer and Imber were able to show that as familiarity increases tasks become 
increasingly inaccessible to consciousness, and further, that people without conscious 
access to how a task is completed are more vulnerable to aspects of their environment. 
In other words, the research provides evidence of increasing mindlessness, in the form 
of vulnerability to cues in the environment, as a function of greater familiarity with a 
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task. Conversely, the research shows that conscious awareness of a task can prevent 
mindless scripted behaviour. 
A second, similar study by Langer and Imber (1979) confirmed this finding. In 
the second study, participants were asked to complete the same object finding task 
and were exposed to the same social interaction scripts (‘boss’ label, ‘assistant’ label, 
or no label). Participants were asked to complete a proofreading task. Proofreading 
was chosen as the task on the basis that all participants were literate, and thus, could 
be expected to be familiar with the activity. Langer and Imber were interested in 
testing whether the tendency to mindlessly engage in scripted behaviour would 
decrease when participants were asked to think about exactly how a task was 
completed. Participants in the components-salient condition were asked to make a list 
of at least three rules that were required for proofreading and to recall which rule they 
were applying during each part of the proofreading task. Participants in the 
components-not-salient condition were not asked to think about the task. Thus, 
participants in the components-salient condition were engaged with the notion of 
exactly how the task was completed, and participants in the components-not-salient 
condition were not. Confirming their earlier findings, Langer and Imber found that 
participants in the components-not-salient condition performed at differing levels as a 
function of the labels assigned to them, but participants in the components-salient 
condition showed no such difference in performance. Specifically, in the components-
not-salient condition, participants labelled as ‘assistant’ did not perform as well as 
participants labelled as ‘boss’ or participants who were not labelled. Again, Langer 
and Imber were able to show that a lack of conscious awareness regarding how a task 
is completed can lead to mindless scripted behaviour, while conscious awareness of a 
task can lead to more mindful processing and the avoidance of scripted behaviour. 
Extending their original work showing the relationship between conscious 
awareness of a task and mindless behaviour, Langer and Imber (1980) conducted a 
study exploring the role of mindlessness in the perception of deviance. Theorising that 
people have constructed a mental category of ‘normal people’, that allows them to 
respond to others mindlessly in the majority of situations, Langer and Imber were 
interested in exploring whether exposure to people who deviate from this category 
caused mindful processing. Participants all watched an identical video of a male 
reading aloud an editorial. Participants in the mindful condition were told that the 
male was either a millionaire, an ex-mental patient, a homosexual, divorced or a 
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cancer victim. These manipulations were expected to lead to mindful processing on 
the basis that participants would be viewing a target person who fell outside the 
‘normal’ category. To control for the possibility that any results were a function of the 
deviancies themselves, as opposed to mindful processing resulting from the deviancy, 
a ‘normal’ mindful condition was added. In the ‘normal’ mindful condition, 
participants were asked to think carefully about the target person’s physical 
characteristics. Participants in the mindless condition were not given any special 
instructions regarding the distinctiveness of the target person or the need to think 
carefully about the person’s physical characteristics.  
Langer and Imber (1980) tested two related hypotheses. Firstly, that those in a 
mindful state would show more accurate recall of the target person’s characteristics 
than those in a mindless state. The second hypothesis was that people in a mindful 
state would more often rate the characteristics of the target person as being atypical 
than people in a mindless state. The second hypothesis was generated on the basis that 
people generally process mindlessly, and hence, do not notice many characteristics of 
other people. Thus, when more characteristics are noticed and recalled (in a mindful 
state), these characteristics are more likely to be rated as being atypical, because they 
are being compared to the abstract idea of a ‘normal’ person that is generally relied 
upon in a mindless state. Both hypotheses were supported by the results. Participants 
in the mindful conditions were more accurate in their recall of the target person’s 
characteristics, and evaluated the characteristics as being more extreme than 
participants in the mindless conditions. These findings support the idea that people 
generally respond mindlessly to others, relying on scripts surrounding the category of 
a ‘normal person’. 
Building on this evidence of people’s mindless reactions to others based on 
the category of a ‘normal’ person, Langer, Bashner and Chanowitz (1985) were 
interested in exploring mindless reactions to ‘handicapped’ (sic) individuals. Langer 
and colleagues noted that ‘handicapped’ people are generally only disadvantaged in 
the performance of certain tasks, and moreover, are often well positioned for the 
performance of certain other tasks (e.g., a deaf person working in a very noisy 
environment, or a person in a wheel chair performing a task that required sitting for 
extended periods). However, mindless processing leads to the activation of scripts 
suggesting that ‘handicapped’ people are less able to perform all tasks. Langer, 
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Bashner and Chanowitz conducted a study to test how attitudes towards 
‘handicapped’ people changed when people were encouraged to process mindfully.  
The degree of mindfulness experienced by participants in the study was 
manipulated in a series of phases. In the first phase, participants in the mindful 
condition were shown slides of ‘handicapped’ people doing specific jobs (e.g., cook, 
teacher), and asked to list four reasons why the person might be good at their job and 
four reasons why they might be bad at their job. In the mindless condition, 
participants were asked to list only one good and one bad reason. In the second phase, 
participants in the mindful condition were shown slides of ‘handicapped’ people in a 
problem situation and asked how the person might deal with the problem. Participants 
in the mindless condition were shown the same slides, but rather than being asked 
how the problem might be solved, they were asked whether it could be solved. Similar 
manipulations were used in the third and fourth phase of the study as a means of 
further shaping the degree of mindful processing (see Langer, Bashner, & Chanowitz, 
1985 for details). In the final phase of the study, participants’ degree of discrimination 
towards, and avoidance of, handicapped people were measured. In line with previous 
research, the results showed that participants encouraged to process mindfully were 
less likely than participants who processed mindlessly to display inappropriate 
discrimination or avoidance behaviour towards ‘handicapped’ people. These findings 
show that people generally mindlessly process ‘handicapped’ others, reacting in 
accordance with mental scripts (such as the one suggesting that ‘handicapped’ people 
experience a lack of ability across tasks). However, the findings also show that 
encouraging people to process mindfully can reduce the discrimination and avoidance 
behaviours that result from such scripts.  
Sharps and Martin (2002) conducted a study exploring the nature of mindless 
decision making. Based on empirical evidence showing that intelligent people will 
mindlessly commit to decisions that display a lack of intellectual awareness, the 
authors explored the importance of contextual information in decision making. 
Participants in the study were exposed to 12 scenarios and asked to determine the 
correctness of decisions that had been made. If implemented, all of the decisions to be 
rated would lead to negative consequences. In the mindless processing condition, 
participants received only the scenarios. In the mindful processing condition, 
participants received the scenarios as well as relevant contextual information. The 
contextual information was made up of obvious facts that would be known by the 
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majority, if not all, of the participants. For example, the contextual information 
included concepts such as; if money is spent on one item it will not be available to be 
spent on another item, and, it is a positive outcome if college students are able to 
obtain the education they need to function in their careers. Participants provided with 
contextual information (in the mindful condition) correctly perceived the decisions as 
having negative consequences significantly more frequently than participants who 
were not provided contextual information (in the mindless condition). These findings 
show that people often evaluate decisions in a mindless way, failing to incorporate 
information that is readily available in their long-term memory. Conversely, the 
findings show that more mindful processing can be encouraged simply by presenting 
pertinent information in the immediate context of decisions (even when that 
information is already known).  
The aforementioned studies provide a representative cross-section of the 
research supporting the existence of mindless processing and the conditions under 
which mindlessness is more likely to occur. In addition to the aforementioned 
research, evidence of mindful and mindless processing has been established in a 
variety of contexts and in reaction to a range of stimuli. Strube, Berry and Moergen 
(1985) demonstrated that people classified as Type A (a behaviour pattern 
characterised as time pressured and competitive) mindlessly commit to the notion that 
they should take control in group situations. Langer and Piper (1987) established that 
when information is learnt unconditionally, people are more likely to behave 
mindlessly, but when the same information is learnt conditionally, mindful behaviour 
is more likely to result. Chanowitz and Langer (1981) were able to show that mindless 
processing can invoke a script for disabled behaviour. Among a group of participants 
led to believe they had a (fictitious) perceptual disorder, those who had processed the 
information regarding the disorder mindlessly showed associated performance 
decrements in a follow up task. Those who had processed the information mindfully, 
however, did not. Dolinski and colleagues (Dolinski, Ciszek, Godlewski, & 
Zawadzki, 2002) demonstrated an increase in mindless processing using the ‘fear-
then-relief’ technique. Across a series of studies, these researchers showed that people 
are more likely to process mindlessly if they are manipulated into a state of fear, and 
then led into a state of relief when the source of the fear is removed. 
Broadly, the research on mindful and mindless processing suggests that in the 
absence of specific external factors, individuals are likely to process information 
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mindlessly. Langer (1989) suggests that unless people are explicitly questioned, 
experience an unexpected failure or a novel consequence, or expect to have future 
interactions for which the information may be relevant, they tend to process 
information mindlessly. Although this list is arguably not exhaustive, there is 
widespread agreement both that mindless processing exists and that it is prevalent in a 
wide variety of situations.  
2.7.3 Refining the Concepts of Mindfulness and Mindlessness 
It is important to note that mindfulness and mindlessness are not conceptualised only 
in behavioural terms. Although the majority of research focuses on the responses that 
result from mindless or mindful processing, the terms refer to a basic state of mind. 
The patterns of response, do not, in themselves, constitute mindlessness or 
mindfulness. Rather, the patterns of response are a result of being in a mindful or 
mindless state of mind (Langer, 1989). Further, it is of value to realise that the 
distinction between mindfulness and mindlessness is qualitative as well as 
quantitative. It is not just that more information is processed in a mindful than in a 
mindless state. In a mindless state, certain information is not readily available for 
conscious consideration (Langer, 1989). 
Mindfulness is not assumed to require more effort than mindlessness. Langer 
(1989), however, suggests that it takes effort to move from a state of mindless 
processing into a more mindful mode. For this reason, it may often appear that 
mindful processing requires greater effort than mindless processing. Langer argues 
that, instead, it is more likely that mindful processing can be effortless and, 
furthermore, capacity increasing rather than capacity consuming. 
2.7.4 Mindlessness and Experience 
The early work conducted by Langer and colleagues was based around the fact that 
mindlessness results from over-familiarity or experience. Langer and Imber (1979; , 
1980) conducted a series of studies, described above, which established that with 
greater familiarity, tasks become increasingly inaccessible to consciousness. 
Furthermore, the research shows that the individual who has over-learnt a task is more 
likely to process mindlessly and be vulnerable to cues in the environment. Langer and 
Imber (1979) showed that participants who had practised a particular task many times 
were more likely to process mindlessly than participants who had less experience with 
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the task. Similarly, Langer and Imber (1980) provided evidence that people have a 
mindlessly applied, abstract notion of a ‘normal’ person, built up over the course of 
their frequent interactions with others. 
As people repeat a task over and over and become better at it, the individual 
components of the task move out of their consciousness. Ultimately, people come to 
assume they can do the task even though they can no longer articulate how they do it 
(Langer, 1991, 2000). This can lead to an outcome orientation that induces 
mindlessness. People who believe they know how to handle a situation don’t feel the 
need to pay attention. This reduced attention means that the individual is only 
focussing on the minimal cues judged necessary to carry out the task or interaction 
(Langer, 1991). This focus on particular cues rather than the broader situation leads to 
behaviour that is governed by rules that potentially do not take into account key 
elements of the environment. Thus, repetition can lead to mindlessness in almost any 
profession (Langer, 1991). 
Epstein (1999), reviewed the empirical evidence from clinical practice, 
educational research, philosophy and cognitive science, and concluded that 
mindlessness is common among more experienced medical practitioners. Within the 
field of medicine, there is evidence that the beginner’s mind is open and allows for 
new diagnostic and therapeutic possibilities. In contrast, the expert’s mind narrows 
possibilities, using prior experience to confine and delimit observations. Epstein 
discusses a range of techniques for increasing mindfulness among more experienced 
practitioners. 
The theoretical and empirical evidence converges such that it is clear that 
mindlessness is more likely among individuals with greater experience with a 
particular task. It is essential to note, however, that both subjective and objective 
measures of experience are useful. It is when an individual believes they know 
something well that they tend to view it mindlessly (Langer, 2000). An individual 
who believes they can perform a task well (whether or not they are correct in this 
assumption) will feel less need to pay attention to the task. Thus, either repetition of a 
task or a belief in one’s own expertise is likely to lead to mindlessness. 
2.7.5 Mindless Processing of Cues from the Computer 
Mindlessness is a state in which the individual shows reduced attention and becomes 
reliant on categories and distinctions drawn in the past. As revealed through the 
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exploration of the empirical evidence, in a mindless state, the individual becomes less 
aware of the broader context and more sensitive to particular cues in the environment 
(for example; a victim oriented request (Langer & Abelson, 1972), being labelled as a 
‘boss’ or an ‘assistant’ (Langer & Imber, 1979), observing a ‘normal’ person (Langer 
& Imber, 1980), or observing a ‘handicapped’ person (Langer, Bashner, & 
Chanowitz, 1985)). Media equation researchers (Nass, 2004; Nass & Gong, 2000; 
Nass & Moon, 2000; Nass, Steuer, Henriksen, & Dryer, 1994; Nass, Steuer, & 
Tauber, 1994) theorise that media equation behaviour results when people in a 
mindless state interact with a computer. This raises the question of which of the cues 
displayed by a computer lead people in a mindless state to treat the computer in a 
social and natural way. 
Nass and colleagues (Moon & Nass, 1996b; Nass, Steuer, Henriksen, & Dryer, 
1994) originally identified three major categories of cues displayed by computers that 
suggest humanness. Firstly, computers use words for output, in either text or voice 
form. Secondly, computers offer interactivity, and more specifically, offer responses 
based on multiple prior inputs, as opposed to responses based only on immediately 
prior input. Finally, computers increasingly fill roles traditionally filled by humans 
(e.g., teacher, bank teller, evaluator, telephone operator). 
More recently, the categories of cues considered to suggest humanness on the 
part of computers has been expanded. Nass (2004) suggests that in addition to the 
aforementioned categories, the following features of computers can be expected to 
trigger social responses on their own, with broader or more robust social reactions 
likely when features are combined: the presentation of faces (whether animated or 
still, realistic or abstract), the manifestation of emotions, perceived engagement with 
and attention to the user, and autonomy or unpredictability. Nass argues that humans 
possess all of the aforementioned elements, and hence, computers (or other 
technologies) that present any of these elements are likely to evoke social responses. 
Taking a slightly broader approach, Fogg (2003) suggests that the cues that 
lead people to respond socially towards computers can be broken down into five 
primary types: physical cues, including the presentation of faces, eyes or bodies and 
the use of movement; psychological cues, incorporating preferences, the use of 
humour, and the display of personality or emotions such as empathy; language cues, 
extending to interactive language use, spoken language and language recognition; the 
display of social dynamics, including turn taking, cooperation, praise for good work, 
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answering questions and displaying reciprocity; and finally, the fulfilling of social 
roles, such as, doctor, teammate, opponent, teacher, pet and guide. Unsurprisingly, 
there is a fair degree of overlap between Nass’ list and Fogg’s categorisation. 
Arguably, the category of social dynamics (Fogg, 2003) is a specific case of the 
notion of interactivity (Nass, 2004), and the psychological cue category (Fogg, 2003) 
is a broader conceptualisation of the manifestation of emotions (Nass, 2004).  
Individual theorists differ slightly in their summations of the cues presented by 
computers that cause social reactions among humans (see Heckman & Wobbrock, 
2000 for an alternative conceptualisation with specific regard to anthropomorphic 
agents). However, there is widespread agreement on two important issues. Firstly, 
computers display cues that suggest humanness. Furthermore, when processed 
mindlessly, these cues are sufficient to cause social reactions on the part of users (see 
Basso, Goldberg, Greenspan, & Weimer, 2001; Chiasson & Gutwin, 2005; Fogg, 
2003; K. Lee & Nass, 2003; Marakas, Johnson, & Palmer, 2000; Mishra, Nicholson, 
& Wojcikiewicz, 2001; Moon & Nass, 1996b; Morkes, Kernal, & Nass, 1998; 
Nakanishi, Nakazawa, Ishida, Takanashi, & Isbister, 2003; Nass, 2004; Nass & 
Moon, 2000; Nass, Moon, Fogg, Reeves, & Dryer, 1995; Nass, Steuer, Henriksen, & 
Dryer, 1994; Nass, Steuer, & Tauber, 1994; Nass, Steuer, Tauber, & Reeder, 1993; 
Nijholt, 2003 for further discussion of these issues). 
2.7.6 The Power of Human Like Cues 
Mindless processing, as a function of the associated attendance to particular cues and 
features of the environment, leads to behaviour that is governed by rules and routines 
that may not be appropriate (Langer, 1989; Langer & Moldoveanu, 2000). In the case 
of the media equation, it is argued that in a mindless state, people attend to the 
human-like cues displayed by the computer, which leads them to behave as though the 
computer is human. Media equation behaviour has been found in a wide variety of 
environments and has been shown to extend to a myriad of social behaviours. The 
reasons for human-like cues leading to such robust and varied responses towards 
computers have been considered extensively in the literature.  
The aforementioned theorised explanations for influence of social cues in 
computers centre around the notion that humans are hardwired to respond in particular 
ways to social cues in the environment. Humans respond, instinctively rather than 
rationally, to things that seem alive in some way. When people perceive social 
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presence, they naturally respond in social ways (for example, feeling anger or 
empathy, or following social rules such as taking turns) (Fogg, 2003). This hardwired, 
instinctual response to human-like or social cues is argued to be a direct result of 
evolving in an environment in which only humans exhibited rich, social behaviours. 
Until recently, it has been an absolute truth that anything that acted socially was 
human. Modern media has changed the validity of this truth. For the first time, 
something other than a human can exhibit social cues (Reeves & Nass, 1996). 
However, as Reeves and Nass (1996) point out, there is no switch in the brain that can 
be thrown to distinguish the real and mediated worlds, hence people respond to 
simulations of social actors (such as computers) as if they were, in fact, social.  
It is unsurprising that humans should find it difficult to reverse the assumption 
that human-like or social cues indicate that one is interacting with a human. Humans 
have evolved in a world where the most important issues (food, shelter, physical 
harm) revolve around other people. Nass (2004) suggests that there has been an 
evolutionary advantage inherent in the notion that anything with even a low 
probability of being human, should be assumed to be human. Nass points to several 
examples of this phenomenon beyond interactions with computers, such as people’s 
ability to see human faces in cars, and the ability to recognise two dots and a curved 
line (the smiley) as a face. Cognitive neuroscientists, such as Pinker (1997), provide 
support for this argument at a higher level of abstraction. Pinker notes that people 
hold many beliefs that contradict their current experience, but that were true in the 
environment in which humans evolved. Pinker further points out that humans will 
pursue goals that were adaptive in past environments, but that subvert their own well 
being in the current context.  
Nass and Gong (2000) suggest that this argument is particularly true in terms 
of speech. When humans hear speech or find themselves speaking, the optimal 
strategy is to preserve cognitive capacity, and assume that one has encountered a 
person. At this point humans stop asking questions like, “Is this a person?” and 
instead focus on questions such as, “How should I respond to this person?”. Nass and 
Gong argue that this strategy has been optimal throughout evolutionary history, as 
only other humans could produce speech. However, with the advent of modern 
computing, this strategy has been weakened. It is now possible to encounter a device, 
such as a computer, which speaks but is not human. 
 78 
Pursuing this argument leads to consideration of ideas such as the ‘Theory of 
Mind Module’, which suggests that humans use a mental ‘crib sheet’ that allows 
appropriate behaviour to be inferred from otherwise confusing surroundings (Mishra 
et al., 1999; Pinker, 1997). When looking at a series of lines on a piece of paper, 
humans do not first experience a two-dimensional image and consciously infer the 
three-dimensional scene from the two-dimensional image. Rather, the three-
dimensional world is immediately perceived, because the human visual system makes 
the inference automatically (Mishra et al., 1999). It is plausible that, in the same way, 
when humans mindlessly attend to the human-like cues presented by a computer, they 
do not first perceive, for example, that the computer is using words for output, and 
then consciously decide to respond socially. Instead, the cues displayed by the 
computer automatically trigger social responses (Mishra et al., 1999). 
2.7.7 Mindlessness and the Media Equation 
There is strong theoretical and empirical support for people’s tendency to process 
mindlessly. Where the issue of causation is considered, media equation researchers 
argue that it is this tendency to process mindlessly that leads to media equation 
behaviour. Consideration of the cues presented by computers and the evolutionary 
links between such cues and humans, supports the notion that computers trigger social 
responses from humans in a mindless state. However, to date there is no empirical 
evidence of a link between mindlessness and the tendency to treat computers as 
though they are human. Moreover, while there is a link between experience and the 
tendency to process mindlessly, there is no clear empirical evidence of a link between 
experience and media equation behaviour.  
2.8 Summary 
Media equation research has established that humans will treat computers socially in a 
variety of ways. While it is clear that people do not treat computers in precisely the 
same way as they treat other people, many social science findings regarding human-
human behaviour are mirrored in the interactions between humans and computers. 
Knowledge of the manner in which people will respond socially towards computers 
provides insight in terms of how software design can be improved. To date, there is 
little evidence of factors that moderate media equation behaviour and a lack of 
substantive research contradicting the media equation. Mindlessness appears to be a 
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theoretically sound explanation for the tendency to respond socially towards 
computers, however, there is a lack of empirical research aimed at testing the 
relationship between mindlessness and the media equation.  
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Chapter 3 
Study 1 – Flattery and Experience as a Moderator of the Media 
Equation 
3.1 Introduction 
While the tendency to react towards computers socially and naturally is well 
established in the media equation literature, to date no media equation research has 
been conducted with Australian participants. The lack of research among Australian 
samples is particularly relevant in light of the media equation research (Takeuchi, 
Katagiri, Nass, & Fogg, 1998; , 2000, discussed in section 2.1.2) showing differences 
between Japanese and American samples in the tendency to respond to computers 
socially. The current study was designed to test whether media equation effects would 
extend to an Australian sample and to more substantively, to explore whether 
experience moderated these effects. The methodology employed was based on 
research conducted by Fogg and Nass (1997b), which explored the impact of positive 
feedback from computers. 
Fogg and Nass (1997b) observed that while much research had been directed 
towards the impact of feedback from computers, all such research was based on the 
notion that the feedback provided by computers was accurate. In light of their own 
research showing that social rules and dynamics guiding human-human interactions 
often apply equally well to human-computer interactions, and the fact that inaccurate 
feedback is common in human-human interactions, they were interested in exploring 
the impact of feedback from computers that was not necessarily accurate. In 
particular, Fogg and Nass (1997b) were interested in the impact of flattery (defined as 
communicating positive things about another person without regard to that person’s 
true qualities or abilities). 
A review of the research on flattery (Fogg & Nass, 1997b) reveals four 
common findings regarding the effects of flattery on a person being flattered (the 
target). In general, targets tend to believe that flatterers speak the truth (even when 
they know flatterers are insincere); flattery creates positive affect in the target (even 
when the target judges the content to be inaccurate); targets like those who flatter 
them; and targets judge the performance of flatterers more favourably (for further 
detail see Pandey & Kakkar, 1982). Fogg and Nass (1997b) conducted a media 
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equation study in which they sought to test the applicability of these effects of flattery 
within human-computer interactions. 
Participants in the Fogg and Nass (1997b) study (discussed in section 2.1.2) 
were told they would be working with the computer to play a guessing game. 
Participants were asked to think of an animal and the computer asked them a series of 
yes/no questions about the animal. After asking questions the computer attempted to 
guess the animal the participant had in mind. The software was designed to make 
reasonable guesses, but to guess incorrectly most of the time. After guessing 
incorrectly, the computer asked participants to suggest a question that could be used 
by the computer to improve its performance in the future. Once the participant 
suggested a question, the computer provided feedback according to one of three 
conditions. Participants in the ‘sincere praise’ and the ‘flattery’ condition received 
positive feedback regarding their suggested question. However, participants in the 
‘sincere praise’ condition had been told that the feedback was the result of a 
comparison with the work of hundreds of previous players of the game, whereas, 
participants in the ‘flattery’ condition had been told that the computer’s feedback was 
random, and thus, unrelated to the quality of input provided by the participant. The 
third condition was a ‘generic feedback’ condition in which participants were simply 
exposed to a message that directed them to begin the next round.  
Supporting the idea that humans respond similarly to flattery from computers 
and flattery from other humans, significant differences were found between responses 
from participants in the ‘flattery’ and ‘generic feedback’ conditions and between 
responses from participants in the ‘sincere praise’ and ‘generic feedback’ conditions. 
Moreover, no significant differences were found between responses from participants 
in the ‘flattery’ condition and those in the ‘sincere praise’ condition. Specifically, 
participants in the ‘flattery’ and ‘sincere praise’ conditions reported greater positive 
affect (specifically, feeling ‘good’, ‘happy’ and ‘relaxed’), reported more feelings of 
power (specifically, feeling ‘important’, ‘dominant’, and ‘powerful’), perceived their 
own performance to have been better, enjoyed the interaction more, were more 
willing to continue working, and evaluated the computers’ performance more 
favourably, than participants in the ‘generic feedback’ condition. In other words, Fogg 
and Nass’ research revealed two key findings. Firstly, people react favourably to 
positive feedback from the computer. Secondly, people do not differ in their reactions 
to positive feedback as a function of the sincerity or accuracy of the feedback (that is, 
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they do not distinguish between flattery and praise). Thus, the effects of flattery from 
a computer were found to mirror the effects of flattery from another person.  
These findings have implications for human-computer interaction theory and 
affective software design. Evidence that positive feedback from a computer leads to 
positive user affect and more favourable ratings of the computer, although arguably 
unsurprising, is an indication of the value of incorporating positive feedback into the 
design of certain applications. Specific examples include educational software, where 
the increased enjoyment, perseverance and feelings of self-worth resulting from 
positive feedback are likely to contribute to the learning experience. Similarly, in 
computer games, positive affect (as a result of positive feedback) is likely to increase 
motivation to keep playing and add to the general appeal of the game. The less 
obvious finding, that the apparent sincerity of positive feedback is unrelated to its 
impact on the user, suggests that attempts to ensure all feedback given to users is 
based on objective fact may not be necessary. Thus, in situations where the amount of 
work required to program software to accurately assess a user’s performance (or to 
give the appearance of doing so) is judged to be onerous, the possibility of providing 
the user positive feedback need not be ruled out. 
3.1.1 Experience 
As described in Chapter 2, the existence of media equation effects is well established. 
However, to date, little work has been done exploring the factors that might moderate 
media equation findings. The amount of experience a user has with computers seems 
likely to interact with the extent to which they exhibit the tendency to treat computers 
like real people. However, the specific nature of the relationship between experience 
and the media equation is less obvious. 
An informal survey (conducted by the author) of computer users of varying 
levels of experience revealed that most people expect that users with high levels of 
experience with computers are less likely to exhibit the tendency to treat computers as 
though they were real people. This argument is based on the belief that more 
experienced users, having spent more time using computers, are more likely to view 
the computer as a tool. They are more likely to be aware of the computer’s true status 
– that of a machine. This argument shares the assumption inherent in both the 
‘computer as proxy’ and anthropomorphism explanations of the media equation effect 
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(as discussed in Chapter 2); individual’s social responses to technology are presumed 
to be consistent with their beliefs about the technology.  
In contrast, consideration of the mindlessness (Langer, 1992) explanation for 
the media equation suggests that the relationship between experience and the media 
equation may be in the opposite direction. That is, that people with high levels of 
experience with computers may be more likely to exhibit the tendency to treat 
computers as though they were real people. Research on mindlessness has shown that 
practice or experience can lead to ‘overlearning’ which increases the chances of 
mindlessness occurring (Langer & Imber, 1979). Essentially, performing a certain 
task a number of times can result in the task requiring less conscious attention. A 
person applying less conscious attention to a task is more likely to act on ‘autopilot’, 
and mindlessly respond based on potentially misleading or inappropriate cues inherent 
in the task. Further, not only people who actually have greater experience, but also 
those who believe they are more experienced can be expected to behave mindlessly. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, it is when a person believes they can do something well 
that they tend to pay less attention to the task (Langer, 2000). Thus, it can be argued 
that people with more experience using computers (as well as people who perceive 
themselves as having more experience with computers) are more likely to be in a state 
of mindlessness when interacting with the computer. Thus, more experienced 
computers users are more likely to attend to the human-like cues displayed by 
computers, and as a result, to mindlessly apply ‘human’ schemas and expectations to 
computers. 
3.1.2 Study One 
The current study was designed to extend Fogg and Nass’ (1997b) work on the media 
equation. Fogg and Nass found that positive feedback (both sincere praise and 
flattery) led to increased positive affect and feelings of power. The current study 
aimed to extend this finding by exploring whether the impact of positive feedback 
applied to other forms of affect. The study was also designed to test for the existence 
of any relationship between level of experience with computers and the tendency to 
treat computers like real people (a media equation effect). Fogg and Nass’ original 
study showed that, as in human-human interactions, flattery from computers had the 
same positive effect as praise from computers. The present study aimed to test 
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whether affective reactions to flattery varied as a function of the user’s level of 
experience with computers. 
In the current study, it was hypothesised that people would react positively to 
praise or flattery from a computer (H3.1), and that people would react in the same 
way to flattery from a computer as they would to praise from a computer (H3.2). The 
following research question was also generated: What, if any, is the relationship 
between experience with computers and the tendency to react to flattery and praise 
from computers in the same manner (RQ3.1)? 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
One hundred and fifty-eight students from the University of Queensland voluntarily 
participated in the study, 84 females and 74 males. One hundred and six of the 
participants were students enrolled in a first year psychology course, and the 
remaining 52 participants were students enrolled in a second year interaction design 
course. Participants ranged in age from 17 to 53 years with an average age of 20.5 
years. 
3.2.2 Procedure 
As the current study was designed to replicate and extend the findings of Fogg and 
Nass (1997b), the procedure employed largely mirrored that used by the original 
researchers. Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants were advised that they would 
use a software program (a computer game) and then be asked for their attitudes and 
opinions regarding the software and their experience. Participants were advised that 
the software program was still being developed, and that their input was needed in 
order to further develop the program, a ‘20 questions’ game. It was explained to 
participants that they would be required to think of an animal while the computer 
asked them a series of questions to which they could answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (e.g., Does 
the animal have fur?). Participants were advised that when the computer had enough 
information it would attempt to guess the animal. If the computer guessed correctly, 
the next round would begin. If, however, the computer guessed incorrectly, then the 
participant was asked to suggest a question the computer could have used to gain 
better information about the animal. At this point, participants were given information 
regarding the feedback they would receive from the computer and how the feedback 
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was generated. This information varied depending on which condition the participants 
were in. Finally, participants were told that when they had finished playing the game, 
they would be asked about their experience whilst playing the game. 
Before beginning to play the ‘20 questions’ game, participants were asked 
about their level of experience with computers and reminded about the nature of the 
task they were undertaking and the nature of the feedback they would receive. 
Participants then played the game until the computer had guessed incorrectly 12 times 
(giving participants 12 opportunities to suggest a question and receive feedback). On 
average, participants played 14.5 rounds of the game. Participants were then required 
to complete the questionnaire component of the study. During this part of the study, 
participants were asked a series of questions about their experience whilst playing the 
game, the computer and the task, and were given the opportunity to play extra rounds 
of the game if they wished. At the conclusion of the study, participants were fully 
debriefed and thanked for their time. 
3.2.3 Manipulation 
The experiment had three conditions: control (generic feedback, N = 51), flattery 
(insincere praise, N = 54), and praise (sincere praise, N = 53). Participants were 
randomly allocated to one of these conditions. The three conditions were identical in 
all ways with the exception of the feedback given by the computer and the 
explanation provided as to how the feedback was generated. In the flattery and praise 
conditions, participants were given exactly the same feedback. Across the twelve 
rounds eliciting feedback, participants were given ten pieces of feedback designed to 
be positive (e.g., "Your question makes an interesting and useful distinction. Good 
job!") and two pieces of feedback designed to be slightly negative (e.g., "That 
question may not be useful in the long term."). The slightly negative feedback was 
included in order to give the positive evaluations more credibility (Fogg & Nass, 
1997b). 
The distinction between the flattery and praise conditions stems from the 
different explanations given to participants regarding the means by which the 
feedback was generated. In the flattery condition, participants were told that the 
feedback provided to them was totally arbitrary and unrelated to the quality of their 
suggestion. Specifically, participants in the flattery condition were told the feedback 
they received was randomly generated. In the praise condition, participants were told 
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the feedback provided to them regarding the quality of their suggestion would be 
accurate. These participants were told that the feedback they received was derived by 
comparing their suggestion to an extensive database of questions. In this manner, the 
feedback was designed to reflect insincere praise in the flattery condition and sincere 
praise in the praise condition. 
In the control condition, participants did not receive positive or negative 
feedback. However, to avoid a confound resulting from differing amounts of 
communication from the computer across conditions, participants in the control 
condition were provided with a message the same length and duration of presentation 
as the average feedback message given to participants in the flattery and praise 
conditions (i.e., "Your suggested question has been stored. Please prepare for the next 
round."). 
3.2.4 Measures 
Participants’ degree of experience was measured using an item asking for how many 
years the participant had been using computers. The median value for this measure 
was eight years (mean = 9.2 years). On this basis, participants who had used 
computers for eight years or less were defined as having low experience, and 
participants who had used computers for more than eight years were defined as 
having high experience. The mean level of experience for the low experience group 
was 6.5 years (SD = 1.5 years, range 0 to 8 years) and the mean level of experience 
for the high experience group was 11.4 years (SD = 2.3 years, range 9 to 20 years). 
The difference in number of years of experience with computers across the high and 
low experience groups was significant (F = 14.76, p < .0001). 
After playing the ‘20 questions’ game, participants completed the 
questionnaire. Except where otherwise identified, all responses were made on 9-point 
Likert scales. In order to assess mood, the questionnaire included the Profile of Mood 
States; 65 5-point adjective rating scales designed to assess mood state (POMS, 
McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1971). To assess general positivity towards self and 
general positivity towards the computer, participants were asked to complete a 9-item 
semantic differential scale for themselves and a 9-item semantic differential scale for 
the computer on which they worked. Participants were also asked six questions 
regarding their own performance and six questions regarding the computer’s 
performance (e.g., “How well do feel you performed?”, “How pleased were you with 
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the computer’s performance?”). Participants’ attitudes towards the ‘20 questions’ 
game were assessed using three items (“How much fun was the 20 questions game?”, 
“How enjoyable was the 20 questions game?”, “How rewarding was the 20 questions 
game?”). In addition to these attitudinal measures of task, participants were asked 
three questions related to performance aspects of the task ("How sensible are the 
guesses the computer is currently making?", "How intelligent are the questions the 
computer is currently asking?", "How accurate is the feedback the computer is 
currently giving (regarding the quality of the questions people suggest)?"). In terms of 
willingness to play more of the game, both subjective (two questionnaire items; “How 
willing would you be to work on this computer in the future?”, “How willing would 
you be to spend more time playing the 20 questions game?”) and objective measures 
(number of extra rounds played) were taken. In addition to these measures, 
demographics (gender, age, and enrolled degree) were collected. 
3.2.5 Scale development 
Where appropriate, exploratory factor analyses via principal components were 
conducted to identify sets of variables that could be combined into scales. Initial 
analyses of the nine semantic differentials describing the self identified one variable 
with low communality, indicating it did not fit in the analysis (“unimportant-
important”). This variable was removed, and factor analysis of the remaining eight 
items produced a two-factor solution that accounted for 68.7% of the original 
variance. The first factor, which reflected positivity, had a reliability (Cronbach’s 
alpha) of .81 (‘Self Positivity’). The second factor, which reflected feelings of power, 
had a reliability of .86 (‘Self Power’). Initial analyses of the nine semantic 
differentials describing the computer indicated one variable with low communality, 
which was removed (“tense-relaxed”). The remaining eight items formed a single 
factor reflecting positivity, which explained 46.3% of the variance (‘Computer 
Rating’). Reliability for this scale was .86. 
The six items assessing participants’ performance were factor analysed, 
yielding a single factor that explained 65.1% of the variance. This scale, which 
reflected positive perceptions of participants’ own performance, had a reliability of 
.89 (‘Own Performance’). Analyses of the corresponding six items assessing 
perceptions of the computer’s performance produced a similar result. A single factor 
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reflecting positive perceptions of the computer was extracted, which explained 72.9% 
of the variance (‘Computer Performance’). The resulting scale had a reliability of .92. 
Two other sets of items were combined to reduce the number of variables to 
be analysed. The three items measuring participants’ attitudes towards the ‘20 
questions’ game, and the two items assessing the subjective measure of willingness to 
act, yielded separate reliabilities of .92 (‘Ratings of Task’) and .77 (‘Willingness to 
Act – Subjective’) respectively. In each case, the items were combined into single 
measures. 
3.3 Results 
Initial analyses revealed few significant differences across the three experimental 
conditions of control, flattery and praise. That is, initial findings did not appear to 
support the hypothesised media equation effects. However, interactions between 
experimental conditions and participants’ experience with computers were noted on 
many of the dependent measures. This latter finding had clear bearing on Research 
Question 3.1. In order to examine the effect of experience in more detail, the data 
were median split into low experience and high experience groups, and subsequent 
analyses were performed separately on each of these groups.  
Experience was not found to be strongly related to any other demographic 
factors. In particular, bivariate analyses revealed that there was no significant 
relationship between experience and the course participants were enrolled in, their 
gender, or their age.  
To test the two main hypotheses, (H3.1) that people will react positively to 
praise or flattery from a computer, and (H3.2) that people will react in the same way 
to flattery from a computer as they do to praise from a computer, two sets of planned 
comparisons were conducted, using the between-subject levels of experimental 
condition (control, flattery and praise)14. To test the first hypothesis, a planned 
comparison was used to compare generic feedback (control) to positive feedback 
(flattery/praise). To test the second hypothesis, a planned comparison was used to 
compare the flattery and praise conditions (analysis two). 
                                                
14 The willingness to act variable (a measure of how many extra rounds of the game participants 
played) was found to be non-normal. Non-normality violates the assumptions of ANOVA so the 
variable was dichotomised. No substantive differences were found between analyses using the 
dichotomised and non-dichotomised measures, thus, all reported analyses were performed using the 
dichotomised version of the measure. 
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A media equation effect is evident where both hypotheses are supported for a 
particular dependent variable. That is, where flattery and praise are found to have a 
more positive impact than generic feedback (analysis one) and where no difference is 
found between flattery and praise (analysis two) for a particular measure. 
In addition to the analyses performed to test the main hypotheses, the success 
of the feedback manipulation was assessed via a T-test. Participants in the flattery and 
praise conditions were asked to indicate whether the feedback they were exposed to 
was generated randomly. Confirming the success of the manipulation, for both high 
and low experience, participants in the flattery condition described the feedback as 
being randomly generated significantly more often than participants in the praise 
condition (see Table 3.2). All participants in the flattery condition correctly indicated 
that the feedback they had received was randomly generated. Most participants in the 
praise condition correctly indicated that the feedback they had received was based on 
a comparison of their suggestions to a database of items. However, seven participants 
in the praise condition indicated that they thought their feedback was randomly 
generated, suggesting that they had misunderstood or not believed the feedback 
manipulation. All the reported analyses were repeated with data from these seven 
participants excluded. No substantive changes in the results arose, so the data from 
the seven participants were retained in the final analyses. 
3.3.1 Analysis One - Generic Feedback Versus Flattery/Praise 
For participants of low experience with computers there were no significant effects of 
feedback type (control or flattery/praise, see Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1. T values and significance levels for analysis one planned comparisons. 
Planned Comparison: Control versus Flattery/Praise 
DV Low Experience High Experience 
  t(66) Sig. t(71) Sig. 
Depression-Dejection 0.34 .73 -1.97 .05* 
Anger-Hostility 0.41 .68 -1.65 .10+ 
Vigour-Activity 0.01 .99 1.11 .27 
Fatigue-Inertia -0.41 .68 -2.49 .01* 
Confusion-Bewilderment 0.10 .91 -2.39 .02* 
Friendliness 0.04 .96 1.92 .06+ 
Willingness to Act (dichotomised) -0.52 .60 2.97 .01* 
Self Positivity 0.56 .57 1.66 .10+ 
Self Power 0.67 .50 0.92 .36 
Computer ratings -0.20 .84 1.54 .13 
Willingness to Act (subjective) -0.56 .57 1.46 .15 
Computer Performance 0.62 .54 2.33 .02* 
Own Performance -1.12 .26 1.56 .12 
Ratings of Task -1.02 .31 1.68 .10+ 
Sensible Guesses 0.34 .73 1.78 .08+ 
Intelligent Questions -1.17 .24 1.47 .15 
Accurate Feedback 1.66 .11 4.05 .01* 
* p < .05, + p < .10 
Note: a negative t-value indicates control mean scores are higher than flattery/praise 
 
For participants of high experience with computers there were six significant 
main effects of feedback type (control or flattery/praise, see Table 3.1). A significant 
effect of feedback type on three of the subscales of the POMS (depression-dejection, 
fatigue-inertia and confusion-bewilderment) was found, indicating that participants in 
the flattery/praise conditions experienced less depression and dejection, less fatigue 
and inertia and less confusion and bewilderment than participants in the control 
condition (see Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, respectively). A significant effect of 
willingness to act (dichotomised) was found, indicating that participants in the 
flattery/praise conditions played more extra rounds of the game than participants in 
the control condition (see Figure 3.4). A significant main effect of feedback type on 
computer's performance was found, indicating that participants in the flattery/praise 
conditions rated the computer’s performance more favourably than participants in the 
control condition (see Figure 3.5). A significant main effect of feedback type on 
accuracy of feedback was found, indicating that participants in the flattery/praise 
conditions judged the feedback to be more accurate than participants in the control 
condition (see Figure 3.6).  
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Figure 3.1. Depression-Dejection – High Experience 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Fatigue-Inertia – High Experience 
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Figure 3.3. Confusion-Bewilderment – High Experience 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Willingness to Act (dichotomised) – High Experience 
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Figure 3.5. Computer Performance – High Experience 
 
3.3.2 Analysis Two - Flattery Versus Praise 
For participants of low experience with computers there was one significant effect of 
feedback type (flattery or praise, see Table 3.2). A significant effect of feedback type 
on accuracy of feedback was found; indicating that participants in the flattery 
condition judged the feedback to be less accurate than participants in the praise 
condition, see Figure 3.6.  
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Table 3.2. T values and significance levels for analysis two planned comparisons. 
Planned Comparison: Flattery versus Praise 
DV Low Experience High Experience 
  t(66) Sig. t(71) Sig. 
Depression-Dejection -1.67 .11 -0.45 .65 
Anger-Hostility -1.90 .07+ -0.82 .41 
Vigour-Activity -0.41 .68 -0.79 .43 
Fatigue-Inertia -1.20 .24 -0.59 .56 
Confusion-Bewilderment -0.29 .77 0.40 .68 
Friendliness 0.11 .92 0.07 .94 
Willingness to Act (dichotomised) 0.83 .42 -1.11 .27 
Self Positivity 0.02 .98 0.13 .89 
Self Power -0.49 .63 -0.27 .78 
Computer ratings 0.39 .69 2.27 .03* 
Willingness to Act (subjective) 0.25 .80 0.91 .37 
Computer Performance -0.09 .93 0.52 .60 
Own Performance -0.25 .80 0.46 .64 
Ratings of Task 0.39 .70 0.78 .43 
Sensible Guesses -1.05 .29 -0.37 .71 
Intelligent Questions 0.23 .82 -0.67 .51 
Accurate Feedback 2.08 .04* 0.99 .33 
Manipulation Check  -2.12 .04* -2.19 .03* 
* p < .05, + p < .10 
Note: a negative t-value indicates flattery mean scores are higher than praise. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Accuracy of Feedback – High and Low Experience 
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For participants of high experience with computers there was one significant 
effect of feedback type (flattery or praise, see Table 3.2). A significant main effect of 
feedback type on semantic differential ratings of the computer was found; indicating 
that participants in the praise condition rated the computer more favourably than 
participants in the flattery condition, see Figure 3.7. 
 
Figure 3.7. Computer Ratings – High Experience 
 
3.3.3 Consistency of Results with the Media Equation 
Among participants of high experience, hypothesis 3.1 and hypothesis 3.2 were 
supported, and thus, support was found for a media equation effect for measures of 
depression-dejection, fatigue-inertia, confusion-bewilderment, willingness to act, 
computer performance and accurate feedback. Moreover, if a less stringent 
significance level is applied to the data (p < .10), media equation effects are evident 
among participants of high experience for the following additional measures: anger-
hostility, friendliness, self positivity, positive task ratings, and sensible guesses. That 
is, high experience participants in the flattery and praise conditions, compared with 
high experience participants in the generic feedback condition, reported less anger and 
hostility, more friendliness, more self-positivity, higher ratings of the task, and more 
sensible guesses from the computer. No significant differences were found between 
 96 
high experience participants in the flattery and praise conditions for any of these 
measures. 
Inconsistent with the predominant pattern of results and thus, in contradiction 
to the media equation, are the significant findings in analysis two, where a difference 
was found between participants in the flattery condition and those in the praise 
condition (for low experience participants in terms of accuracy of feedback, and for 
high experience participants with regard to ratings of the computer). 
3.4 Discussion 
The predominant pattern of results provides strong support for a media equation effect 
with regard to flattery among high experience participants, but not among low 
experience participants. Participants who had high experience with computers tended 
to treat the computer in a manner equivalent to the way in which people treat other 
people who flatter them. Research on human-human interactions has shown that even 
when they know that someone is being insincere, targets of flattery tend to believe 
that the flatterer speaks the truth, feel positive as a result of the flattery, like the 
person flattering them, and judge the flatterer’s performance more favourably. The 
results from the present study showed that in the flattery condition, when participants 
knew the computer was giving random feedback (or being ‘insincere’), they tended to 
believe that the computer spoke the truth (both hypotheses supported for ‘accurate 
feedback’), they tended to experience less negative mood as a result of the flattery 
(both hypotheses supported for ‘depression-dejection’, ‘fatigue-inertia’ and 
‘confusion-bewilderment’), and they tended to judge the computer’s performance 
more favourably (both hypotheses supported for ‘computer performance’). Moreover, 
the general positivity experienced by high experience participants translated into 
action in the form of playing extra rounds of the game (both hypotheses supported for 
‘willingness to act’). 
These results support the idea that human-computer flattery dynamics parallel 
human-human flattery dynamics. Three of the four major findings in the literature on 
human-human flattery interactions were replicated in human-computer interactions. 
However, evidence of increased liking for computers as a result of flattery was not 
found in the present study. Directly assessing a participant’s ‘liking’ for a computer is 
problematic in a media equation study. When constructing a questionnaire for use in 
media equation research it is important to avoid using items that imply that computers 
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have human characteristics. If the items used in a media equation study imply human 
characteristics on the part of computers there is a risk of data contamination as a result 
of participants responding to the resulting demand characteristics of the study (Nass & 
Moon, 2000). A question such as “how much do you like the computer you worked 
with?” could be viewed as implying human characteristics on the part of the 
computer. Thus, in the present study a less direct measure of liking for the computer 
was employed. The questionnaire included a semantic differential upon which 
participants were asked to rate the computer (this semantic differential resulted in the 
‘computer ratings’ scale). The results for ‘computer ratings’ did not follow the media 
equation pattern of results (a significant difference was found between the flattery and 
praise condition for ‘computer ratings’). Specifically, highly experienced participants 
in the praise condition rated the computer significantly more positively than 
participants in the flattery condition. Aside from the manipulation check, the 
‘computer ratings’ measure is the only variable on which highly experienced 
participants showed a difference across flattery and praise conditions. This finding 
could be viewed as evidence that the media equation’s relation to flattery only extends 
to some of the behaviours noted in human-human flattery interactions. Specifically, 
although flattery from computers is viewed as being accurate and leads to increased 
positive affect and more positive ratings of the computer’s performance it does not 
result in increased liking for the computer. However, future replications of this 
finding are needed in order to confirm that this finding is not a result of a unique 
feature of the current study. 
3.4.1 Extensions to Prior Research 
The present study extended previous work on flattery and the media equation by 
finding positive effects of positive feedback (flattery or praise) on a range of measures 
of affect. While Fogg and Nass (Fogg & Nass, 1997b) showed that positive feedback 
led to increased positive affect in the form of feeling ‘good’, ‘happy’ and ‘relaxed’ 
and increased feelings of power, the current study found that the positive impact of 
positive feedback extended to decreased feelings of ‘depression-dejection’, ‘fatigue-
inertia’, and ‘confusion-bewilderment’. This evidence of a wider affective impact of 
the media equation (in terms of flattery) suggests a number of implications in terms of 
software design (see relevance section below). 
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A further extension of prior research in the current study is the media equation 
effect for an objective measure. The current study found a positive impact of flattery 
and praise across a range of subjective measures, but beyond these subjective 
measures, the study also found an impact of flattery and praise on an objective 
measure of willingness to act. High experience participants in the flattery and praise 
conditions tended to play significantly more extra rounds of the game than 
participants in the control condition. This finding indicates that the increased positive 
affect and improved ratings of the computer’s performance resulting from positive 
feedback translates into actual behaviour.  
The major contribution of the current study stems from the findings regarding 
experience. It is important to note that level of experience with computers did not 
covary with any of the other demographic characteristics of the sample, suggesting 
that the presence or absence of the media equation effect is a result of experience with 
the computer. The study provides initial evidence of experience moderating whether 
or not a media equation effect occurs. High experience participants displayed a 
pattern of results that was clearly consistent with the media equation; they responded 
positively to positive feedback and did not discriminate between praise and flattery. 
Low experience participants did not display results consistent with the media equation 
for any of the measures taken; whether exposed to generic feedback in the control 
condition or positive feedback in the praise or flattery condition, low experience 
participants reacted in the same way. The only exception to this consistency of 
behaviour across conditions is with regard to the ‘accuracy of feedback’ measure; low 
experience participants rated the feedback from the computer as more accurate in the 
praise condition than in the flattery or control conditions. This anomaly may reflect 
the fact that participants were told the feedback would be accurate in the praise 
condition and inaccurate in the flattery condition. In other words, this finding can be 
seen as low experience participants correctly distinguishing between accurate 
feedback (praise) and non-accurate feedback (flattery). This finding is consistent with 
the notion that low experience participants were processing mindfully, while high 
experience participants were processing mindlessly.  
The finding that only more experienced computer users exhibited media 
equation effects in response to flattery provides support for the mindlessness 
explanation for the media equation. The pattern of results is consistent with the idea 
that greater practice or familiarity with a task increases the likelihood of applying less 
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conscious attention to the task and, as a result, responding mindlessly to particular 
cues that are presented. These cues (discussed in chapter 2) lead the more experienced 
user, who is processing mindlessly, to automatically respond to the computer as 
though it is human. In the present study, this mindless response took the form of 
reacting positively to flattery, and failing to distinguish between flattery and praise. 
3.4.2 Relevance 
The general implications of the current study for human-computer interaction theory 
and affective software design revolve around the value of incorporating positive 
feedback into software applications. The lack of distinction made by users between 
praise and flattery suggests that it is not always necessary to ensure that feedback to 
the user appears to be based on an objective assessment of performance. However the 
current study provides insight into some further implications for applications seeking 
to utilise positive feedback.  
Evidence that the impact of positive feedback extends beyond generally 
positive affect to reduced feelings of fatigue and confusion has implications for 
applications in the domains of educational software and leisure. In an educational 
domain, the evidence that positive feedback leads to decreased feelings of fatigue and 
confusion suggests that learning benefits could result from the inclusion of positive 
feedback. Users may experience less fatigue and hence be motivated to spend more 
time using educational programs when exposed to positive feedback. Moreover, less 
confusion should benefit learning, as feelings of confusion or bewilderment are likely 
to discourage users of educational software. Similarly, a lack of fatigue and confusion 
for computer game players (resulting from positive feedback) should lead to increased 
playing time and satisfaction with a game. 
However, the implications discussed above should be considered in light of 
the findings regarding experience. The current findings suggest that the benefits of 
positive feedback and more specifically, flattery are only applicable to more 
experienced users. Thus, software designers seeking to utilise positive feedback need 
to be confident their audience includes experienced users. There appears to be no 
negative effects of positive feedback or flattery on low experience users, so no 
impairment of software is likely to result from the inclusion of positive feedback for 
these users. However, for the advantages of positive feedback to impact on the design 
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of software it seems likely that users need to be reasonably well experienced with 
computers.  
3.4.3 Alternative Explanations 
One alternative explanation for the results in Study 1 is that users’ who exhibited a 
media equation pattern of results tended to overestimate their degree of experience 
with computers (as opposed to the interpretation that users of high experience tend to 
show a media equation pattern of results). However, the measure of experience used 
in the current study was a question regarding the number of years for which 
participants had been using computers. This is a fairly specific and concrete scale. It 
seems unlikely that participants would significantly misestimate or misrepresent the 
number of years for which they had been using computers. Moreover, as discussed, 
the belief that one is experienced at a task is sufficient to lead to decreased attention to 
the task, and thereby, sufficient to cause mindlessness. Thus, the current results 
support the mindlessness explanation of media equation behaviour, irrespective of the 
accuracy of participants’ reported experience levels. 
It could also be argued that the lack of significant differences observed 
between the flattery and praise conditions was a result of the praise operationalisation 
failing. Participants in the praise condition may not have believed they were receiving 
objective feedback, in which case the praise condition would be identical to the 
flattery condition (i.e., both involved the presentation of insincere feedback). 
However, this explanation seems unlikely as all but seven of the participants in the 
praise condition reported that they believed the feedback they received was sincere. 
Moreover, there seems little reason to believe that the flattery operationalisation was 
inherently more convincing than the praise operationalisation. 
3.5 Conclusions 
Study 1 provides further evidence of the media equation operating in situations where 
computers provide positive feedback to users. Moreover, the study extends evidence 
of media equation behaviour to an Australian sample. The study also extends previous 
research by finding strong evidence of a moderating effect of experience, with more 
experienced users reacting favourably to positive feedback without distinguishing 
between flattery and praise. The results raise the possibility that media equation 
effects are more likely to be exhibited by more experienced users. The evidence that 
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more experienced users are more likely to treat computers as if they are human aligns 
with, and supports, the mindlessness explanation of media equation findings.  
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Chapter 4 
Study 2 - Team Affiliation and Further Evidence for Experience as a 
Moderator 
4.1 Introduction 
The first study, reported in the previous chapter, provides important initial evidence of 
a link between degree of experience with computers and propensity to show a media 
equation response. As discussed in section 2.7, research on mindlessness has shown 
that practice or experience can lead to ‘overlearning’ which increases the chances of 
mindlessness occurring (Langer & Imber, 1979). Thus, the link identified in the first 
study provides support for the mindlessness explanation of the media equation. 
It is possible (although unlikely from the perspective of mindlessness as an 
explanation for the media equation15) that the moderating effects of experience are 
unique to flattery. Further evidence that high experience participants are more likely 
to display media equation behaviour would provide additional support for the 
mindlessness explanation of the media equation. Knowledge of the cause of media 
equation behaviour will inform understanding of when people are likely to respond to 
computers socially. The second study sought to replicate the findings of the first 
study, regarding experience and media equation behaviour, within the context of 
group identity and team formation. 
 4.1.1 Group Identity and the Media Equation 
Social identity theory posits that people strive to maintain and enhance their self-
esteem, which is made up of two components: personal identity which is derived from 
one’s traits and personal relationships and social identity which is that part of the self-
concept that is derived from group memberships (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). A person’s 
social identity shapes how they think, feel and behave in particular contexts (Vaughan 
& Hogg, 1995). When a social identity becomes salient, one’s self-definition, self-
perceptions, attitudes and behaviours become homogenous and congruent with the 
ingroup’s norms and stereotypes (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Vaughan & Hogg, 1995). In 
group formation research, an ingroup is defined as any group to which a person 
perceives themselves to belong, and an outgroup is defined as any group to which a 
                                                
15 For further detail on the mindlessness explanation of the media equation see sections 2.7 and 7.3 – 
7.7.  
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person does not perceive themselves to belong. Research has shown that people 
perceive themselves to be more similar to members of their ingroup (Mackie, 1986), 
are more likely to act cooperatively with members of their ingroup (Hogg & Abrams, 
1988; Vaughan & Hogg, 1995), feel a stronger need to agree with the opinions of 
their ingroup (Mackie, Gastardo-Conaco, & Skelly, 1992; Wilder, 1990), perceive 
messages from members of their ingroup to be of a higher quality than messages from 
outgroup members (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Vaughan & Hogg, 1995), and conform 
more to members of their ingroup in both behaviour and attitude (Hogg & Abrams, 
1988; Vaughan & Hogg, 1995). As a result of the pervasive nature of such group 
favouritism, a major focus of social psychological research is the factors that lead to 
group (or team) formation (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Nass, Fogg, & Moon, 1996; 
Vaughan & Hogg, 1995). Two factors which emerge repeatedly as causes of team 
formation are identity (simply labeling someone as part of a team) and 
interdependence (linking individual’s outcomes to the outcome of the entire team) 
(Nass, Fogg, & Moon, 1996; Vaughan & Hogg, 1995).  
Given the strength and variety of findings showing people’s preference and 
favouritism towards members of their own groups and teams, Nass, Fogg and Moon 
(1995; , 1996) explored the possibility that people would form team relationships with 
computers. The research was conducted with a view to establishing whether benefits 
similar to those shown in human-human team relationships, in terms of affiliation and 
liking towards the computer, would be shown. Nass and colleagues conducted two 
studies in which they manipulated levels of identity and interdependence and 
measured the degree of affiliation participants felt towards the computer.  In the first 
study (Nass, Fogg, & Moon, 1995), participants were placed in either the ‘team’ or 
‘individual’ condition and required to complete the desert survival problem (described 
in section 2.1.1).  
In the ‘team’ condition, participants were told they were part of the ‘blue 
team’ and that they would interact with a teammate called the ‘blue computer’ 
(identity manipulation). In addition, participants were told that they would be 
evaluated as a team with the computer (interdependence manipulation). In the 
‘individual’ condition, participants were told that they would be interacting with the 
computer but that they would be working as an individual – a blue individual working 
with a green computer (identity manipulation). In addition, participants were told that 
they would be evaluated on the basis of their individual work alone (interdependence 
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manipulation). The study found that people who work in teams with computers 
display the same sorts of attitudes and behaviours as people working in teams with 
other humans. Specifically, participants working in a team with the computer, 
compared with participants working as individuals, perceived themselves as more 
similar to the computer, perceived themselves as more cooperative, perceived 
themselves as more open to influence, perceived the computer’s information as being 
of a higher quality, and were more likely to conform to the computer’s suggestions. 
This first study shows that people will affiliate with groups, but as the identity 
and interdependence manipulations were not applied orthogonally, it is not possible to 
tell whether one or both are required for the affiliation effects found. In the second 
study (Nass, Fogg, & Moon, 1996), identity was again manipulated by telling 
‘identity’ participants that they were part of the ‘blue team’ and that they would 
interact with a teammate called the ‘blue computer’, and ‘non-identity’ participants 
that they would be working as an individual, a ‘blue individual’ who would be 
working with a ‘green computer’. Interdependence was again manipulated by telling 
‘interdependent’ participants that they would receive the same evaluation as the 
computer they were working with, and ‘non-interdependent’ participants that they 
would be evaluated on the basis of their work alone. However, in the second study, 
identity and interdependence were manipulated orthogonally. Using a methodology 
that was otherwise identical to that employed in the first study, Nass and colleagues 
found that interdependence with the computer, but not identity, led to a sense of team 
affiliation with the computer, and also to the effects of being on a team observed in 
the social psychology literature. Specifically, participants in the ‘interdependence’ 
condition perceived the computer to be more similar to themselves, saw themselves as 
more cooperative, were more open to influence from the computer, thought the 
information from the computer was of higher quality, found the information from the 
computer friendlier, and conformed more to the computer’s information. 
The lack of effect for identity in Nass and colleagues’ study is striking given 
the breadth of research showing a link between manipulations of identity and team 
formation (Vaughan & Hogg, 1995). Nass, Fogg and Moon (1995; , 1996) drew upon 
a range of findings in the social identity and group formation literature to develop 
their identity manipulation. Their manipulation successfully captured the key feature 
of human-team formation research, in that, participants were categorised as group 
members in the identity condition, and were not categorised in the non-identity 
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condition. Nass and colleagues’ findings could be interpreted as evidence that the 
social psychology research on identity and group formation does not extend to 
human-computer interactions. However, the robustness of the link between 
categorisation and team formation, and the increasingly wide range of studies 
showing a media equation effect, suggest the possibility that a different manipulation 
of identity might be more likely to lead to team affiliation in human-computer 
interactions. On this basis, an extensive review of the group formation and team 
affiliation literature was conducted. 
One of the strongest findings in intergroup behaviour research is the minimal 
group effect (Vaughan & Hogg, 1995). The minimal group paradigm is an 
experimental methodology developed by Tajfel and colleagues to explore the minimal 
conditions required for intergroup behaviour (including team formation) (Tajfel, 
Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). In Tajfel and colleagues’ original study, participants 
were invited to take part in a study on decision-making, and ostensibly assigned to 
one of two groups on the basis of their reported preference for paintings by either the 
artist Kandinsky or Klee. In fact, participants were assigned to groups randomly. 
Participants knew only which group they themselves were in (either the Kandinsky or 
Klee group), as the team membership of others in the room was disguised with the use 
of code numbers. Participants were then given the opportunity to allocate money to 
pairs of fellow participants who were identified only by group membership and code 
number, with allocations always being made between one member of each group. The 
allocation took place (using a paper and pencil allocation matrix) for a series of pairs 
of participants always excluding the self. The results indicated that participants tended 
to strongly favor their own group (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). The 
striking feature of this and subsequent minimal group paradigm (MGP) studies is that 
team affiliation effects resulted even though the categorisation was on the basis of a 
largely arbitrary criterion. The groups created had no history or future, and self-
interest was not a motivating factor for participants (Vaughan & Hogg, 1995).  
More recently, MGP studies have shown categorisation and associated 
affiliation effects on the basis of random allocations to groups (Gagnon & Bourhis, 
1996; Grieve & Hogg, 1999), painting preferences (L. Gaertner & Insko, 2000; , 
2001), line length estimation (overestimators and underestimators) (Dobbs & Crano, 
2001), figural versus grounded perceptual style (Otten & Moskowitz, 2000), shape 
dependency and independency (Hertel & Kerr, 2001), and concave and convex 
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attention styles (Otten & Wentura, 2001). The identity manipulations in all these 
studies share many characteristics with the identity manipulation employed by Nass 
and colleagues in their study (1995; , 1996). However, the identity manipulations 
employed by Nass and colleagues differ from those in the social psychology literature 
in one key aspect. All MGP studies incorporate the presence of two groups (or at least 
the perception, on the part of participants, that two groups are involved). The study 
conducted by Nass and colleagues implied to participants in the identity condition that 
they were part of a team, but did not suggest that any other teams might be involved 
in the study. It is likely (and seems to be an assumption inherent in the MGP) that an 
awareness of the presence of another group is a key factor in creating a salient identity 
manipulation. Thus, the current study was designed to extend the work of Nass and 
colleagues (1995; , 1996) by including the presence of another group, and testing to 
see whether an identity manipulation (in the absence of any sense of interdependence) 
would lead to team affiliation effects. 
4.1.2 Study Two 
The current study was designed with two separate aims; the first was related to 
extending the research conducted by Nass, Fogg and Moon (1995; , 1996). Nass and 
colleagues found that interdependence, but not identity, led to team affiliation effects. 
However, as discussed, the studies conducted by Nass and colleagues did not include 
the presence of a second team, a feature common to all Minimal Group Paradigm 
research. Evidence that it is possible to generate a sense of team affiliation towards 
computers among humans with a basic identity manipulation would suggest that it is 
easy for designers to leverage the benefits of team affiliation in their designs (for 
example, people finding the information from the computer to be friendlier or being 
more open to influence from the computer). Thus, the first aim of the current study 
was to test whether increased group affiliation would result between humans and 
computers as a result of an arbitrary identity categorisation that involved the presence 
of two teams. Based on the strength of minimal group findings, showing group 
affiliation among humans in response to arbitrary categorisation, it was hypothesised 
that participants would show group affiliation effects as a result of a traditional 
identity manipulation in which they were arbitrarily placed on the same team as a 
computer (H4.1). 
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The second aim of the current study was to extend previous research (Study 1) 
showing media equation behaviour on the part of participants with high, but not low, 
experience with computers. Specifically, the study was designed to explore whether 
team affiliation effects between humans and computers were moderated by 
experience. Based on previous research (Study 1) showing the relationship between 
experience and media equation behaviour, and the theoretical links between 
mindlessness and experience, it was hypothesised that the propensity to show team 
affiliation effects in response to being placed on a team with a computer would be 
stronger for participants with a greater degree of experience (H4.2).  
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
Sixty students from the University of Queensland voluntarily participated in the 
study, 40 females and 20 males. In return for their time, students were given a movie 
pass. Fifteen of the participants were from the Faculty of Arts, 20 were from the 
Business, Economics and Law faculty, and 25 were from the Engineering, Physical 
Science and Architecture faculty. Participants ranged in age 17 to 35 years with an 
average age of 19.8 years. 
4.2.2 Procedure 
As the study was designed to extend the findings of Nass et al. (1995; , 1996), the 
procedure employed in the present study is similar to that used by the original 
researchers. Upon arrival, participants were thanked for agreeing to participate and 
told that the study was focused on decision making with computers. In all conditions, 
participants were asked to wait outside the room until everyone had arrived. When all 
participants for a session had arrived, they were given a subject number and asked to 
take a seat at a computer and follow the instructions on the screen. All participants 
were asked not to speak to one another during the study. Participants were tested in 
sessions with between 4 and 6 people, so that in each session there were always at 
least 2 people in each team.  
After entering demographic information into the computer, participants were 
informed that the computers they were working on had been programmed to make use 
of neural networks. Specifically, they were informed that the computers had been 
trained to use neural networks to complete two different tasks: a text rating task 
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(TRT) that involved rating a passage of text on various descriptive dimensions, and 
the desert survival task (DST) that involved ranking a series of items according to 
their importance for survival in a desert16. Participants were informed that the 
computers were capable of proficiently completing both tasks, but that their 
performance was not perfect. 
For the TRT, participants were asked to read a body of text (taken from The 
Pigeon by Patrick Suskind) and rate the extent to which six words (descriptive, 
emotive, intriguing, factual, stimulating, entertaining) accurately described the 
passage. Definitions for each of the words were provided. Participants rated the 
applicability of each descriptive word on a scale from 1 (low) to 100 (high). After the 
participants had completed their ratings, the computer presented its own ratings in a 
table that also displayed the participant’s initial ratings. Participants were informed 
that the computer had not been exposed to that particular passage of text before. 
Ostensibly, the computer rated the applicability of the words to the passage on the 
basis of the neural network it employed. In actual fact, the computer changed the six 
ratings by the same absolute value for all participants (for example, if the participant’s 
rating of the passage for the word ‘descriptive’ was under 50, the computer calculated 
its own rating as the participant’s rating plus 37, if the participant’s rating for 
‘descriptive’ was over 50, the computer calculated its rating as the participant’s rating 
less 37). This manipulation resulted in each participant experiencing the same degree 
of disagreement between their original ratings and the computer’s ratings. After 
viewing the computer’s ratings, participants were asked to enter a final rating for each 
word; that is, they were given the opportunity to alter their original ratings. 
For the DST, participants were asked to imagine they were stranded in the 
desert and to rank 12 items according to their importance for survival. When 
participants had completed their ranking, the computer provided a ranking and listed 
reasoning for the differences between the participant’s ranking and the computer’s 
ranking (for example, if the computer ranked the torch in a higher position than the 
participant, the reasoning presented was, “A torch is the only reliable means of 
signaling after dark.”). Ostensibly, the computer used a neural network to rank the 
items. In fact, the computer’s ranking was systematically different from the 
participant’s (for example, the item placed in rank 1 by the participant was always 
                                                
16 An additional task (the Text Rating Task) was added to the original methodology in the interest of 
exploring participants’ reactions to variety of computer based tasks. 
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moved to rank 3 by the computer). This manipulation resulted in each participant 
experiencing the same degree of disagreement between their original rankings and the 
computer’s rankings. Participants were presented with a table that contained their own 
initial rankings, the computer’s rankings, and the reasoning behind the differences 
between the participant’s and the computer’s rankings. Participants made a final 
ranking and they were informed that the computer-based task component of the study 
was concluded. Participants then completed the questionnaire component of the study 
on paper17, were debriefed and thanked for their time. The entire study generally took 
participants between 40 and 50 minutes to complete. 
4.2.3 Manipulation 
The experiment had three conditions: control (participants worked as individuals, N = 
25), human-team (participants were on a team with other participants, N = 19), and 
human-computer team (participants were on a team with other participants and 
computers, N = 17). The three conditions were identical in all ways with the 
exception of whether participants were led to believe they would be working as part 
of a team (control versus human-team and human-computer team) and whether the 
team would include computers (human-team versus human-computer team). It was 
necessary to include both a human-team and a human-computer team condition in 
order to be able to distinguish the effects of working on a team that included a 
computer, from the effects that result from working on a team with other people. If 
only one team condition had been employed, in which participants worked with other 
human and computer teammates, it would not have been possible to determine 
whether any resulting team affiliation effects were a function of working with human 
teammates or a function of working with computer teammates. 
In all conditions, the room contained six computers arranged in two banks of 
three. In the control condition, participants were given a subject number on a white 
piece of cardboard and told they would be working on their own during the 
experiment. The computers all had white identification cards attached to their 
monitors, and the interface for the two tasks (TRT and DST) had a black border. 
Participants were told it did not matter which computer they used, and that they could 
                                                
17 Paper questionnaires were used to avoid any politeness effects resulting from participants answering 
questions about the computer, at the computer on which they had been working (see Nass, Moon and 
Carney 1999, for further details on the politeness effect.) 
 110 
work on any computer in the room. The questionnaires completed by participants 
were printed on white paper. 
In the human-team condition, participants were randomly given a subject 
number printed on either red or blue cardboard and told they would be working as 
part of the red or blue team, respectively. As per the control condition, the computers 
all had white identification cards attached to their monitors, and the interface for the 
two tasks had a black border. However, a sign saying either ‘blue team’ or ‘red team’ 
identified the two banks of three computers (this was designed to create a sense of an 
area of the room dedicated to each team). Participants were told it did not matter 
which computer they used, but that they should work on one of the computers in their 
team area. The questionnaires completed by participants were printed on red paper for 
members of the red team and blue paper for members of the blue team. 
In the human-computer team condition, participants were randomly given a 
subject number printed on either red or blue cardboard and told they would be 
working as part of the red or blue team, respectively. As per the human-team 
condition, the two banks of three computers were identified by a sign saying either 
‘red team’ or blue team’. In contrast to the control and human-team conditions, the 
computers had either red or blue identification cards, and the task interface had either 
a red or blue border. Participants were asked to use a red computer if they were on the 
red team and a blue computer if they were on the blue team. The questionnaires 
completed by participants were printed on red paper for members of the red team and 
blue paper for members of the blue team. 
Thus, the control condition was differentiated from the human-team and 
human-computer team conditions on the basis of whether participants were led to 
believe they were working on their own or as part of a team. Furthermore, the human-
team and human-computer team conditions were differentiated on the basis of 
whether the computer was made to appear to be part of the team. The purpose of this 
latter difference was to allow the separation of the effect of being on a team with other 
people from the effect of being on a team with a computer. 
4.2.4 Measures 
Participants’ degree of experience was measured using an item asking, “In general, 
how experienced are you with computers?” The median value for this measure was 6 
on a 9-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “very experienced” (mean = 6.2). On 
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this basis, participants who scored 6 and below were defined as having low 
experience, and participants who scored above 6 were defined as having high 
experience. Low experience participants reported spending an average of 3.9 hours 
per week on the computer, and high experience participants reported spending an 
average of 7.1 hours per week on the computer.  
After all interaction with the computer was complete, participants completed 
the written questionnaire. Except where otherwise identified, all responses were made 
on 9-point Likert scales. In order to assess mood, the questionnaire included the 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS); 20 mood descriptors rated on a 5-point 
Likert scale designed to assess positive and negative mood states (Watson, Clark, & 
Tellengen, 1988)18. 
Participants’ attitudes towards the ‘Text Rating Task’ and the ‘Desert Survival 
Task’ were assessed using three items each (e.g. “How much fun was the text rating 
[desert survival] task?”). Participants also rated the quality of the information 
provided by the computer with three items (e.g. “How relevant was the information 
the computer provided?”). To assess the degree of openness to influence from the 
computer, participants rated seven items drawn from Nass and colleagues’ original 
study (1995; , 1996) (e.g. “How receptive were you to the computer’s suggestions?”). 
In addition to these measures, demographics (gender, age, and enrolled degree) were 
collected. 
For each task, participants were asked two questions related to similarity of 
their ratings/rankings (“How similar were your initial ratings [final ratings] to the 
computer’s ratings?”). For analysis, these measures were combined by subtracting 
each respondent’s initial rating of similarity from their final rating. This variable 
represented a subjective measure of the degree to which respondents felt their 
ratings/rankings had become more similar to the computer’s suggestions (TRT 
similarity, DST similarity). 
For both the TRT and the DST, objective measures of the extent to which 
participants were influenced by the computer were recorded. For the text rating task, 
the total difference between the participant’s final ratings and the computer’s 
suggested ratings was calculated, such that participants who were more influenced by 
                                                
18 The 20 item PANAS was used in favour of the 65 item POMS (McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1971) 
employed in the first study. The less detailed measure of mood was chosen for the current (and 
subsequent) studies on the basis that it was considered less likely to be found arduous by participants, 
and hence, less likely to lead to questionnaire fatigue. 
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the computer’s suggestions received lower scores, and participants who were less 
influenced by the computer’s suggestions received higher scores. Since the computer 
suggestions were based on a systematic alteration of the participants’ initial 
ratings/rankings, these measures are directly comparable between participants. 
Similarly, for the desert survival task, the total difference between participant’s final 
rankings and the computer’s suggested rankings was calculated, such that participants 
who were more influenced by the computer’s suggestions received lower scores, and 
participants who shifted their rankings further from the computer’s suggestions 
received higher scores (TRT difference score, DST difference score). 
4.2.5 Scale development 
Where relevant, exploratory factor analyses via principal components were conducted 
to identify sets of variables that could be combined into scales. Factor analysis of the 
20 PANAS items showed, as expected, a two-factor solution, with the 10 positive 
mood descriptors loading on one factor (‘Positive Mood’; Cronbach’s alpha = .78) 
and the 10 negative mood descriptors loading on another factor (‘Negative Mood’; 
Cronbach’s alpha = .74). The three items assessing ratings of the text rating task 
loaded on a single factor (‘TRT Rating’; Cronbach’s alpha = .91). Similarly, the three 
items assessing ratings of the desert survival task loaded on a single factor (‘DST 
Rating’; Cronbach’s alpha = .87). The three items rating the quality of the information 
provided by the computer loaded on a single factor (‘Information Quality’; 
Cronbach’s alpha = .85), as did the seven items assessing the respondent’s openness 
to influence (‘Openness to Influence’; Cronbach’s alpha = .91). 
4.3 Results 
A series of one-way ANOVAs were conducted on the dependent measures, with the 
experimental manipulation (control, human-team and human-computer team) as the 
independent variable. Checks of the ANOVA assumptions of linearity, normality, and 
homogeneity of variance for these analyses indicated no reason for concern. Results 
from these initial analyses were non-significant. Prior findings (Study 1) suggest that 
media equation effects are more apparent amongst people with more extensive 
experience with computers, so the sample was split into two groups of respondents 
(low and high experience with computers). The splitting of the sample on the basis of 
experience gave rise to 6 cells. Neither average age nor the distribution of enrolled 
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degree varied across cells. Gender was not evenly distributed across cells, however as 
each cell contained both males and females, and gender was not significantly related 
to any of the dependent measures, this was not considered problematic. 
Subsequent one-way ANOVAs were conducted separately for the low 
experience and high experience respondents. The ANOVAs conducted on the low-
experience respondents (N = 32) showed no significant effect of experimental 
manipulation for any of the dependent measures (see Table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1. ANOVA results for respondents with low and high experience with 
computers. 
Low Experience  
(N = 32) 
High Experience  
(N = 28) Measure 
 F (2,29) Sig. F (2,25) Sig. 
Positive Mood 1.68 .20 <1 .50 
Negative Mood 1.62 .22 <1 .41 
TRT Rating <1 .41 3.87 .03* 
DST Rating 1.21 .31 3.90 .03* 
TRT Similarity 2.19 .13 4.10 .03* 
DST Similarity <1 .76 <1 .56 
Information Quality <1 .81 5.01 .02* 
Openness to Influence <1 .52 3.77 .04* 
TRT Difference  <1 .89 6.07 .01* 
DST Difference  <1 .86 4.00 .03* 
* p < .05 
 
The ANOVAs conducted on the high-experience respondents (N = 28) 
showed significant effects across the experimental manipulation for several measures 
(see Table 4.1). Significant main effects on the three-level experimental manipulation 
were followed up with post-hoc pairwise comparisons to identify the source of each 
main effect. Marginally significant (p < .10) pairwise comparisons were interpreted, 
in a limited number of cases, on the basis that the ANOVA indicated a significant 
effect and moreover, the pattern of results shown by the significant and marginal 
pairwise comparisons was consistent.  
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There were significant differences across conditions for the ratings of both the 
text rating task and the desert survival task. Post-hoc analyses and mean scores (TRT 
rating, DST rating, see Figures 4.1 and 4.2) indicated that high experience participants 
in the human-team and human-computer team conditions rated both tasks more 
positively than their counterparts in the control condition (Text rating task: control vs. 
human-team t = 2.08, p < .08, control vs. human-computer team t = 2.27, p < .05. 
Desert survival task: control vs. human-team t = 1.76, p < .10, control vs. human-
computer team t = 2.8, p < .05). No such pattern existed for low experience 
participants. This finding suggests that for high experience (but not low experience) 
respondents, simply being placed in a team was sufficient to promote more positive 
attitudes to the tasks than working alone. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. TRT Rating – High Experience 
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Figure 4.2. DST Rating – High Experience 
 
 
For high experience respondents’ subjective ratings of how much they altered 
their responses to be like the computer’s suggestions, there were significant 
differences across conditions for the text rating task, but not the desert survival task 
(see Table 4.1). Post-hoc analyses and mean scores for the text rating task (TRT 
similarity, see Figure 4.3), suggested that participants in the human-team condition 
reported more alteration of their responses than participants in the control condition 
(control vs. human-team t = 2.15, p < .05) and that participants in the human-
computer team condition reported less alteration of their responses than participants in 
the human-team condition (human-team vs. human-computer team t = -3.46, p < .01). 
High experience participants in the human-team condition felt they changed their 
responses to be like the computer’s suggestions to a greater extent than participants in 
the control condition or participants in the human-computer team condition. This 
effect was not present for the desert survival task. 
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Figure 4.3. TRT Similarity – High Experience 
 
High experience respondents showed significant differences across conditions 
for both their ratings of the quality of information provided by the computer, and their 
openness to influence from the computer (see Table 4.1). Post-hoc analyses and mean 
scores for these measures indicated that high-experience respondents in the human-
computer team condition rated the quality of information from the computer lower 
(Information Quality, see Figure 4.4) and reported lower levels of openness to 
influence from the computer (Openness to Influence, see Figure 4.5) than their 
counterparts in the control and human-team conditions (Information Quality: control 
vs. human-computer team, t = -2.93, p < .01, human-team vs. human-computer team, t 
= -2.03, p < .07. Openness to Influence: control vs. human-computer team, t = -3.12, p 
< .01, human-team vs. human-computer team, t = -2.24, p < .07). When high 
experience participants were placed in a team with a computer as well as other 
humans, they were less positive about the quality of information provided by the 
computer, and described themselves as being less open to being influenced by the 
computer, than participants working with only human-team members or participants 
working on their own. 
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Figure 4.4. Information Quality – High Experience 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Openness to Influence – High Experience 
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Amongst high experience respondents, there were significant differences 
across conditions for the extent to which respondents’ final ratings/rankings differed 
to the computer’s suggestions for both the text rating task and the desert survival task 
(see Table 4.1). Post-hoc analyses and mean scores for these measures indicated that 
high-experience respondents in the human-computer team condition had 
ratings/rankings that were further from the computer’s suggestions in both the text 
rating task (TRT Difference score, see Figure 4.6) and the desert survival task (DST 
Difference score, see Figure 4.7) than their counterparts in the control and human-
team conditions (TRT Difference score: control vs. human-computer team, t = 2.62, p 
< .05, human-team vs. human-computer team, t = 3.03, p < .05. DST Difference 
score: control vs. human-computer team, t = 2.00, p < .07, human-team vs. human-
computer team, t = 2.45, p < .05). High experience participants, in a team with a 
computer, were less influenced by the computer in both tasks, than high experience 
participants in the human-team and control conditions. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. TRT Difference Score – High Experience 
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Figure 4.7. DST Difference Score – High Experience 
 
4.4 Discussion 
4.4.1 Team Affiliation 
The first aim of the current study was to test whether increased group affiliation 
would occur between humans and computers, as a result of an arbitrary identity 
categorisation that involved the presence of two teams. While Nass, Fogg and Moon 
(1995; , 1996) found no effect for identity (i.e., the categorisation of participants into 
arbitrary teams) in their original study, there was evidence in the present study of 
team affiliation effects as a result of the identity manipulation. High experience 
participants rated both the text rating and the desert survival tasks more positively 
when they were part of a team (in comparison to participants who were working on 
their own). Whether the team was a human-team or a human-computer team did not 
affect this result – high experience participants on both kinds of team rated the tasks 
more positively. This finding suggests that there is a benefit to computer users in team 
environments. Whether or not the computer is made to be part of the team, computer 
users in a team environment enjoy computer-based tasks more than computer users 
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who are not part of a team environment19. Moreover, participants in the human-team 
condition perceived themselves as changing their responses to be more similar to the 
computer’s responses to a greater extent than participants in the control condition. 
These findings support the first hypothesis, that participants would show group 
affiliation effects as a result of a traditional identity manipulation in which they were 
arbitrarily placed on the same team as a computer. 
The key difference between the present study and previous research conducted 
by Nass and colleagues (1995; , 1996) is the presence of another team. As in 
traditional minimal group and social identity research, the present study incorporated 
the presence of two distinct teams in all team conditions. In light of the lack of effect 
found by Nass and colleagues, it seems likely that the presence of another team (or at 
least knowledge of the existence of another team) is an essential prerequisite for team 
affiliation effects to occur in a computer-based task environment.  
4.4.2 The effects of being on a team with a computer 
An unexpected, but consistent, pattern of results arose for high experience participants 
across the human-team and human-computer team conditions. Initially, these results 
appear to be contrary to the first hypothesis, that participants would show group 
affiliation effects as a result of a traditional identity manipulation, in which they were 
arbitrarily placed on the same team as a computer. Broadly speaking, high experience 
participants in the human-computer team condition rated the quality of information 
from the computer lower, felt they were less open to influence from the computer, 
perceived their own responses to the text rating task to be less similar to the 
computer’s ratings, and were objectively less influenced by the computer’s response 
in both the text rating and desert survival tasks, than high experience participants in 
the human-team condition. This finding is in contrast to the findings of Nass and 
colleagues (1995; , 1996) in which participants perceived the computer as having 
more influence, rated the quality of information from the computer more highly, and 
conformed more to the computer’s recommendations when the computer was made a 
part of the team.  
                                                
19 It should be noted that this effect is not a result of interaction with teammates or other similar 
variables. The only difference between control conditions and team conditions in the study was 
whether participants were told they were working as part of a team or working on their own. There was 
never any interaction between participants during the study. The same numbers of people were in the 
room, seated in the same configuration, in all conditions.  
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The contrary pattern of results obtained in the current study is intriguing, as it 
is not possible to conclude that the identity manipulation did not work. Firstly, team 
affiliation effects are present for high experience participants in terms of rating of the 
tasks. Secondly, those in the human-computer team condition did not show the same 
attitudes and behaviour as those in the human-team condition. Those who had a 
computer teammate as well as human-teammates generally reacted negatively towards 
the computer in comparison to those who were part of a team without the computer as 
a teammate. This finding is particularly interesting given that the human-team and the 
human-computer team conditions were identical except that in the human-computer 
team condition, it was implied that the computer was part of the team, and in the 
human-team condition no such implication was made. It appears that there is 
something unique about being on a team that includes a computer that leads to a 
negative reaction towards that computer. 
These findings raise the question of why high experience people would be 
inclined to disregard or undervalue the computer’s recommendations. Initial 
consideration of the social identity literature led to the opposite pattern of results 
being hypothesised. It was expected that high experience participants would be more 
likely to treat the computer as a team member, and thus, to be more influenced by the 
computer’s ratings and rankings in the two tasks, when the computer was made part 
of the team. The pattern of results obtained contradicted these expectations. High 
experience participants working with the computer as a team member were less 
influenced by the computer than either low experience participants or participants in 
which the computer was not a team member. 
However, further exploration of the social identity literature leads to 
explanations of the high experience participants’ behaviour that are in line with the 
media equation explanation of people’s reactions to computers. Research has been 
conducted identifying a phenomenon known as the ‘Black Sheep Effect’ whereby 
group members may reject another group member based on that group member’s 
deviation from the group prototype (Biernat, Vescio, & Billings, 1999; Branscombe, 
Wann, Noel, & Coleman, 1993; Hogg, Hardie, & Reynolds, 1995; Jetten, Spears, & 
Manstead, 1997; Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Martinez-Taboada, 1998; Marques, Paez, 
& Abrams, 1998; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988; Matheson, Cole, & Majka, 2003). These 
studies highlight unfavourable evaluations and derogation of ingroup members as a 
form of ingroup bias that marginalises members who threaten positive ingroup 
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identity. If the current findings are considered in light of the ‘Black Sheep Effect’, 
then they can be interpreted as a clear example of media equation behaviour. 
Specifically, it can be argued that high experience participants placed on a team with 
the computer (but not low experience participants) treat the computer like a person to 
the extent that they perceive the computer as a member of the ingroup, albeit a 
member of the group that does not contribute positively to their group identification. 
It can be further argued that as a result, high experience participants derogate this less 
positively perceived group member (the computer) by placing less value on its 
recommended ratings and rankings, and generally perceiving the information it 
provides to be of less value. This derogation of the computer and the information it 
provides does not occur among high experience participants unless the computer is 
implied to be a member of the team. Low experience participants, on the other hand, 
do not exhibit a media equation pattern of results; even when it is implied that the 
computer is a team member, the computer is not perceived as a member of the group, 
and thus, no negative reaction towards the computer as a group member results. This 
explanation is strengthened by the fact that the results extend beyond subjective 
ratings and into objective behaviour. The pattern of results was consistent for 
subjective ratings of the quality of information provided by the computer, subjective 
ratings of the degree to which participants felt they were open to influence from the 
computer, subjective ratings of the degree of similarity between participants’ and 
computers’ text ratings, and objective measures of the degree to which participants 
actually changed their ratings and rankings in the text rating and desert survival 
tasks20.  
It would seem that while high experience computer users tend to treat 
computers like real people and places to the extent that they will accept the 
categorisation of the computer as a fellow group member, the effect is not strong 
enough for them to perceive the computer as a positive addition to the group. Rather, 
high experience users seem to be prepared to accept the computer as a teammate, but 
presumably because of deviations from the assumed group prototype, the computer is 
reacted to negatively, and its input is marginalized or disregarded. According to the 
                                                
20 It is interesting to note that this pattern of results did not extend to subjective ratings of similarity 
between participants’ and computers’ desert surival task (DST) rankings. This may be a function of the 
fact that the DST is perceived as a more difficult task than the text rating task (TRT), or a task on 
which computers would be less capable than humans. It may also be that because the DST has only 12 
degrees of freedom and the TRT has 100, participants perceived that there was much less possibility of 
being influenced by the computer in terms of the DST in comparison to the TRT.  
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‘Black Sheep Effect’ and the associated theory of group formation, this derogation of 
the marginal ingroup member (in this case the computer) serves to strengthen and 
protect the existing team identity. Thus it can be argued that these findings provide 
indirect support for the first hypothesis, that participants would show group affiliation 
effects, albeit in a manner different to that which was expected21. 
An alternative explanation for this pattern of results would be that participants 
found the concept of having the computer as a teammate ridiculous. In response to 
being forced into an absurd situation, participants became contrary and deliberately 
changed their responses to be counter to the recommendations made by the computer. 
However, this explanation cannot account for the fact that only high experience 
participants showed these effects (i.e., only high experience participants rated the 
information provided by the computer as less useful, perceived themselves as less 
influenced by the computer, perceived themselves as less similar to the computer, and 
changed their responses away from the recommendations made by the computer). Nor 
can it account for the fact that high experience participants reported enjoying the task 
more when they worked as part of a team regardless of whether the computer was part 
of the team.  
4.4.3 Experience 
The second aim of the current study was to extend the findings of Study 1, which 
showed media equation behaviour on the part of participants with high, but not low, 
experience with computers. No significant differences were found for low experience 
participants, whereas, significant effects were found across conditions, on a variety of 
measures, for high experience participants. Thus, support was found for the second 
hypothesis, that the propensity to show team affiliation effects in response to being 
placed on a team with a computer would be stronger for participants with a greater 
degree of experience. 
This finding further supports the explanation that media equation behaviour 
(treating computers as though they are real people and places) results from a state of 
mindlessness. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, more experienced participants are 
more familiar with computers and computer based tasks than less experienced 
                                                
21 While the ‘Black Sheep Effect’ provides a convincing and apt explanation for the findings discussed, 
no statistical analysis of the explanation is possible on the basis of the existing data. Future research is 
needed to more directly assess the utility of the ‘Black Sheep Effect’ as an explanation for the current 
findings.  
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participants, and hence, less likely to be mindful during the computer based tasks 
completed as part of this study. Similarly, participants who perceive themselves to be 
more experienced with computers are less likely to be mindful during completion of 
the study than participants who perceive themselves to be less experienced. Thus, 
irrespective of the accuracy of their judgments of their own experience levels, 
participants who judge themselves to be more experienced are more likely to be in a 
mindless state. Participants in a mindless state are less likely to notice all the cues 
presented in a situation (including those which would remind them that they are not 
dealing with a human) and instead, are likely to react to certain cues that suggest 
humanness on the part of the computer. In other words, participants who judge 
themselves to be more experienced are more likely to be relaxed in the environment 
and to be acting on ‘autopilot’. The human-like cues presented by the computer are 
less likely to be consciously (or unconsciously) inspected or questioned, and 
behaviour that is generally applied when dealing with other humans results. The 
findings of the current study, in combination with the first study, provide strong 
empirical support for the link between greater experience and media equation 
behaviour. This empirical evidence of the relationship between experience and the 
media equation provides theoretical support for the mindlessness explanation of the 
media equation. However, it does not constitute empirical evidence of mindlessness 
as the cause of the media equation. Further research is needed to directly assess the 
mindlessness explanation of the media equation. Regardless of the process underlying 
the phenomenon, this is the second study to find evidence of the positive correlation 
between experience and behaviour consistent with the media equation. 
4.4.4 Implications 
The study provides further support for the notion that being made to feel part of a 
team when working on a computer based task leads to more positive reactions to the 
task itself (among high experience participants). It is likely to be valuable to create a 
team environment amongst computer users who are facing tasks that might otherwise 
be perceived less positively. Although there is no evidence to suggest that the positive 
impact of being part of a team extends to low experience computer users, neither was 
there any evidence that such users react negatively to being part of a team 
environment. Thus, a group of more experienced computer users (e.g., office 
workers), or a group with varying degrees of experience with computers (e.g., high 
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school students) will be likely to react more positively to computer based tasks if the 
tasks are presented in an environment in which the users are encouraged to perceive 
themselves as a team. 
Of particular note is the ease with which a sense of identity was created in the 
current study. Participants were simply told that they would be working on either the 
red or blue team, and given minimal environmental reminders of this fact (coloured 
subject numbers, coloured questionnaires and a designated ‘team area’ in which to 
work). The simplicity and effectiveness of this operationalisation implies that 
leveraging the benefits of team affiliation (particularly increased positive reactions to 
computer based tasks) should be relatively easy in real world environments. 
Assigning people to arbitrary teams and providing minimal contextual reminders of 
team membership in the work environment should be sufficient to create team 
affiliation effects. However, it should be noted that the current study reveals that the 
presence of another team is a necessary condition for team affiliation effects. The 
construction of opposing teams may only be feasible or appropriate in certain real 
world environments. 
A limitation of the current study is the lack of a condition in which 
participants worked on a computer on their own. Thus, it is not possible to discuss the 
implications of the current study for people working on their own with a computer. 
Future research that applies the current methodology with the addition of a single 
person with computer condition could provide valuable information regarding the 
potential for team affiliation effects when people are working with a computer on 
their own. 
The results of the study could be interpreted as suggesting that it is unwise to 
attempt making a computer part of a team of humans. No benefits of making the 
computer part of the team were found for low experience participants, and for high 
experience participants a strong negative reaction towards the computer resulted. 
However, the literature exploring the ‘Black Sheep Effect’ suggests that the use of 
marginal team members in a scapegoat role leads to the protection and strengthening 
of the group identity. It may be that although humans in a particular group will 
marginalise computer team members, they will experience improved group affiliation 
among themselves as a result. Thus, creating a situation in which the computer 
appears to be part of a team may only be beneficial when the aim is to strengthen the 
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sense of group affiliation between the human team members and not when the aim is 
to improve attitudes towards a computer-based task. 
 4.5 Conclusions 
The first hypothesis, that participants would show group affiliation effects as a result 
of being placed on a team with a computer, was strongly supported but not in the 
manner initially expected. Rather than reacting with increased positivity and openness 
to influence towards a computer that was made part of a team, participants derogated 
and appeared to marginalise computers that were made to appear as part of the team; 
arguably, they treated the computer as a ‘black sheep’. However, it can be argued that 
this negative reaction towards the computer teammate is actually a team affiliation 
effect, in that, the computer must be perceived as a teammate for there to be any 
reason to react negatively towards it and the information it provides. This argument is 
strengthened by the fact that no negative reaction towards the computer occurred in 
the human-team conditions. According to the ‘Black Sheep Effect’, the derogation of 
the computer and the information it provided may have been a means of protecting the 
team identity and affiliation for the other (human) team members. 
The second hypothesis, that affiliation effects would be stronger for 
participants with a greater degree of experience, was also strongly supported. Low 
experience participants in the present study showed no evidence of media equation 
behaviour at all. High experience participants, on the other hand, showed a range of 
media equation reactions, both in terms of subjective responses and objectively 
measured behaviour.  
The present study extends the original study conducted by Nass and 
colleagues, by showing that the presence of a second group or team allows for the 
creation of a team identity in the absence of any interdependence between the 
computer and the human participants. The present study further extends previous 
research by showing that high experience computer users will accept the computer as 
a team member, but not a valued or positively perceived team member. 
Broadly speaking, the results provide further support for the media equation 
theory and additional support for the notion that media equation behaviour is more 
prevalent amongst more experienced computer users. The results also provide an 
intriguing insight into an easily applied area of the media equation. Future research 
directed towards confirming and further exploring the tendency of high experience 
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participants to accept the computer as a team member, but treat the computer as a 
‘black sheep’, is likely to be of great value.  
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Chapter 5 
Study 3 – Stereotyping, Media Equation, Mood and Mindlessness 
5.1 Introduction 
The two previous studies (described in Chapters 3 and 4) provide indirect support for 
the mindlessness explanation of media equation behaviour. These studies show clear 
evidence of a stronger propensity among participants with greater experience with 
computers to treat computers as though they are human. Participants of high 
experience, but not low experience, displayed a media equation pattern of results, 
reacting to flattery from a computer in a manner congruent with people’s reactions to 
flattery from other humans (D. Johnson, Gardner, & Wiles, 2004). When assigned to a 
team that involved a computer, participants of high experience, but not low 
experience, exhibited ingroup bias (D. Johnson & Gardner, 2005, under review) in a 
manner consistent with human based research on group affiliation and the ‘Black 
Sheep Effect’.  
These links between degree of experience and propensity to exhibit a media 
equation effect are consistent with the mindlessness explanation of the media 
equation. As discussed in section 2.7, Langer and Imber (1979) hypothesised that 
although a task is initially performed with conscious awareness, with greater 
familiarity the task becomes increasingly inaccessible to the consciousness and hence, 
is more likely to be dealt with mindlessly. Obviously, for more experienced computer 
users, tasks on the computer are likely to be more familiar. Thus, the finding that 
more experienced computer users tend to treat computers as though they are social 
actors can be interpreted as being a result of the fact that more experienced users are 
more likely to be in a mindless state when working on the computer.  
The measures of experience used in the current program of research are self-
reported. Thus, the accuracy of the measures is reliant on the accuracy of participants’ 
judgments of their own experience. However, mindlessness is likely to occur in 
situations where individuals believe they are familiar with a particular task or 
environment (Langer, 2000). The previous studies (Chapters 3 and 4) show a clear 
link between participants’ beliefs that they are more experienced with computers and 
the tendency to treat computers as though they are human. Thus, irrespective of the 
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accuracy of participants’ judgments of their own experience, the current findings 
remain consistent with the mindlessness explanation of the media equation. 
While research showing the moderating effect of experience on media 
equation behaviour supports the mindlessness explanation of the media equation, it 
does not constitute direct evidence of a causal relationship between mindlessness and 
media equation behaviour. Evidence that more experienced participants show a 
greater tendency than less experienced participants to treat computers in a social and 
natural way, is theoretically likely to be a function of mindless versus mindful 
processing, but the research conducted provides no objective evidence of this link. 
Indeed, to date, the potential relationship between mindlessness and the media 
equation has not been tested. The aim of the present study is to provide a more direct 
test of the possible link between a state of mindlessness and media equation effects. 
5.1.1 Manipulating Mindlessness 
The most direct path to exploring the potential link between mindlessness and media 
equation behaviour is to study participants in mindless and mindful states, and assess 
whether their tendency to exhibit media equation patterns of behaviour vary as 
expected (that is, assess whether people in a mindless state show a greater propensity 
to treat computers socially and naturally than people in a mindful state). The most 
obvious and direct method for assessing the relationship would be by conducting a 
media equation study, measuring the degree of mindlessness experienced by 
participants, and assessing whether any relationship exists between degree of 
mindlessness and the propensity to display media equation behaviour. Unfortunately, 
no psychometrics for mindlessness have been developed. Brown and Ryan (2003) 
developed the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS), but distinguish between 
Langer’s conception of mindful and mindless processing (Langer, 1989; Langer & 
Imber, 1979; Langer & Weinman, 1981) and the mindfulness which the MAAS is 
designed to measure, defined as an open, undivided observation of what is occurring 
both internally and externally. 
Given the inability to directly measure the degree of mindlessness experienced 
by participants, the relationship between mindlessness and media equation behaviour 
must be assessed via alternative methodologies. One means by which the link can be 
explored is through manipulating the degree of mindlessness experienced by 
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participants and assessing the extent to which media equation behaviour is displayed 
as a result.  
The literature on mindlessness provides a number of potential techniques for 
leading participants to process in either a mindful or mindless state. Techniques for 
increasing mindfulness include: employing different communication techniques 
(Burgoon, Berger, & Waldron, 2000), increasing the personal relevance of the task 
being undertaken (Langer, 1989), asking people to justify their opinions and 
responses to questions (Folkes, 1985; Langer, 1989), deviating from expected scripts 
for particular situations (Langer & Imber, 1980), requiring people to provide multiple 
answers to a particular question (Langer, Bashner, & Chanowitz, 1985), presenting 
information conditionally (Langer & Piper, 1987), and pre-questioning people about a 
situation or topic before they engage with it (Pressley et al., 1992). However, many of 
these findings have been explored in very specific contexts, and have not been 
replicated in a variety of settings, making it difficult to be confident of their 
usefulness in a media equation environment. Moreover, attempting to incorporate 
such techniques into a media equation study would arguably lead to the creation of 
demand characteristics that would significantly weaken the validity of the study. For 
example, pre-questioning people about the media equation before they were involved 
in a media equation study would result in a situation where any media equation 
behaviour shown could be argued to be a result of the demand characteristics of the 
study (people deliberately displaying the behaviour about which they had just been 
asked). Similarly, asking people to justify their responses, in a media equation study, 
might lead to a situation in which people question the purpose of the study or become 
suspicious. Such questioning or suspicion could easily skew the results of the study. 
One particularly well-established finding, which is unlikely to introduce 
demand characteristics, is the link between positive mood and a state of mindlessness. 
This link has been consistently found in a wide variety of settings (see Bless et al., 
1996; Schwarz & Bless, 1991 for reviews). Although researchers are yet to concur on 
the specific process responsible for positive mood leading to more mindless 
processing and negative mood leading to more mindful processing, there is general 
agreement that the link between affective state and processing style exists (Bless et 
al., 1996; Schwarz & Bless, 1991).  
There are three main theoretical accounts for the link between affect and 
mindlessness (Bless et al., 1996). Firstly, individuals in a good mood may not have 
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the cognitive resources required by systematic processing strategies, and therefore, 
default to less taxing heuristic strategies. Secondly, individuals in happy moods avoid 
investing cognitive effort in tasks unless doing so promises to maintain or enhance 
their positive mood (the mood maintenance motivation account). Thirdly, negative 
affect signals that the environment poses a problem, whereas positive affect signals 
that the environment is benign. As a result, negative affective cues may motivate 
detail oriented, systematic processing which is usually adaptive in handling 
problematic situations. In contrast, positive affect states by themselves signal no 
particular action requirement, and happy individuals may hence not be motivated to 
expend cognitive effort unless called for by other goals (the affect-as-information 
hypothesis). The specific process by which affect influences the degree of 
mindlessness experienced by people is not relevant for the current research. The links 
between positive mood and mindless processing and negative mood and mindful 
processing are well established, and thus, in the present study, mood manipulation 
techniques were employed as a means of varying the degree of mindlessness among 
participants. 
5.1.2 Stereotyping 
The existence of stereotyping and prejudice on the basis of gender is well established 
in the psychology literature (see Vaughan & Hogg, 1995 for a review). Media 
equation researchers have successfully shown that participants will extend this pattern 
of behaviour to include computers, in a series of studies showing gender stereotypical 
reactions towards computers on the part of human participants. Nass, Moon and 
Green (1997) conducted computer-based tutoring and testing sessions with 
participants on the topics of computers (stereotypically male domain) and love and 
relationships (stereotypically female domain). The computers, on which participants 
worked, spoke with either a female or male pre-recorded human voice. Nass and 
colleagues found evidence of three specific stereotypical attitudes applied to the 
computer by participants in the study. Firstly, evaluation from computers speaking 
with a male voice was rated as more valid than evaluation from computers speaking 
with a female voice. Secondly, when placed in a dominant role, computers with a 
male voice were rated more positively than computers with a female voice. Finally, 
computers speaking with a male voice were rated as knowing more about the 
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stereotypically male domain and computers speaking with a female voice were rated 
as knowing more about the stereotypically female domain.  
Based on research on gender and social influence among humans (see Eagly, 
1983 for a review), Lee, Nass and Brave (2000) exposed participants to a hypothetical 
social dilemma situation and then assessed the degree to which the participants were 
persuaded by a computer speaking with either a male-sounding, or a female-sounding, 
synthesised voice. Parallelling the human-centred research on which the study was 
based, these researchers found that participants assigned more masculine attributes to 
the male-sounding synthesised voice than to the female-sounding synthesised voice. 
Furthermore, participants were, in general, more convinced by the male-sounding 
voice, male participants found the male-sounding voice more attractive, and female 
participants found the female-sounding voice more attractive.  
Lee (2003) conducted a study in which participants played a trivia game with 
the aid of an animated character. In line with equivalent research conducted with 
humans in a computer-free environment, Lee found that participants were more likely 
to conform to the suggestions of a male animated character than a female animated 
character, when the topic being discussed was stereotypically male (sports), and were 
more likely to conform to the suggestions of a female animated character than a male 
animated character when the topic being discussed was stereotypically female 
(fashion).  
Mullennix et al. (2003) noted the possibility that research exploring 
stereotypical reactions to computer-generated speech could partially reflect the fact 
that synthesised female voices are of a slightly lower quality than male synthesised 
voices (as a function of the fact that it is harder to synthesise certain vocal and 
prosodic characteristics of the female voice). With this in mind, Mullennix et al. 
(2003) conducted a study in which participants were exposed to male and female, 
human and synthesised voices presenting a persuasive argument. These researchers 
found that degree of persuasion did not differ across human and synthetic speech, that 
females were more persuadable in general, and that ratings of the voices were 
consistent across human and synthetic speech. Mullennix et al. concluded from this 
research that gender stereotyping towards computers was consistent, irrespective of 
whether the computer spoke with human or synthesised speech. 
In sum, the above research has shown that computer users will apply social 
rules concerning gender stereotypes to computers. Consistent with the social 
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psychology literature on gender-stereotyped behaviour in human interactions, 
participants have been shown to apply gender stereotyped attributes to pre-recorded 
and synthesised voices on a computer, to perceive computers as knowing more about 
a topic when the topic is presented by a gender-stereotype-consistent synthesised 
voice, and to be more likely to conform to the suggestions of a computer when the 
gender of an animated character is stereotype-consistent with the topic being 
discussed. 
5.1.3 Study Three  
The current study involved participants interacting with a multimedia tutorial 
describing how car engines work (a stereotypically male topic). Participants were 
exposed to either a male or female sounding computer-generated voice22 during the 
tutorial. Thus, half the participants experienced a gender-stereotype-consistent 
combination of male voice and male topic, while half the participants experienced a 
gender-stereotype-inconsistent combination of female voice and male topic.  
The study was designed with both a primary and a secondary aim. The 
primary aim was to seek more direct evidence of the theorised link between 
mindlessness and media equation behaviour. The study was designed to explore 
whether media equation behaviour (in this case, stereotyping) is moderated by 
affective state. Based on the aforementioned research linking mood and degree of 
mindlessness, it was expected that participants in a positive mood would be more 
likely than participants in a negative mood to behave mindlessly, and hence, be more 
likely to display media equation behaviour. Specifically, it was hypothesised that 
participants in a positive mood would exhibit a stronger, gender-stereotypical 
response (reacting more positively to the male voice than the female voice) than 
participants in a negative mood (H5.1).  
As part of the primary aim of the study (seeking evidence for mindlessness as 
an explanation for media equation behaviour), a research question was also generated 
– How do experience and mood interact in terms of their impact on media equation 
behaviour? (RQ5.1). The previous findings, linking greater experience to media 
                                                
22 A synthetic voice, rather than a recording of a human voice was employed on the basis that a 
synthetic voice was far less suggestive of humanness on the part of the computer. This allows for a 
more conservative test of the media equation, as arguably, a human voice might suggest to participants 
they are actually interacting with another human through the computer, or imply that social reactions 
are more appropriate. 
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equation responses, are theorised to reflect that more experienced participants are 
more likely to be in a mindless state. Given that mood has also been shown to impact 
upon the degree of mindlessness experienced by people, it is of value to explore how 
these two factors (experience and mood) interact. It is possible that they have an 
additive effect (for example, highly experienced people in a positive mood are more 
mindless than either highly experienced people in a negative mood or less 
experienced people in a positive mood) or that the impact of one factor subsumes the 
impact of the other (for example, people in a positive mood behave mindlessly 
towards computers regardless of how experienced they are). 
The secondary aim of the current study was to extend the body of research on 
gender stereotypical responses to computers by exploring the issue of gender 
stereotyping within a learning environment. Based on the previous research, described 
above, it was expected that participants would apply gender stereotypes to computer-
synthesised voices. Specifically, it was expected that participants would ascribe 
stereotypically masculine attributes to a male-sounding voice and stereotypically 
feminine attributes to a female-sounding voice, and moreover, would react more 
positively to a male-sounding voice describing car engines than to a female-sounding 
voice on the same topic. Given that the first hypothesis largely encompasses the issue 
of stereotyping, no formal hypothesis was derived in relation to the study’s secondary 
aim.  
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
Seventy-six students (32 males and 44 females) from a variety of undergraduate 
degree programs at the University of Queensland voluntarily participated in the study. 
In return for their time, participants were given a movie pass. Participants ranged in 
age from 17 to 28 years, with an average age of 20.7 years. 
5.2.2 Procedure 
Upon arrival, participants were told they would be taking part in two separate and 
unrelated studies (in fact, the first study was the mood manipulation and the second 
study was the stereotyping study). Participants were told the first study was about the 
impact of film excerpts on mood and asked to put on headphones and watch a five-
minute video clip on the computer. In the positive mood condition, participants 
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watched a segment of the movie ‘Austin Powers: Goldmember’, a segment of a short 
humourous animation called ‘The Chubb Chubbs’ and a segment of an episode of the 
television show ‘The Simpsons’. In the negative mood condition, participants watched 
a segment of the movie ‘The Pianist’. Both the positive and negative mood video clips 
were pilot tested to ensure they affected mood as expected. When participants had 
finished watching the clip, they were given a short questionnaire to complete which 
assessed their mood.  
Participants were then told that the second study was a test of a computer-
based tutorial system. Participants were asked to pay attention to the tutorial, as they 
would be asked for their opinions of the tutorial and the interface at the conclusion of 
the tutorial. The tutorial, which explained how a car engine works, was created in 
Macromedia Director and included a series of still images and animations. 
Participants in the ‘male voice’ condition, listened to a computer-generated voice that 
sounded male, while participants in the ‘female voice’ condition, listened to a 
computer-generated voice that sounded female. The computer-generated voices were 
created using the CSLU toolkit (“ttl” with a pitch of 220, speech range of 40 and a 
speech rate of .95 for the female voice and “mwm” with a pitch of 115, speech range 
of 19 and a speech rate of .95 for the male voice). All participants saw the same 
visuals and heard exactly the same content spoken. When participants had finished the 
tutorial they were given a questionnaire to complete. 
5.2.3 Measures 
Participants’ affective state after watching the mood induction video was measured 
using three items. Participants were asked to rate on a 9-point scale the extent to 
which they felt bad-good, sad-happy, and negative-positive. These three items formed 
a reliable scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .96). 
After watching the tutorial, participants’ impressions of the qualities of the 
computer voice were assessed. As a means of assessing the validity of the voice-
gender manipulation, participants were asked “How ‘male’ did the voice sound?” and 
“How ‘female’ did the voice sound?” In addition, based on previous research 
exploring the aspects of a voice that were commonly used to distinguish between 
human and computer voices (Mullennix, Stern, Wilson, & Dyson, 2003), participants 
were asked to rate on a 7-point scale the extent to which they thought the voice was 
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‘squeaky’, ‘soft’, ‘slow’, ‘accented’, ‘nasal’, ‘lively’, and ‘easy to understand’. Each 
of these variables was analysed separately. 
A set of 15 items selected from amongst the items in the BEM Sex Role 
Inventory (Bem, 1974) was used to assess participants’ impressions of the computer 
voice. These items had been identified in previous research as being stereotypically 
male (e.g., ‘dominant’), stereotypically female (e.g., ‘gentle’), or stereotypically 
unrelated to gender (e.g., ‘truthful’). The 15 items were selected on the basis that they 
could reasonably be applied to a computerised voice.  
Participants were also asked to rate on a series of 7-point scales their 
impressions of the tutorial program. Specifically, participants were asked the extent to 
which they thought the tutorial was ‘competent’, ‘informative’, ‘knowledgeable’, 
‘sophisticated’, ‘professional’, ‘educational’, ‘convincing’, ‘trustworthy’, ‘reliable’, 
‘helpful’, ‘intelligent’, ‘insightful’ and ‘easy to work with’.  
In addition, separate items assessed respondents’ overall satisfaction with the 
tutorial (“Were you satisfied with the tutoring program?”), and their willingness to act 
(“How interested would you be in watching further sections of the car engine 
tutorial?”). These measures were assessed on a 7-point scale that ranged from 1 (not 
at all) to 7 (very much). Finally, participants were asked for demographic information 
(age, gender, enrolled degree), and their degree of experience was assessed by asking 
participants, “For how many years have you been using computers?”. 
5.2.4 Scale Development 
Where relevant, exploratory factor analyses via principal components were conducted 
to identify sets of variables that could be combined into scales. The fifteen items 
drawn for the BEM Sex Role Inventory were subject to a factor analysis that indicated 
a 3-factor solution as being appropriate. Three items (‘adaptable’, ‘independent’, and 
‘sympathetic’) were dropped due to low communalities and/or split loadings. The 
final three-factor solution explained 63.5% of the variance.  
Initial investigation suggested that two of the three factors were intercorrelated, so 
oblique rotation was used. The first factor contained five items that belong to the 
feminine subscale of the BSRI; these items were collapsed to form a single measure 
labelled ‘Feminine’. The second factor contained three items that are identified by the 
BSRI as being stereotypically masculine; these items were collapsed to form a single 
measure labelled ‘Masculine’. Finally, the third factor contained four items that the 
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BSRI identifies as non-sex-stereotyped. Inspection of these items revealed that not 
only were all four items gender-neutral, but also, that they were inherently positive 
characteristics (truthful, reliable, helpful and self-reliant). These items were combined 
to form a single measure that was labelled ‘Positive Characteristics’. The ‘Feminine’ 
factor and the ‘Positive Characteristics’ factor were correlated at .38; other factor 
intercorrelations were negligible. The loading matrix and Cronbach’s alphas for the 
final three factors are shown below (see Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1. Factor loadings and Cronbach’s alphas for the BSRI factor analysis. 
Factor 
Item 1 2 3 
Sensitive .87 .07 -.04 
Understanding .86 -.03 -.06 
Gentle .73 -.13 .11 
Friendly .70 -.03 .14 
Affectionate .56 .07 .01 
Dominant -.10 .85 .23 
Competitive .23 .84 -.17 
Aggressive -.12 .80 .05 
Truthful -.02 -.08 .80 
Reliable -.01 .08 .79 
Helpful .11 -.07 .79 
Self-reliant .11 .22 .61 
Cronbach’s alpha .84 .79 .79 
 
The items designed to assess participants’ impressions of the tutorial program 
were subject to a factor analysis via principal components, which indicated a single-
factor solution as appropriate. The single factor explained 60.2% of the variance, with 
a Cronbach’s alpha of .94. All items were averaged to form a single measure of 
‘tutorial rating’. 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Manipulation checks 
Analyses indicated that the mood induction video successfully evoked positive and 
negative mood. Across all participants, ratings of mood for those who viewed the 
negative mood induction video were significantly lower than for those who viewed 
the positive mood induction video (F(1,74) = 375.15, p < .001). Analyses of 
participants’ impressions of the computerised voices indicated that the male voice was 
 138 
recognised as more male than female (F(1,74) = 170.94, p < .001), and the female 
voice was recognised as more female than male (F(1,74) = 293.60, p < .001).  
 5.3.2 Analysis planning 
The full study design was a three-way ANOVA, with between-subjects factors of 
participant mood (positive or negative), participant gender (male or female), and 
tutorial voice (male or female). However, given the strong a priori expectation that 
male and female participants would engage in sex stereotyping of the computer voices 
to a different extent (E. Lee, 2003; Mullennix, Stern, Wilson, & Dyson, 2003), it was 
decided to analyse the data from female and male participants separately, and thus 
avoid the complexity of potential 3-way interaction effects.  
5.3.3 Analysis of female participants 
The responses of female participants were analysed using two-way ANOVAs, with 
between-subjects effects of mood (positive and negative) and tutorial voice (male and 
female). See Table 5.2 for results of these analyses. Where two-way interactions were 
significant, these effects were investigated via simple main effects analyses.  
There were significant main effects for type of tutorial voice. Female 
participants rated the female voice as being more squeaky and as having less 
masculine characteristics than the male voice.  
There were also significant voice by mood interactions for impressions of the 
voice on measures of: positive characteristics, tutorial rating, overall satisfaction, and 
willingness to act. The voice by mood interaction for impressions of the voice as 
masculine was marginally significant (p < .10); given the relevance to the research of 
this effect and its consistency with the other significant interactions, it was also 
interpreted. To assess these interactions, simple main effects analyses were conducted 
to assess the effects of voice separately for positive and negative mood (see Table 
5.3). 
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Table 5.2. Results of ANOVAs (tutorial voice by mood) for female participants. 
Effect Variable F (1,42) 
Voice Squeaky 5.78* 
 Soft <1 
 Slow 1.57 
 Accented <1 
 Nasal <1 
 Lively 3.14+ 
 Easy to Understand <1 
 Masculine  5.59* 
 Feminine 1.35 
 Positive Characteristics 1.92 
 Tutorial Rating <1 
 Overall Satisfaction <1 
 Willingness to Act <1 
Mood Squeaky 1.19 
 Soft <1 
 Slow 3.35+ 
 Accented <1 
 Nasal <1 
 Lively <1 
 Easy to Understand <1 
 Masculine  <1 
 Feminine <1 
 Positive Characteristics <1 
 Tutorial rating <1 
 Overall Satisfaction <1 
 Willingness to Act <1 
Voice by Mood Squeaky 1.69 
 Soft 1.58 
 Slow <1 
 Accented <1 
 Nasal 1.28 
 Lively <1 
 Easy to Understand <1 
 Masculine 3.00+ 
 Feminine <1 
 Positive Characteristics 10.77** 
 Tutorial Rating 7.93** 
 Overall Satisfaction 7.52** 
 Willingness to Act 4.11* 
+p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01 
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Table 5.3. Simple main effects of tutorial voice for female participants. 
Variable Mood F (1,42) 
Masculine Positive 8.78** 
 Negative <1 
Positive Characteristics Positive 12.08** 
 Negative 1.51 
Tutorial Rating Positive 4.57* 
 Negative 3.43 
Overall Satisfaction Positive 7.49** 
 Negative 1.40 
Willingness to Act Positive 4.23* 
 Negative <1 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
 
 
Overall, the interactions present a consistent pattern of results, in which there 
are no significant effects of tutorial voice in the negative mood condition, and 
significant effects of voice in the positive mood condition, such that the male tutorial 
voice was rated more positively than the female tutorial voice. Female participants, in 
a positive mood, rated the male voice as being more masculine and having more 
positive characteristics than the female voice, rated the male-voiced tutorial more 
positively than the female-voiced tutorial, were more satisfied with the male-voiced 
tutorial than the female-voiced tutorial, and were more willing to further interact with 
the male-voiced tutorial than the female-voiced tutorial. In contrast, female 
participants in a negative mood did not show a preference for either the male-voiced 
or the female-voiced tutorial. The interactions are graphed in the five figures below 
(see Figures 5.1-5.5). 
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Figure 5.1. Ratings of Voice as Masculine (Female Participants) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Ratings of Voice for Positive Characteristics (Female Participants) 
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Figure 5.3. Tutorial Ratings (Female Participants) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Overall Satisfaction (Female Participants) 
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Figure 5.5. Willingness to Act (Female Participants) 
 
 
 
5.3.4 Analysis of male participants 
The responses of male participants were analysed using two-way ANOVAs, with 
between-subjects effects of mood (positive and negative) and tutorial voice (male and 
female). Unlike the female participants, there were no significant mood by voice 
interactions for male participants (see Table 5.4). 
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Table 5.4. Results of ANOVAs (tutorial voice by mood) for male participants. 
Effect Variable F (1,30) 
Voice Squeaky <1 
 Soft <1 
 Slow 1.16 
 Accented 1.07 
 Nasal <1 
 Lively <1 
 Easy to Understand 4.59* 
 Masculine  <1 
 Feminine <1 
 Androgenous <1 
 Tutorial Rating <1 
 Overall Satisfaction 2.01 
 Willingness to Act 4.22* 
Mood Squeaky 1.50 
 Soft 1.50 
 Slow 1.16 
 Accented 1.73 
 Nasal <1 
 Lively 3.83 
 Easy to Understand 3.10 
 Masculine  3.08 
 Feminine 1.08 
 Androgenous <1 
 Tutorial Rating 1.08 
 Overall Satisfaction 2.36 
 Willingness to Act 4.32* 
Voice by Mood Squeaky <1 
 Soft <1 
 Slow <1 
 Accented 2.07 
 Nasal <1 
 Lively <1 
 Easy to Understand <1 
 Masculine 1.06 
 Feminine 1.77 
 Androgenous <1 
 Tutorial Rating <1 
 Overall Satisfaction <1 
 Willingness to Act <1 
 *p < .05, **p < .01 
 
Male participants rated the male-tutorial voice as easier to understand than the 
female-tutorial voice, and were more willing to engage in further work with a male-
voiced tutorial than with a female-voiced tutorial. In addition, male participants in a 
positive mood were more willing to work further with the tutorial than male 
participants in a negative mood.  
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The different results shown by male and female participants prompted follow-
up analysis of the effectiveness of the mood manipulation. This analysis indicated that 
males were significantly less influenced by the mood manipulation than females 
(F(1,74) = 3.66, p < .05). This finding may partially explain why the effects for 
females varied as a function of mood, while the effects for males did not. 
5.4 Discussion 
Female participants in a positive mood, but not in a negative mood, differentiated 
between the male- and female-tutorial voice such that the male-voiced tutorial was 
rated more positively than the female-voiced tutorial on a range of dimensions. Given 
that the tutorial topic was car engines (a stereotypically male domain) these results are 
in line with the primary aim of the study, and strongly support the first hypothesis that 
participants in a positive mood would exhibit a much stronger gender-stereotypical 
response than participants in a negative mood. In contrast, male participants did not 
exhibit the same pattern of results. Overall, the results for males suggest that they may 
have engaged in a slight degree of stereotyping, reacting more positively to the male 
voice than the female voice on one measure. However, for males, the degree of 
stereotyping was not affected by their mood. For the sake of clarity, the results for 
female and male participants are discussed separately. 
5.4.1 Female Participants 
Mood 
The results from the post-video mood questionnaire indicate that the mood 
manipulation worked effectively for female participants.  
Voice 
The main effect of voice for the ratings of ‘maleness’ and ‘femaleness’ clearly 
indicates that the synthetic voice designed to be male was recognised by female 
participants as sounding male, and the synthetic voice designed to be female was 
recognised by female participants as sounding female. Female participants tended to 
rate the female voice as more squeaky than the male voice. This finding aligns with 
previous research (discussed in section 5.1.2) showing that, in general, male 
synthesised voices are more pleasant to listen to than female synthesised voices, 
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probably because female voices are more difficult to accurately synthesise than male 
voices (E. Lee, 2003; Mullennix, Stern, Wilson, & Dyson, 2003).  
Stereotyping and Mindlessness 
Considering separately those participants who are in a positive and negative mood, a 
consistent pattern of results is revealed. Females in a positive mood reacted more 
positively to the male synthetic voice (the gender-stereotype-consistent condition) 
than to the female synthetic voice (the gender-stereotype-inconsistent condition). 
Specifically, female participants in a positive mood rated the male-voice as having 
more masculine and positive characteristics, rated the male-voiced tutorial more 
positively than the female-voiced tutorial, were more satisfied with the male-voiced 
tutorial than the female-voiced tutorial, and were more willing to interact further with 
the male-voiced tutorial than the female-voiced tutorial. In contrast, amongst female 
participants in a negative mood, this preference for the gender-stereotype-consistent 
tutorial was not present. 
This pattern of results supports the hypothesis. Participants in a positive, but 
not a negative mood, reacted with a gender stereotypical attitude towards the 
interface. These results support the mindlessness explanation of the media equation. 
Participants in a positive mood (and thus arguably in a mindless state) are more 
inclined to react to the human-like cues presented by the computer and react to the 
computer as though it is actually human, and in the present study, as though the 
computer has a gender. This finding constitutes initial empirical evidence of a link 
between mindlessness and a media equation effect. 
5.4.2 Male Participants 
Mood 
The results of the post-video mood questionnaire show that male participants rated 
both the positive and negative mood manipulation videos as having far less impact on 
their mood than female participants. This finding suggests that the affective state of 
males was less influenced by the videos used in the study than was the affective state 
of females. The reduced impact of the mood manipulation on male participants could 
either be the result of some specific characteristics of the males who participated in 
the study, or the consequence of an interaction between gender and the particular 
mood induction videos employed. 
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Males in a positive mood were more willing to work further with the tutorial 
than males in a negative mood. This effect did not vary as a function of the gender of 
the tutorial voice, and thus perhaps reflects that participants in a positive mood are 
more likely to be generous with their time than participants in a negative mood.  
Voice 
The main effect of voice for the ratings of ‘maleness’ and ‘femaleness’ clearly 
indicates that the synthetic voice designed to be male was recognised by male 
participants as sounding male, and the synthetic voice designed to be female was 
recognised as sounding female. 
Males rated the male-voiced tutorial as easier to understand than the female-
voiced tutorial. This finding may, in part, reflect a tendency to stereotype, but 
previous research (Mullennix, Stern, Wilson, & Dyson, 2003) suggests that this 
finding is more likely to reflect actual differences in the quality of male and female 
synthesised voices. Additionally, male participants who interacted with the male-
voiced tutorial were more prepared to interact further with the tutorial than male 
participants who interacted with the female-voiced tutorial. This increased willingness 
to interact further with the male-voiced tutorial either reflects the differing quality of 
the male and female synthesised voices, or indicates a slight tendency to stereotype on 
the part of male participants.  
Stereotyping and Mindlessness 
For male participants, no evidence of interactions between mood and tutorial voice 
was found. It could be concluded that male participants do not exhibit media equation 
patterns of behaviour, or that male participants stereotype less than female 
participants. Both these conclusions seem unlikely as in both cases there is a great 
deal of research (discussed in the introduction) suggesting the opposite; that is, no 
gender difference in the propensity to exhibit a media equation pattern of behaviour 
has been found across the myriad of previous media equation studies, and male 
participants have been shown to stereotype as much, or more than, female 
participants. It is more likely that the lack of interactions is due to the mood 
manipulations having less impact on male participants than on female participants (as 
evidenced by the post manipulation mood questionnaire). Thus, while females were 
affected to the point where two clear subgroups emerged (negative mood and positive 
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mood), and interactions between mood and voice of tutorial emerged, males were 
insufficiently affected by the manipulation and no reliable test of potential 
interactions between mood and voice was possible. It is also possible that the lack of 
effect for male participants stems from the use of a stereotypically male topic in the 
tutorial. Lee (2003) found that males were less likely to be influenced by a computer 
discussing a stereotypically male topic, and females were less likely to be influenced 
by a computer discussing a female topic. It is possible that in the current study, male 
participants knew, perceived themselves to know, or felt they should have known 
more about car engines than did female participants. As a result, they may have been 
less open to influence from the computer and the tutorial. 
 5.4.3 Implications 
The findings with respect to stereotyping indicate situations in which people’s 
attitudes towards a tutorial can be improved through the use of gender-stereotype-
consistent voices. Specifically, it would seem that tutorials employing male voices 
when discussing stereotypical male areas of expertise will benefit from users 
experiencing increased positivity towards the tutorial, increased satisfaction and 
increased willingness to further engage with the tutorial. However, such techniques 
obviously raise ethical concerns in terms of reinforcing stereotypes among users. 
Conversely, it might also be possible to use computer interfaces as a means of 
reducing stereotypes. The literature on intergroup behaviour lists a number of specific 
techniques for reducing stereotypes (for examples, see Alvarez-Torres, Mishra, & 
Zhao, 2001; Eberhardt & Fiske, 1996; S. Gaertner, Mann, Dovidio, Murrell, & 
Pomare, 2000; Vaughan & Hogg, 1995), some of which require contact between 
members of different groups (for example, Hewstone, 1996; Kunda, 1999). The 
current (and previous) research shows that people will stereotype a computer and 
thereby treat it as a member of a particular group. Thus, in situations where it is 
difficult or problematic to bring together human members of different groups as a 
means of reducing stereotypes, computers could be used as replacements for members 
of particular human groups. 
5.4.4 Experience 
Beyond seeking evidence of a link between mood and media equation effects, this 
study was also designed to explore how mood interacted with participant experience 
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in terms of the degree of media equation behaviour shown (Research Question 5.1). 
Unfortunately, the sample of data collected for the study was too small to allow for 
the statistical analysis of the impact of mood and experience on stereotyping 
behaviour. However, in the interest of informing future research, certain trends can be 
observed in the data. For female participants, it appears that the mood manipulation 
subsumed any experience effects, such that the results did not vary as a function of 
experience for female participants. For male participants, the pattern of results 
suggested that participants with greater experience tended to react more positively to 
the gender-stereotype-consistent tutorial than participants with less experience with 
computers. These trends are in line with the previous two studies (described in 
Chapters 3 and 4); however, given the sample size, no firm conclusions regarding the 
relationship between mood and experience can be made. 
5.4.5 Alternative Explanations 
One alternative explanation for the results shown by female participants is that female 
synthetic voices are of a lower quality than male synthetic voices, and that 
participants were reacting to the lower quality of the female voice and favouring the 
male voice as a result. However, this explanation cannot account for the fact that 
participants reacted differently to the male and female voice as a function of their 
mood. Further, previous research has explored this issue and found that people react 
stereotypically to computers when the issue of differences in voice quality is removed 
(E. Lee, 2003; Mullennix, Stern, Wilson, & Dyson, 2003). Finally, female participants 
in the present study only distinguished between the male and female voice in terms of 
‘squeakiness’. No significant distinctions were made on any of the other objective 
voice characteristics. 
Inherent in the interpretation of the results described above, is the assumption 
that positive mood results in mindlessness, which in turn leads to an increased 
tendency to treat the computer as though it were human. An alternative interpretation 
would be that positive mood leads directly to an increased tendency to stereotype, 
rather than an increased tendency to behave mindlessly towards the computer. That is, 
there is no difference in the extent to which participants tend to treat the computer like 
a human as a function of mood; rather, participants are simply stereotyping when in a 
good mood and not stereotyping when in a bad mood. However, the empirical 
evidence regarding a direct link between mood and stereotyping is inconsistent. Some 
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researchers have found evidence of increased stereotyping among people in a positive 
mood, and others have found evidence of increased stereotyping among people in a 
negative mood (Abele, 2000). Thus, it is difficult to judge the validity of the 
aforementioned alternative explanation. Regardless, the argument for the link between 
mindlessness and the media equation would be greatly strengthened through 
replication of the effect shown, using a mindlessness manipulation that did not 
involve mood. 
5.4.6 Future Research 
The current study was limited by the fact that only a stereotypically masculine tutorial 
topic was employed. Future research, incorporating a stereotypically feminine tutorial 
topic, is needed in order to explore whether the pattern of results found for female 
participants in the current study extends to males when a stereotypically female topic 
is discussed. Such research may need to employ an alternative mood manipulation, as 
the mood induction used in the present study seemed to influence the affective state of 
males far less than females. Further research is also needed to properly investigate the 
potential relationship between experience and mindlessness. The present study 
provided insufficient data for exploration of this issue. Finally, given that 
mindlessness can only be manipulated indirectly, future research employing 
alternative means of varying the degree of mindlessness / mindfulness of participants 
would greatly strengthen research in this area.  
5.5 Conclusions 
The present findings replicate and extend previous research showing people’s 
tendency to exhibit a media equation effect and to apply gender stereotypes to 
computers within a learning environment (in support of the secondary aim of the 
study). Moreover, this study is an initial attempt to explore the relationship between 
mindlessness and the media equation. The finding that females in a positive mood 
show a greater propensity to gender stereotype computers than females in a negative 
mood is preliminary evidence suggesting that mindless processing is responsible for 
the tendency to treat computers as though they are real people or places.  
 
 151 
Chapter 6 
Study 4 – Media Equation, Cues and Mindlessness 
6.1 Introduction 
Prior to the current program of research, no empirical evidence of the theorised link 
between mindlessness and the media equation had been sought or found. People’s 
tendency to treat computers like real people or places has implications for the manner 
in which people’s experience with computers can be improved. Further, the tendency 
to treat computers socially has implications for the ways in which people might be 
misled or deceived in virtual environments. Thus, there is significant value in 
investigating the causes of media equation behaviour so that an understanding can be 
developed of when such behaviour is more likely to occur. 
 The first two studies in the current program of research (Chapters 3 and 4) 
provide clear evidence of a positive correlation between experience with computers 
and the propensity to display a media equation pattern of behaviour. Although not a 
causal link, in light of the evidence showing that mindlessness is more prevalent 
among experts (Epstein, 1999; Langer, 2000), these findings provide support for the 
mindlessness explanation of the media equation. The third study (Chapter 5) provided 
more direct evidence of the link between mindlessness and the media equation by 
showing that female participants in a positive mood, but not a negative mood, will 
show a media equation pattern of response (applying gender stereotypes to 
computers). Study 3 represents evidence of a change in media equation behaviour 
resulting from the manipulation of a third variable (mood) that is purported to relate to 
levels of mindlessness. However, alternative explanations for these findings highlight 
the value in further exploring the relationship between mindlessness and the media 
equation. Moreover, any attempt to manipulate levels of mindlessness is open to the 
alternative explanation that another covariate (as opposed to mindlessness) is 
responsible for the change in media equation behaviour. For example, in the previous 
study it could be argued that manipulation of participants’ mood leads to changes in 
another, extraneous factor that, in turn, leads to changes in media equation behaviour. 
With this possibility in mind, the fourth study was designed to assess the 
mindlessness explanation for the media equation in a more direct manner. Detailed 
inspection of the theorised causal chain from mindlessness to media equation 
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behaviour reveals an alternative technique for seeking empirical support for the 
mindlessness explanation. The theorised causal chain is as follows: (i) People interact 
with computers in either a mindful or a mindless state, (ii) The computer displays 
certain cues that suggest humanness (including using words for output, offering 
interactivity, filling roles traditionally filled by humans, see section 2.7.5 for further 
details), (iii) When processed in a mindless state, people react to these cues and treat 
the computer as though it were human. When processed in a mindful state people do 
not react to these cues in such a manner.  
The third study attempted to manipulate the first step in this process (described 
above) by changing the likelihood of participants being in either a mindful or 
mindless state. An alternative means of testing the theorised causal process that 
reduces the possibility of an extraneous variable being introduced is to manipulate the 
second step in the process – the cues displayed by the computer. If the cues displayed 
by the computer are changed sufficiently, it seems likely that the propensity to treat 
the computer as though it were human would also change. Specifically, it can be 
argued that if a computer displayed sufficient cues suggesting ‘non-humanness’ or 
‘computerness’, then the propensity to treat computers as though they are human 
would decrease or disappear. 
Changing the cues displayed by the computer in order to reduce mindlessness 
(in the form of treating the computer as though it were human) is supported both 
theoretically and empirically (see Burgoon, Berger, & Waldron, 2000 discussed 
below). The mindlessness explanation for media equation behaviour is based around 
the notion that the cues displayed by a computer (the use of words for output, 
interactivity, filling roles traditionally filled by humans) trigger particular scripts and 
expectations associated with human-human interactions, and as a result, people treat 
the computer as though it were human (Nass & Moon, 2000). Thus, it seems 
theoretically plausible that providing additional cues that suggest ‘non-humanness’ 
might interfere with the triggering of scripts and expectations associated with human-
human interaction.  
To this end, Nass and Moon (2000) suggested that research should investigate 
whether cues uniquely associated with computers, such as extremely rapid calculation 
or “crashing”, remind users that social responses to computers are inappropriate. The 
specific examples of cues uniquely associated with computers provided by these 
researchers are difficult to implement in an experimental methodology. A computer 
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that crashes is likely to be very annoying to participants and thus, a confound would 
be introduced along with the manipulation. Similarly, while a computer performing 
extremely rapid calculations could be incorporated into experimental methodology, 
such a computer might appear more competent or useful than a control computer that 
did not exhibit rapid calculations, again introducing a potential confound. While the 
specific examples suggested by Nass and Moon are methodologically challenging, the 
notion of providing cues that remind participants they are dealing with a computer 
remains useful. 
Empirical support for the idea of changing the cues displayed by the computer, 
as a means of reducing media equation behaviour, is provided by Burgoon, Berger 
and Waldron (2000) who showed that discrepant, asynchronous or suspicion arousing 
features of the modality, message, source or situation can increase mindfulness. It 
seems possible that cues reminding participants that they are dealing with a computer 
would be perceived as discrepant, in comparison with their normal computing 
experience. Moreover, Sharps and Martin (2002) conducted research exploring the 
impact on decision making when participants were reminded of known and obvious 
information. These researchers found that the presentation of pertinent information 
(even that which is already available through long term memory) can improve 
understanding of situations and reduce mindlessness in the decision making process. 
In terms of media equation research, it seems that participants are failing to attend to 
the pertinent and known information that they are not dealing with a human. Sharps 
and Martin’s findings suggest that simply reminding participants of this information 
may be sufficient to change their behaviour. Thus, there is both theoretical and 
empirical support for the possibility that providing computer users with cues that 
remind them they are not dealing with a human will decrease their tendency to treat 
the computer as though it were human. 
6.1.1 Experience and Cues 
The present program of research has shown a clear relationship between experience 
and media equation behaviour. Specifically, it has been found that high, but not low, 
experience participants will show a media equation pattern of response (and more 
specifically, that participants that perceive themselves as having high, but not low, 
experience with computers, will show a media equation pattern of response). It is 
theorised that this difference is a function of the fact that low experience people are in 
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a more mindful state than high experience people. If this is the case, then changing the 
cues displayed by the computer to suggest less humanness should have no impact on 
the behaviour of low experience participants. People of low experience are not 
responding to the human-like cues displayed by the computers, so altering such cues 
should not make any difference to their behaviour. In contrast, a change in the cues 
displayed by the computer should impact on the propensity of high experience 
participants to show a media equation pattern of response. Although high experience 
participants can be expected to be in a mindless state when interacting with the 
computer, it can be theorised that the addition of cues reminding them they are 
dealing with a computer could counteract or interfere with the cues suggesting 
humanness, so that media equation behaviour does not result. 
It could be argued that a simpler manipulation would be to remove the cues 
suggesting humanness from the computer and/or the interface, and assess the resulting 
change in behaviour among people interacting with the computer. However, removing 
these cues would fundamentally change the nature of the computer. Removing the use 
of words on computers or decreasing their interactivity and assessing people’s 
behaviour towards such modified computers is not possible. If the computer does not 
use words, there is a paucity of tasks for which it can be used. Similarly, in the 
absence of interaction between the computer and its user, it is not possible to assess 
the user’s behaviour or attitudes towards the computer.  
6.1.2 Study Four 
In order to test the effect of modification of the cues displayed by the computer on 
media equation behaviour, a media equation methodology that has been shown to 
result in media equation behaviour is required. In light of the evidence showing that 
an Australian sample responds to flattery from the computer (Chapter 3), flattery was 
selected for use in the current study. Given that the original study established that 
flattery and praise resulted in the same reactions from participants and that the 
tendency to respond positively to flattery from computers is a clear media equation 
effect, the use of praise was removed from the current study for the sake of improving 
the overall statistical power of the research. Thus, participants in the current study 
were exposed to either flattery or no feedback from the computer. It was expected that 
participants of high, but not low, experience would respond positively to flattery from 
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the computer, but that this reaction would be moderated by the cues manipulation 
described below. 
The aim of the current study was to directly empirically test the mindlessness 
explanation for the media equation. Specifically, the study explored whether adding 
cues suggesting ‘non-humanness’ to the computer interface would decrease the 
tendency to show media equation behaviour. It was hypothesised that high experience 
participants would show a decreased tendency to display media equation behaviour 
when exposed to cues reminding them that were not dealing with a human (H6.1). 
The behaviour of low experience participants was not expected to change as a 
function of the cues manipulation. Low experience participants were expected to 
show the same reaction, regardless of whether or not they were exposed to flattery 
from the computer. 
To further increase the saliency of the cues suggesting ‘non-humanness’, a 
secondary manipulation was incorporated into the current study. It was expected that 
participants who were thinking about the fact that the computer had been programmed 
would be more likely to attend to cues suggesting ‘non-humanness’, and in general, 
be more aware of the notion that the computer was not human. With this in mind, 
participants who were exposed to cues suggesting ‘non-humanness’ were also asked 
to think about how the computer was programmed while completing the study.  
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
One hundred and forty-two students from the University of Queensland and the 
Queensland University of Technology voluntarily participated in the study, 67 
females and 75 males. Participants were enrolled in Multimedia and Design (N=49), 
Science (N=29), Arts (N=44) and Information Technology (N=20) degrees. 
Participants ranged in age from 17 to 53 years with an average age of 21.6 years23.  
6.2.2 Procedure 
As the study was designed to explore the mindlessness explanation of the media 
equation using the previously employed flattery methodology, the procedure 
employed in the present study partly mirrors that used in the first study (Chapter 3). 
                                                
23 Although both study 1 (chapter 3) and the current study were completed by a 53 year old participant, 
none of the participants involved in the research were involved in more than 1 of the studies conducted. 
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Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants were advised that they would use a 
software program (a 20 questions computer game) and then be asked for their 
attitudes and opinions regarding the software and their experience using the software. 
Participants were advised that the software program was still being developed and that 
their input was needed in order to further develop the program. It was explained to 
participants that they would be required to think of an animal while the computer 
asked them a series of questions to which they could answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (e.g., “Does 
the animal have fur?”). Participants were advised that when the computer had enough 
information it would attempt to guess the animal. If the computer guessed correctly, 
the next round would begin. If, however, the computer guessed incorrectly, then the 
participant was asked to suggest a question the computer could have used to gain 
better information about the animal. The game was programmed to make reasonable 
guesses but to be wrong most of the time. At this point, participants were given 
information regarding the feedback they would receive from the computer and how 
the feedback was generated (the feedback type manipulation). Participants were then 
given information regarding a question they should think about while completing the 
study (the computer cue manipulation) and told that the writer of the best answer to 
the question would win a DVD player. The notion of winning the DVD player was 
included to increase participants’ motivation and hence, the likelihood that they would 
be thinking about the question during the study. In fact, the winner of the DVD player 
was randomly determined, as explained to participants during debriefing. Finally, 
participants were told that when they had finished playing the game they would be 
asked about their experience whilst playing the game. 
Before beginning to play the ‘20 questions’ game, participants were asked 
about their level of experience with computers and reminded about the nature of the 
task they were undertaking, the nature of the feedback they would receive and the 
question they should be thinking about during the study. Participants then played the 
game until the computer had guessed incorrectly 8 times, giving participants 8 
opportunities to suggest a question and receive feedback24. On average, participants 
played 9.42 rounds of the game. At the conclusion of the game-playing component of 
the study, participants were given 3 minutes to answer the question they had been 
                                                
24 In the first study (Chapter 3), participants were required to play the game until they had provided 12 
additional questions. The current study required participants to undertake additional tasks, and so the 
number of questions required was reduced to ensure that the study did not become arduous.   
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asked to think about as part of the cue manipulation. Participants were then required 
to complete the questionnaire component of the study. During this part of the study 
participants were asked a series of questions about their experience whilst playing the 
game, the computer and the task, and were given the opportunity to play extra rounds 
of the game if they wished. At the conclusion of the study, participants were fully 
debriefed and thanked for their time. 
6.2.3 Manipulation 
The current study involved 2 manipulations each with 2 levels; feedback type (flattery 
or control) and computer cues (present or absent). The 2 manipulations were varied 
orthogonally resulting in four conditions (flattery with computer cues present (N= 
35), flattery with computer cues absent (N=34), control with computer cues present 
(N=37), and control with computer cues absent (N=36)).  
In terms of the feedback manipulation, in the flattery condition, participants 
were given feedback after each of the 8 rounds in which they suggested a question to 
the computer. Participants were told that feedback provided to them would be totally 
arbitrary and unrelated to the quality of their suggestion. Specifically, participants in 
the flattery condition were told that the feedback they received would be randomly 
generated. These participants received 7 pieces of feedback designed to be positive 
(e.g., "Your question makes an interesting and useful distinction. Good job!") and one 
piece of feedback designed to be slightly negative ("That question may not be useful 
in the long term.")25. 
In the control condition, participants did not receive positive or negative 
feedback. However, to avoid a confound resulting from differing amounts of 
communication from the computer across conditions, participants in the control 
condition were provided with a message the same length and duration of presentation 
as the average feedback message given to participants in the flattery condition (i.e., 
"Your suggested question has been stored. Please prepare for the next round."). 
In terms of the computer cues manipulation, participants in the ‘computer cues 
present’ condition were exposed to specific prompts designed to remind them of the 
fact they were dealing with a computer. Specifically, before the beginning of each 
                                                
25 In earlier flattery studies (Fogg & Nass, 1997b, Study 1), the slightly negative feedback was included 
in order to give the positive evaluations used in the praise condition more credibility. In the current 
study, the negative feedback was included to ensure consistency with the earlier studies. 
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round of the game the interface displayed a loading prompt which described loading 
certain files (p11.a7p, dyn.a7p and xbx.a7p). At the conclusion of the loading screen a 
dialogue box appeared stating “p11.a7p, dyn.a7p and xbx.a7p successfully loaded. 
Please think of an animal and click on OK when you are ready to begin answering 
questions”. In addition, participants in the ‘computer cues present’ condition were 
asked to think about and answer the following question (the programming question), 
“How do you think this game was programmed? (you can explain in pseudo-code, or 
just discuss the style, features and mechanisms that you think were employed)”. 
Participants in the ‘computer cues absent’ condition were not presented with 
specific prompts designed to remind them of the fact they were dealing with a 
computer. Instead, these participants were presented with a “Please wait …” prompt 
that updated at the same rate as the prompts presented in the computer cues condition. 
At the conclusion of the loading screen, a dialogue box appeared stating, “Please 
think of an animal and click on OK when you are ready to begin answering 
questions”. Rather than answer a question about how the game was programmed, 
participants in the ‘computer cues absent’ condition were asked to think about and 
answer the following question (the popularity question), “What do you think are the 
features and characteristics of the 20 questions game that make it so popular?”. For 
the sake of clarity, the differences across conditions are presented in a table below 
(see Table 6.1). 
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Table 6.1. Manipulations across conditions  
 Computer Cues Present Computer Cues Absent 
Flattery  • Positive feedback provided 
• Computer cues provided in 
loading screens and dialogue 
boxes 
• Asked to consider and answer 
question regarding 
programming of game 
• Positive feedback provided 
• No computer cues provided in 
loading screens and dialogue 
boxes 
• Asked to consider and answer 
question regarding the 
popularity of ‘20 questions’ 
games 
Control • No feedback provided 
• Computer cues provided in 
loading screens and dialogue 
boxes 
• Asked to consider and answer 
question regarding 
programming of game 
• No feedback provided 
• No computer cues provided in 
loading screens and dialogue 
boxes 
• Asked to consider and answer 
question regarding the 
popularity of ‘20 questions’ 
games 
 
6.2.4 Measures 
Participants’ degree of experience was measured using an item asking for how many 
years the participant had been using computers. The median value for this measure 
was 10 years (mean = 10.68 years). On this basis, participants who had used 
computers for 10 years or less were defined as having low experience, and 
participants who had used computers for more than 11 years were defined as having 
high experience. The mean level of experience for the low experience group was 8.48 
years (SD = 1.88 years, range 4 to 10 years) and the mean level of experience for the 
high experience group was 13.95 years (SD = 2.35 years, range 11 to 20 years). The 
difference in number of years of experience with computers across the high and low 
experience groups was significant (F = 5.14, p <.05). 
After playing the ‘20 questions’ game, participants completed the 
questionnaire. Except where otherwise identified, all responses were made on 9-point 
Likert scales. In order to assess mood, the questionnaire included the Positive and 
Negative Affect Scale (PANAS); 20 mood descriptors rated on a 5-point Likert scale 
designed to assess positive and negative mood states (Watson, Clark, & Tellengen, 
1988). To assess general positivity towards self and general positivity towards the 
computer, participants were asked to complete a 9-item semantic differential scale for 
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themselves and a 9-item semantic differential scale for the computer on which they 
worked. Participants were also asked six questions regarding their own performance 
and six questions regarding the computer’s performance (e.g., “How well do feel you 
performed?”, “How pleased were you with the computer’s performance?”). 
Participants’ attitudes towards the ‘20 questions’ game were assessed using three 
items (“How much fun was the 20 questions game?”, “How enjoyable was the 20 
questions game?”, “How rewarding was the 20 questions game?”). In addition to 
these attitudinal measures of task, participants were asked three questions related to 
performance aspects of the task ("How sensible are the guesses the computer is 
currently making?", "How intelligent are the questions the computer is currently 
asking?", "How accurate is the feedback the computer is currently giving?"). In terms 
of willingness to play more of the game, both a subjective (“How willing would you 
be to work on this computer in the future?”) and an objective measure (number of 
extra rounds played) were taken. In addition to these measures, demographics 
(gender, age, and enrolled degree) were collected.  
6.2.5 Scale Development 
Where appropriate, exploratory factor analyses via principal components were 
conducted to identify sets of variables that could be combined into scales. The 
PANAS was subject to a factor analysis via principal components using oblique 
rotation, which indicated a two-factor solution as appropriate. The two-factor solution 
explained 54.3% of the variance. The first factor was made up of the positive items of 
the PANAS and had a reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of .92 (‘Positive PANAS scale’). 
The second factor was made up of the negative items of the PANAS and had a 
reliability of .84 (‘Negative PANAS scale’). The two factors were correlated at 0.10. 
Factor analysis of the nine semantic differentials describing the self yielded a 
single factor that explained 57.2% of the variance. This scale, which reflected 
positivity towards the self, had a reliability of .90 (‘Self SD Scale’). Factor analysis of 
the 9 semantic differentials describing the computer yielded a single factor that 
explained 47.1% of the variance. This scale, which reflected positivity towards the 
computer, had a reliability of .86 (‘Computer SD Scale’). 
Factor analysis of the six items assessing the computer’s performance resulted 
in a single factor explaining 67.0% of the variance. This scale, which reflected 
positive perceptions of the computer’s performance, had a reliability of .90 
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(‘Computer Performance Scale’). Factor analysis of the six items assessing 
participants’ own performance yielded a single factor explaining 65.5% of the 
variance. This scale, which reflected positive perceptions of participants’ own 
performance, had a reliability of .89 (‘Own Performance Scale’). Finally, the three 
items designed to assess participants’ attitudes to the task (the ‘20 questions’ game) 
were factor analysed, and a single factor explaining 83.8% of the variance was 
extracted. This scale, which reflected positive perceptions of the task, had a reliability 
of .90 (‘Rating of Task’). 
In addition, the objective measure of willingness to act (operationalised as the 
number of extra rounds played by participants) was found to be negatively skewed. 
As a result, it was dichotomised into participants who played any extra rounds of the 
game and participants who did not play any extra rounds of the game (‘Dichotomised 
objective WTA’). The subjective measure of willingness to act (‘Willingness to use 
computer again’), and three items assessing the performance aspect of the task 
(‘Sensible Guesses’, ‘Intelligent Questions’, ‘Accurate Feedback’) were used as 
single-item measures. 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Analysis planning 
The full study design was a three-way ANOVA, with between-subjects factors of 
computer cues (present or absent), feedback type (control or flattery), and participant 
experience (low or high). However, given the strong a priori expectation that high 
and low experience participants would react differently to the manipulations, it was 
decided to analyse the data from low and high experience participants separately, and 
thus avoid the complexity of potential 3-way interaction effects.  
6.3.2 Low experience participants 
The responses of low experience participants were analysed using two-way 
ANOVAs, with between-subjects effects of computer cues (present or absent) and 
feedback type (control or flattery; see Table 6.2). Where two-way interactions were 
significant, these effects were investigated via simple main effects analyses (see Table 
6.3).  
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Table 6.2. Results of ANOVAs (computer cues by feedback type) for low experience 
participants. 
Effect Variable F (1,81) 
Computer cues Positive Panas Scale 2.43 
 Negative Panas Scale 1.43 
 Self SD Scale 1.23 
 Computer SD Scale <1 
 Willingness to Use Computer Again 1.40 
 Computer Performance Scale <1 
 Own Performance Scale 4.81* 
 Rating of Task  <1 
 Sensible Guesses 2.47 
 Intelligent Questions <1 
 Accurate Feedback 1.17 
 Dichotomised Objective WTA <1 
Feedback Positive Panas Scale <1 
 Negative Panas Scale 1.02 
 Self SD Scale <1 
 Computer SD Scale <1 
 Willingness to Use Computer Again <1 
 Computer Performance Scale 2.76+ 
 Own Performance Scale <1 
 Rating of Task  <1 
 Sensible Guesses <1 
 Intelligent Questions 2.30 
 Accurate Feedback 1.40 
 Dichotomised Objective WTA 1.04 
Computer cues by feedback Positive Panas Scale <1 
 Negative Panas Scale <1 
 Self SD Scale <1 
 Computer SD Scale <1 
 Willingness to Use Computer Again 1.91 
 Computer Performance Scale 5.35* 
 Own Performance Scale <1 
 Rating of Task  <1 
 Sensible Guesses <1 
 Intelligent Questions 1.23 
 Accurate Feedback <1 
 Dichotomised Objective WTA 1.04 
+p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01 
 
For low experience participants, there was a main effect of computer cues on 
the ‘Own Performance Scale’, such that participants’ own performance was rated 
lower in the presence of computer cues (Mean = 5.99) than in the absence of 
computer cues (Mean = 6.59). There was also an interaction between computer cues 
and feedback on the ‘Computer Performance Scale’, which was analysed via simple 
main effects analyses (see Table 6.3 and Figure 6.1). 
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Table 6.3. Simple main effects of feedback for low experience participants. 
Variable Computer 
Cues 
F (1,81) 
Computer Performance Scale Present 9.08** 
 Absent <1 
**p < .01 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Computer Performance – Low Experience 
 
The interaction was such that, for low experience participants, when computer 
cues were absent, there was no effect of feedback. When computer cues were present, 
flattery produced higher ratings of computer performance than no feedback (control). 
6.3.3 High experience participants 
The responses of high experience participants were analysed using two-way 
ANOVAs, with between-subjects effects of computer cues (present or absent) and 
feedback type (control or flattery; see Table 6.4). Where two-way interactions were 
significant, these effects were investigated via simple main effects analyses (see Table 
6.5).  
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Table 6.4. Results of ANOVAs (computer cues by feedback type) for high experience 
participants. 
Effect Variable F (1,48) 
Computer cues Positive Panas Scale 6.11* 
 Negative Panas Scale 4.01* 
 Self SD Scale <1 
 Computer SD Scale <1 
 Willingness to Use Computer Again <1 
 Computer Performance Scale <1 
 Own Performance Scale <1 
 Rating of Task  <1 
 Sensible Guesses <1 
 Intelligent Questions <1 
 Accurate Feedback 1.01 
 Dichotomised Objective WTA 1.01 
Feedback Positive Panas Scale <1 
 Negative Panas Scale <1 
 Self SD Scale <1 
 Computer SD Scale <1 
 Willingness to Use Computer Again <1 
 Computer Performance Scale 2.57 
 Own Performance Scale <1 
 Rating of Task  <1 
 Sensible Guesses <1 
 Intelligent Questions <1 
 Accurate Feedback <1 
 Dichotomised Objective WTA <1 
Computer cues by feedback Positive Panas Scale 1.19 
 Negative Panas Scale <1 
 Self SD Scale <1 
 Computer SD Scale 3.80+ 
 Willingness to Use Computer Again 3.80+ 
 Computer Performance Scale 10.32** 
 Own Performance Scale 3.23+ 
 Rating of Task  1.68 
 Sensible Guesses 6.27* 
 Intelligent Questions 7.02* 
 Accurate Feedback 5.88* 
 Dichotomised Objective WTA <1 
+p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01 
 
For high experience participants, there was a main effect of computer cues for 
Positive and Negative PANAS scales, such that positive affect was lower when 
computer cues were present (mean = 2.59) than when computer cues were absent 
(Mean = 3.22), and negative affect was lower when computer cues were present 
(Mean=1.12) than when computer cues were absent (Mean=1.22). There were also 
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multiple interaction effects that are analysed via simple main effects in Table 6.5 
below. 
 
Table 6.5. Simple main effects of feedback for high experience participants. 
Variable Computer 
Cues F (1,48) 
Computer SD Scale Present 2.82+ 
 Absent 1.07 
Willingness to Use Computer Again Present <1 
 Absent 4.56* 
Computer Performance Scale Present 9.90** 
 Absent 1.56 
Own Performance Scale Present 2.82+ 
 Absent <1 
Sensible Guesses Present 3.20+ 
 Absent 3.11+ 
Intelligent Questions Present 3.72+ 
 Absent 3.32+ 
Accurate Feedback Present 3.30+ 
 Absent 2.59 
+p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01 
 
For high experience participants, both significant and marginally significant 
interactions, as well as all associated main effects, were interpreted26. This less 
statistically conservative approach was taken on the basis that the current research is 
largely exploratory. The current program of research represents the first attempt to 
directly empirically assess the mindlessness explanation of the media equation, and 
thus, both the significant and the marginally significant effects are likely to be useful 
in terms of informing future research in this area. The pattern of results shown is 
consistent across dependent measures, suggesting that the findings are not spurious 
and worthy of interpretation. 
 The pattern of results, shown across all interactions is as follows: when 
computer cues were absent, high experience participants reacted more positively to no 
feedback than they did to flattery. When computer cues were present, high experience 
participants reacted more positively to flattery than they did to no feedback. This 
pattern of results extended to the ‘Computer SD Scale’ (see Figure 6.2), ‘Willingness 
                                                
26 For the sake of consistency, less conservative significance levels were also applied to analyses for 
low experience participants. However, for low experience participants, none of the interactions were 
marginally significant.   
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to Use Computer Again’ (see Figure 6.3), ‘Computer Performance Scale’ (see Figure 
6.4), ‘Own Performance Scale’ (see Figure 6.5), ‘Sensible Guesses’ (see Figure 6.6), 
‘Intelligent Questions’ (see Figure 6.7), and ‘Accurate Feedback’ (see Figure 6.8). 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Computer Semantic Differential – High Experience 
 
 
Figure 6.3. Willingness to Use Computer Again – High Experience 
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Figure 6.4. Computer Performance – High Experience 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5. Own Performance – High Experience 
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Figure 6.6. Sensible Guesses – High Experience 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7. Intelligent Questions – High Experience 
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Figure 6.8. Accurate Feedback – High Experience 
 
6.4 Discussion 
The pattern of results found was far more complicated than anticipated. The 
expectation that low experience participants would not show a media equation effect, 
irrespective of the cues manipulation, was largely confirmed. The first hypothesis, 
that participants of high experience would show a decreased tendency to display 
media equation behaviour when exposed to cues reminding them that they were not 
dealing with a human (the ‘computer cues present’ condition), was not confirmed. In 
fact, the results for high experience participants were largely opposite to the expected 
pattern. For the sake of clarity, the results for low and high experience participants are 
discussed separately. 
6.4.1 Low Experience 
In comparison to high experience participants, low experience participants exhibited 
very little distinction between flattery and no feedback (control), irrespective of the 
presence or absence of computer cues. This was as expected, and consistent with the 
previous research showing that low experience people are less likely to display media 
equation behaviour (Chapters 3 and 4) and specifically, that low experience people 
are less likely to respond to flattery from a computer (Chapter 3). This pattern of 
results is consistent with the expectation that less experienced participants (and 
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participants who perceive themselves to be less experienced) are more likely to be in a 
mindful state, and thus any change in the cues displayed will have no impact on their 
behaviour towards the computer. However, low experience participants did show 
some reactions to the feedback and cues presented by the computer. 
Cues 
Low experience participants rated their own performance lower when computer cues 
were present than when computer cues were absent. The computer cues present and 
computer cues absent conditions were identical with the exception of whether 
participants saw technical or non-technical loading screens and the question which 
participants were required to answer. It seems unlikely that the style of the loading 
screens affected participants’ opinions of their own performance. It is feasible, 
however, that the question regarding programming led to a dampening of participants’ 
opinions of their own performance in comparison to the question about the popularity 
of the ‘20 questions’ game. Specifically, low experience participants may have felt 
more daunted when they were asked to think about how the game was programmed 
than when asked to think about why the ‘20 questions’ game is so popular. Having 
less familiarity with computers, low experience participants may have felt less able to 
answer the programming question than the popularity question. As a direct 
consequence of questioning their ability in this way, low experience participants may 
have rated their own performance less positively.  
Cues and Feedback 
 For low experience participants, the interaction between cues and feedback was 
significant for only one dependant measure – ratings of computer performance. When 
computer cues were absent, low experience participants did not distinguish between 
flattery and no feedback when rating the computer’s performance. When computers 
cues were present, low experience participants exposed to flattery rated the 
computer’s performance more highly than when given no feedback. This is the same 
pattern of response as shown by high experience participants across a range of 
dependant measures in the current study (this finding is also consistent with the 
behaviour of high experience participants in Study 1 and participants in the original 
media equation flattery research conducted by Fogg and Nass (1997b)). The possible 
explanations for this pattern of response are considered as part of the discussion of the 
results for high experience participants. 
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In the original study (Chapter 3), low experience participants did not react to 
flattery at all, while high experience participants responded to flattery across a variety 
of measures. In the current study, low experience participants are showing the same 
behaviour as high experience participants in terms of ratings of computer’s 
performance. One possible explanation for this stems from difference in the 
distributions of participants’ experience across the two studies. In the original study, 
the median experience level of participants was 8 years, whereas in the current study, 
the median experience level of participants was 10 years. Thus, the low experience 
sample in the current study is more experienced than the low experience sample in the 
original study. It could be that in the current study the low experience sample has 
sufficient experience to behave similarly to the high experience sample in terms of 
ratings of computer performance, but insufficient experience for this similarity to 
extend to any other measures.  
6.4.2 High Experience 
High experience participants experienced less positive and less negative affect when 
computer cues were present than when computer cues were absent. It seems unlikely 
that this is related to the different loading screens viewed by participants. It is 
possible, however, that the ongoing consideration of the programming question 
required more cognitive effort than did the popularity question. As a result, a decrease 
in arousal or interest (reflected in lower ratings of affect generally) may have 
stemmed either from the perception that the question was harder, or from the relative 
levels of cognitive effort that were actually applied by high experience participants 
when answering the different questions. 
The major finding with respect to high experience participants is the series of 
interactions showing a largely consistent pattern. In the computer cues present 
condition, high experience participants showed a more positive reaction to flattery 
than to no feedback, and in the computer cues absent condition, high experience 
participants showed a less positive reaction to flattery than to no feedback. This 
pattern extended to positivity towards the computer, willingness to use the computer 
again, ratings of computer performance, ratings of participants’ own performance, 
perceptions that the computer made sensible guesses, perceptions that the computer 
asked intelligent questions and perceptions that the computer provided accurate 
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feedback. The consistency of this pattern precludes the assumption that the results are 
spurious or due to experimental noise.  
Computer Cues Present  
When computer cues were present, high experience participants displayed a media 
equation pattern of response consistent with the first study (Chapter 3) and previous 
media equation flattery research (Fogg & Nass, 1997b). That is, they reacted more 
positively to flattery than to no feedback (feeling more positive towards the computer, 
rating its performance more positively, and being more willing to work on it in the 
future). However, in the present study, it was expected that the cues reminding 
participants they were dealing with a computer to dampen or remove the tendency to 
treat the computer as though it were human. 
There are two possible explanations for this lack of effect of the presence of 
computer cues on media equation behaviour. One compelling explanation is that the 
addition of cues reminding participants that they were interacting with a computer and 
not a human, in combination with the requirement to think about how the game was 
programmed, was insufficient to prevent high experience participants from reacting to 
the computer as though it were human. The mindlessness explanation for the media 
equation assumes that human-like cues displayed by the computer trigger scripts and 
expectations that lead people to behave as though the computer is human. These 
scripts are, by definition, well learnt and easy to trigger as they are learnt and 
reinforced whenever humans interact with one another. In comparison, humans have 
very few, if any, scripts or expectations linked to cues reminding them that they are 
dealing with a computer. Irrespective of this, any such expectations or scripts can be 
assumed to be weaker than those associated with human interaction, as scripts 
associated with computer interaction are likely to be exercised and reinforced less 
often than scripts associated with human interaction. Thus, when high experience 
participants, who can be expected to be in a mindless state, are presented with cues 
suggesting humanness (for example; words for output, interactivity and the filling of 
roles traditionally filled by humans) alongside cues suggesting ‘computerness’, it can 
be argued that the cues suggesting humanness are far more likely to inform their 
behaviour. Thus, the results from the present study could be interpreted as evidence of 
the strength of the link between the human like cues displayed by computers and the 
tendency to treat them as though they were human when in a mindless state. 
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Obviously, this first explanation for the lack of effect of computer cues 
assumes that the mindlessness explanation for the media equation is correct. Although 
the current program of research provides indirect support for the mindlessness 
explanation, the current study fails to provide more direct empirical evidence of the 
link between mindlessness and media equation behaviour. This highlights a second 
potential explanation for the lack of effect of computer cues in the current study – that 
mindlessness is not the cause of media equation behaviour. Mindlessness is by 
definition a reversible state (Langer, 1992). The tendency of high experience 
participants to display a media equation effect in the presence of cues reminding them 
they are not interacting with a human can be interpreted as evidence that it is not 
possible to reduce or remove the tendency to treat computers as though they are 
human. If media equation behaviour cannot be dampened or stopped, then 
mindlessness cannot be the cause of media equation behaviour. To properly explore 
alternative explanation for media equation behaviour, the results for each of the 
studies in the current program of research must be considered together (this possibility 
is considered in detail in the General Discussion). However, it seems premature to 
assume that mindlessness is not the cause of the media equation on the basis of the 
current results, particularly in light of the possibility that the manipulations employed 
in the current study were simply not strong enough to result in a change in behaviour. 
Computer Cues Absent 
When computer cues were absent in the present study, participants experienced an 
interaction with the computer identical to that experienced by participants in the first 
study, with the exception of the requirement to think about and answer the question 
regarding the popularity of the ‘20 questions’ game. In the first study, high experience 
participants showed a media equation pattern of response, reacting more positively to 
flattery than to no feedback. In the current study, when computer cues were absent, 
high experience participants showed the opposite pattern of results, reacting more 
positively to no feedback than to flattery. It seems likely that this opposite pattern of 
results is related to the question about the popularity of the ‘20 questions’ game, as 
this is the only substantive difference between the computer cues absent condition in 
the current study and the original study. 
The popularity question was incorporated in the computer cues absent 
condition as a control to counterbalance the programming question used in the 
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computer cues present condition. The popularity question was selected on the basis 
that it would not remind participants of the fact they were dealing with a computer, 
and because it would not seem inconsistent with the rest of the study. The question, 
“What do you think are the features and characteristics of the 20 questions game that 
make it so popular?”, was written in reference to the game, known as ‘20 questions’, 
which has existed for a long time and in a variety of forms. The question was not 
intended as a reference to the adaptation of the game incorporated in the current 
study. However, a review of participants’ qualitative responses to the question reveals 
that many participants interpreted the question as referring to the game they had just 
finished playing and not to the myriad versions and interpretations of the game. Of the 
33 high experience participants in the computer cues absent condition, the answers of 
13 participants made it clear they interpreted the question as referring to the game 
they had played as part of the study (that is, these participants interpreted the question 
in an unexpected manner), and the answers of 4 participants made it clear they 
interpreted the question as referring to the broader notion of the 20 questions game 
(that is, these participants interpreted the question as intended in the design of the 
study). The remaining responses were ambiguous as to which interpretation of the 
question was being answered27. 
Thus, between 39% and 88% of participants in the computer cues absent 
condition interpreted the popularity question as referring to the game they were 
playing as part of the study. This belief provides a potential explanation for the 
unexpected results shown in the computer cues absent condition. For these 
participants, the computer would have appeared to be praising itself (the question 
asked was “What do you think are the features and characteristics of the 20 questions 
game that make it so popular?” which implies and assumes that the game being 
played as part of the study is popular). Given the deliberate simplicity of the interface 
this may have seemed a ridiculous and immodest claim to most of these participants. 
Moreover, research has shown (described in detail in Chapter 2) that in certain 
                                                
27 Unfortunately, this ambiguity precluded any statistical assessment of the relationship between 
interpretation of the question and the results shown. Because the question asked did not require 
participants to make clear which of two possible interpretations of the question they were responding 
to, it is only possible to identity that 39% of high experience participants interpreted the question as 
referring to the specific game they had played and 12% of participants interpreted the question as it was 
intended. The remaining 49% of participants provided answers that were ambiguous in this regard and 
hence couldn’t be classified into one group or the other. It is not possible to run any meaningful 
statistical analysis without knowing which interpretation the majority of participants made of the 
popularity question.  
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situations, computers that praise themselves are perceived less positively (Nass & 
Steuer, 1993; Nass, Steuer, Henriksen, & Dryer, 1994; Nass, Steuer, & Tauber, 1994).  
It seems likely that participants who also received flattery from the computer 
became suspicious. These participants were exposed to a computer that played a very 
simple game, implied that the game was very popular, provided arbitrary positive 
feedback about the participants’ behaviour and then asked the participants for their 
opinions of the game. It seems feasible that participants following this thought pattern 
would become suspicious or even antagonistic. These participants seem to be reacting 
to the perception that the computer was using a combination of flattery and the 
implication that the game they had played was very popular, as a means of coaxing or 
directing them into affirming the popularity of the ‘20 questions’ task. For 
participants in the control condition, this thought pattern would be unlikely to arise. 
Although a proportion of these participants also interpreted the popularity question as 
referring to the game they were currently playing, they did not receive positive 
feedback from the computer, and hence, they would have been less likely to react 
adversely. 
In sum, high experience participants in the computer cues absent condition 
reacted more positively to no feedback than to flattery in direct contradiction to the 
results from the first study and the findings of Fogg and Nass (1997b). It seems that 
although the popularity question was designed as a control measure, a confound was 
introduced due to the unexpected interpretation of the question. The question was 
perceived as self-praise from the computer, which may have led to the negative 
reactions to flattery from the computer shown by participants. 
Unfortunately, the introduction of this confound prevents any analysis of the 
relative degree of media equation behaviour shown by high experience participants in 
the computer cues present, and the computer cues absent, conditions. Although the 
computer cues presented to participants proved to be insufficient to stop them from 
treating the computer socially, it is possible that they led to a reduction in the extent to 
which the computers were treated like humans. However, due to the confound 
introduced in the computer cues absent condition, it is not possible to test whether any 
such reduction occurred. Future research, free from any confounding variables is 
needed to assess this possibility. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
As expected, in line with the first two studies, low experience participants did not 
show a media equation response. Low experience participants showed no 
differentiation between flattery and no feedback from the computer. This finding is 
further support for the idea that low experience participants interact with computers in 
a mindful state, and hence, do not respond to the human-like cues displayed by 
computers. High experience participants, on the other hand, did differentiate between 
flattery and no feedback from the computer, but not in the manner expected. When 
exposed to cues designed to remind them that they were interacting with a computer, 
high experience participants still displayed media equation behaviour; reacting more 
positively to flattery from the computer than to no feedback. It seems likely that the 
computer-cues manipulation used in the study was insufficient to cause high 
experience participants to become mindful during their interaction with the computer. 
When high experience participants were not exposed to cues designed to remind them 
they were interacting with a computer, their reactions were the opposite to what, 
based on previous research, would be expected. This unexpected pattern of results is 
presumably due to a confound introduced through the combination of the popularity 
question (used as part of the computer cues manipulation) and the flattery participants 
received (as part of the feedback manipulation). 
The current study is the first reported research to employ modification of the 
cues displayed by a computer as a means of empirically evaluating the mindlessness 
explanation of the media equation. As such, the study provides important insight into 
the methodological issues surrounding attempts to explore the causes of media 
equation behaviour, and provides a base from which future research can expand. 
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Chapter 7 
General Discussion and Conclusions 
The current chapter summarises the research conducted as part of the thesis and 
considers how the findings address the gaps in the media equation literature 
(identified in Chapters 1 and 2). The evidence found for the moderating impact of 
experience is discussed and the methodological and theoretical implications of this 
finding are considered. The evidence supporting the mindlessness explanation of 
media equation behaviour is evaluated and a possible alternative explanation 
(automaticity) is discussed. The methodological implications arising from the studies 
conducted are identified and the implications for the existing literature are considered. 
The impact of the findings on software design recommendations is also discussed. 
Finally, the broader implications of the evidence for the moderating influence of 
experience are considered and directions for future research are discussed.  
7.1 Media Equation Behaviour Shown   
The findings reported in this thesis are significant in a number of ways. Generally, 
they confirm the presence of a media equation effect amongst an Australian sample 
(Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6). Specifically, Study 1 showed that people would respond to 
flattery from a computer in the same way that they respond to flattery from other 
humans. In comparison to participants exposed to praise or no feedback, participants 
(of high, but not low experience) tended to believe that flattering computers spoke the 
truth, experienced less negative mood as a result of the flattery, tended to judge the 
flattering computer's performance more favourably and moreover, played extra 
rounds of the game in response to flattery (Chapter 3). Study 2 showed that people 
enjoy tasks more in a team environment, but react negatively towards a computer that 
is made part of the team. In comparison to participants working on their own, or in a 
team without a computer as part of the team, participants (of high, but not low 
experience) rated a computer that was ostensibly part of the team as providing lower 
quality information and being less influential. Moreover, participants actually 
changed their own ratings and rankings less in response to a computer that was part of 
the team, than in response to a computer that was not part of the team (Chapter 4). 
Study 3 showed that females would apply gender stereotypes to computers. In a study 
involving a tutorial which employed either a female (gender-stereotype-inconsistent) 
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synthetic voice or a male (gender-stereotype-consistent) synthetic voice, females rated 
the male voice as having more masculine and positive characteristics, rated the male-
voiced tutorial more positively than the female-voiced tutorial, were more satisfied 
with the male-voiced tutorial than the female-voiced tutorial, and were more willing 
to interact further with the male-voiced tutorial than the female-voiced tutorial 
(Chapter 5). 
7.2 Moderating Effect of Experience 
The program of research provides clear evidence of the moderating effect of 
experience on the tendency to show a media equation pattern of response. Participants 
of high experience with computers were consistently more likely than participants of 
low experience with computers, to respond to the computer socially. This pattern 
extended to 3 of the 4 studies conducted (Chapters 3, 4 and 6). In the first study 
(Chapter 3), high experience participants displayed a pattern of results that was 
clearly consistent with the media equation; they responded positively to positive 
feedback and did not distinguish between praise and flattery. In comparison, low 
experience participants did not distinguish between generic feedback, praise and 
flattery. In the second study (Chapter 4), low experience participants did not differ as 
a function of whether they worked on their own, in a team with other humans, or in a 
team with other humans and a computer. In contrast, high experience participants 
enjoyed the task more in both team conditions and reacted negatively towards the 
computer when it was made to be part of the team. In the final study (Chapter 6), low 
experience participants, once again, did not distinguish between generic feedback and 
flattery from the computer. In comparison, high experience participants distinguished 
between control and flattery for several of the measures taken. In the third study 
(Chapter 5), no evidence of the moderating effect of experience was found. It is 
possible that this indicates that experience does not moderate the tendency to apply 
stereotypes to computers. It may also be that the effect of mood subsumes the 
moderating role of experience such that people in a good mood tend to show a media 
equation pattern of response and people in a bad mood tend not to show a media 
equation pattern of response, regardless of degree of experience. However, the sample 
size of the third study is insufficient for statistical analysis of these issues. 
Approximately four times as many participants would have been required to allow 
exploration of these questions in the third study. 
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These findings are the first reported evidence of a demographic factor 
consistently co-varying with the tendency to treat computers socially. No previous 
media equation research has shown clear evidence of experience (or any other factor) 
as a moderator (cf. Takeuchi & Katagiri, 1999a, discussed in section 2.4). Evidence of 
the relationship between the tendency to respond socially to computers and 
experience with computers has implications both for situations in which people can be 
expected to display media equation behaviour and also for the theorised causes of the 
media equation. 
The measures of experience employed in the current program of research were 
based on self-report from participants. Thus, it can be argued that the measures are 
subject to misperceptions on the part of participants regarding their levels of 
experience. However, the measure of experience used in the majority of studies was 
the number of years participants had been using computers. There seems little reason 
to believe that participants would, systematically or deliberately, incorrectly estimate 
the number of years they had been using computers. Irrespective, the main implication 
of the relationship between experience and media equation behaviour is the link to 
mindlessness. 
It should also be noted that the experience measures used in the current 
program of research were relatively simplistic (years of experience in Studies 1, 3 and 
4, and self-report ratings of general experience in Study 2). In particular, years of 
experience is weakened as a measure by its lack of distinction between, for example, 
someone who has used a computer for 5 years at an average of 40 hours per week and 
someone who has used a computer for 5 years at an average of 4 hours per week. 
However, a more accurate measure of actual experience would have required more 
detailed and complex measurements, ideally collected via interview, which was not 
practical given the sample sizes of the studies conducted. Another alternative would 
have been to employ a multi-item scale of perceived computer experience, however, 
the creation and validation of such a scale would involve several studies and was 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
7.3 Experience as Evidence of Mindlessness 
As discussed in section 2.7, the prevailing theorised explanation for the media 
equation – mindlessness, is based on the notion that people respond to the human-like 
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cues displayed by a computer mindlessly. That is, people are exposed to certain facets 
of the computer, which suggest humanness, and they automatically respond socially 
as a result, rather than carefully considering these human-like facets and realising that 
while they suggest humanness, they do not originate from a human, and hence, any 
kind of social reaction is inappropriate. The current findings with respect to 
experience align with the mindlessness explanation of media equation behaviour. 
Outside of media equation research, the tendency to behave mindlessly has 
been shown to increase with expertise (Epstein, 1999; Langer, 1989, 1991). It is 
argued that a beginner’s mind is often more open to possibilities, while an expert’s 
mind tends to narrow the possibilities (Epstein, 1999). This state is believed to result 
from the process whereby as a particular task is repeated, and performance of the task 
improves, the individual components of the task move out of consciousness and the 
person undertaking the task is more likely to be in a mindless state, and thus, more 
likely to respond based on specific cues presented in the environment (Langer, 1991, 
for further detail see section 2.7.4). It is proposed in this thesis that if mindlessness is 
the cause of the tendency to treat computers socially, then it should be expected that 
those with more experience with computers would be more likely to show a media 
equation pattern of response. Those with more experience are less likely to find the 
environment novel and are less likely to be consciously attending to all aspects of the 
situation. Thus, the propensity to fall back on well-learnt behavioural scripts (those 
that are normally applied during human-human interaction) is increased. It is 
important to note that this pattern is expected to extend to people who perceive 
themselves as being more experienced. It is the perception that one is more 
experienced and not the objective accuracy of this perception that leads to 
mindlessness. That is, when people believe they are familiar with a task, they can be 
expected to pay less attention to the environment and to behave mindlessly (Langer, 
2000). Hence, in terms of the link between mindlessness and the tendency for more 
experienced people to show media equation behaviour, peoples’ opinions regarding 
their degree of experience with computers is more important than the objective 
accuracy of these judgments.  
It should also be noted that the theorised link between mindlessness, 
experience and media equation behaviour relies on the assumption that the tasks that 
were undertaken by participants, during the studies conducted as part of the thesis, 
were not sufficiently novel to cause high experience participants to become mindful. 
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This seems a reasonable assumption, as although the specific tasks undertaken as part 
of the current research are potentially unique, the style and the elements of the tasks 
are not unusual. For example, although participants may not have played ‘20 
questions’ on a computer before, it is likely that they had played simple games on a 
computer. Moreover, the components of the task (reading information on the screen, 
clicking on buttons, entering text and selecting check-boxes) are common to many 
computer-based tasks. Thus, it is assumed that high experience participants would not 
be particularly struck by the novelty of the tasks they completed during the studies, 
and therefore that the tasks would not have led to them becoming more mindful. 
Obviously, the correlation between experience and the media equation pattern 
of response is not evidence of causation. While the relationship described aligns with 
the mindlessness explanation of the media equation, it is by no means empirical 
evidence of causation. It could be argued that a third variable, which happens to 
covary with experience, could be the actual cause of the tendency to treat computers 
socially. In the absence of the ability to experimentally manipulate levels of 
experience, it is not possible to show a causal link between experience, mindless and 
the media equation. However, the link between experience and the media equation 
argues for further research to seek more direct evidence of the relationship between 
mindlessness and the media equation. 
7.4 Mood, Mindlessness and the Media Equation 
The third study (Chapter 5) suggests that it is possible to manipulate the tendency to 
exhibit a media equation pattern of response as a function of mood. Based on research 
linking mood and mindlessness, showing that people in a positive mood process 
information more mindlessly and people in a negative mood process information 
more mindfully, it was hypothesised that people in a positive mood would be more 
likely to respond to a computer in a social and natural way than people in a negative 
mood. The expected pattern of results was found for females, but not males (a 
disparity theorised to be a function of the fact that the mood manipulation was less 
effective for male participants). Female participants in a positive mood reacted more 
positively to a gender-stereotype-consistent tutorial than to a gender-stereotype-
inconsistent tutorial, a preference that was not evident among female participants in a 
negative mood. Thus, it was shown that female participants were more likely to 
exhibit media equation behaviour (favouring a male-synthesised voice speaking about 
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a stereotypically male topic, over a female-synthesised voice speaking on the same 
topic) when in a positive mood - a state in which people can be expected to be 
processing mindlessly.  
These findings strengthen the argument for the theorised link between 
mindlessness and media equation behaviour. The research shows that stereotypical 
reactions to computers increase among people in a good mood in comparison to those 
in a bad mood. This constitutes important initial evidence of the ability to activate and 
dampen media equation behaviour. However, these findings only strengthen the 
theorised link between mindlessness and the media equation and cannot be argued to 
be evidence of the link per se. It could be argued (as per the findings with respect to 
experience) that mood co-varies with a third variable that, in turn, impacts upon the 
tendency to show media equation behaviour, and that mindlessness is thus not part of 
the causal chain. 
7.5 Cues as a Direct Manipulation of Mindlessness 
The indirect support provided by the third study highlights a problem inherent in any 
research conducted with the aim of assessing the validity of the mindlessness 
explanation of the media equation. Any attempt to manipulate participants' general 
levels of mindlessness followed by an assessment of the degree of media equation 
behaviour shown, remains vulnerable to the argument that a third variable is involved 
in the causal chain. This vulnerability is a function of the fact that mindlessness can 
only be manipulated indirectly; for example, via mood. However, consideration of the 
theorised process by which people come to exhibit media equation behaviour reveals 
an alternative methodology whereby empirical support for the explanation can be 
found. The current theoretically accepted model is that computers display certain cues 
that suggest humanness, and when processed in a mindless state, these cues lead 
people to react as though the computer is human which, in turn, leads to a media 
equation pattern of response. When processed in a mindful state, these cues (although 
still present) do not result in people treating the computer as though it is human, and 
thus, no media equation behaviour is shown.  
The findings in terms of experience (Chapters 3 and 4) and mood (Chapter 5) both 
provide empirical support for the presence (or absence) of mindless processing among 
participants who react (or do not react) towards the computer as though it is human. 
However, the final study (Chapter 6) attempted to provide more direct empirical 
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support by manipulating the cues provided by the computer rather than the degree of 
mindlessness experienced by the person interacting with the computer (as discussed in 
section 6.4.2, no clear conclusions can be made from this study as a result of the 
introduction of a potential confound). 
As discussed in Chapter 6, it was theorised that a computer showing cues that 
suggested 'computerness' (e.g., technical loading screens) should lead users to be less 
likely to react towards the computer as though it were human. In addition, it was 
hypothesised that users who were asked to think about how the software was 
programmed would be less likely to react towards the computer as though it was 
human. However, the results for the final study were far more complicated than 
expected. Essentially, those participants who were hypothesised to show a media 
equation pattern of response (i.e., participants who were not exposed to 
'computerness' cues and who did not think about how the software was programmed) 
did not treat the computer as though it was human. One feasible explanation for this 
pattern of results is that the flattery manipulation employed interacted with the cues 
displayed by the computer such that the computer seemed to be praising itself then 
asking participants for confirmation of its quality. In contrast, participants who were 
not expected to show a media equation pattern of response (i.e., participants who were 
exposed to 'computerness' cues and who were asked to think about how the software 
was programmed) did, in fact, treat the computer as though it were human (reacting 
positively towards flattery from the computer). It is possible that this finding is a 
function of the chosen manipulation being too weak. Perhaps the human-like cues 
being displayed by the computer and the tendency to react to these cues are so strong 
that simply adding cues which should remind the user they are interacting with a 
computer and asking them to think about the programming of the device is 
insufficient to break the media equation effect.  
7.6 Summary of Support for Mindlessness Explanation 
Prior to the current body of work, the link between mindlessness and the media 
equation was generally assumed but purely theoretical. The research conducted 
provides initial empirical support for the mindlessness explanation. The finding that 
participants of high experience are more likely to treat computers socially than 
participants of low experience is theoretically consistent with the mindlessness 
explanation. The finding that mood manipulations result in a change in the propensity 
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to treat computers socially further strengthens the link, in that, if mindlessness is the 
cause of media equation behaviour, those in a positive mood should be more likely to 
treat computers as social actors than those in a negative mood. The research 
conducted is the first reported evidence of the ability to increase or decrease media 
equation behaviour. The final study (Chapter 6) does not provide further support for 
the mindlessness explanation. It would seem that either the manipulations employed 
were insufficient to lead to a decrease in media equation behaviour or, alternatively, 
that it is not possible to prevent a media equation pattern of response among 
participants predisposed to treating the computer socially. 
7.7 Automaticity as an Alternative to Mindlessness 
The final study (Chapter 6) raises the question of whether changing the cues presented 
by the computer can ever lead to a decrease in the tendency to treat computers 
socially. Although requiring the dismissal of the results of the third study (Chapter 5) 
as an anomaly, the possibility that the media equation cannot be broken is an 
interesting one. However, if the answer to this question is affirmative, then the media 
equation cannot be the result of mindlessness. Mindlessness is a process that can be 
reversed - anything that can be processed mindlessly can also be processed mindfully 
under the appropriate conditions (Langer, 1989). The suggestion that media equation 
behaviour cannot be reduced or stopped requires an alternative explanation as to the 
behaviour’s cause. The most obvious alternative explanation for the media equation is 
automatic processing (or automaticity). 
Automaticity is defined as processing that is effortless, unconscious and 
involuntary - a fluent performance without the conscious deployment of attention 
(Moats, 2000; Tzelgov, 1999). While mindlessness/mindfulness and 
automatic/controlled processing are both frameworks that distinguish between fully 
conscious active processing and less conscious, more passive processing, certain key 
differences between the two exist (Langer, 1992). The key differences identified are 
as follows: controlled processing is the conscious processing of information within a 
given context, and mindfulness is awareness of the larger context through which 
information is understood; automatic processing requires the repeated pairing of 
stimulus and response while mindlessness does not (although it often results from 
repetition); controlled processing is assumed to require cognitive capacity and mental 
effort and mindfulness is not; and finally, once information has become automatic 
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after being controlled it will stay in that mode, whereas, mindlessly accepted 
information can always be processed mindfully (Langer, 1989, 1992). Of these 
distinctions, the latter two are the most relevant when considering the potential cause 
of media equation behaviour. 
In terms of cognitive capacity and mental effort, none of the existing media 
equation research reports any evidence of capacity consumption differences. In the 
current research, follow-up analyses (across the four studies) revealed no differences 
between people who showed and did not show media equation behaviour, in terms of: 
time taken to complete tasks, time taken to answer questions, and number of words 
written in response to open ended questions. If automaticity is the cause of the media 
equation, then some evidence of differing levels of cognition should be recognisable 
between people who are responding socially and those who are not. 
Moreover, Study 3 (Chapter 5) shows that media equation behaviour can be 
stopped or reduced if people are in a bad mood. As mentioned, the ability to stop 
media equation behaviour by inducing negative mood would not be possible if the 
process causing the behaviour is automaticity. Given these findings, and the lack of 
evidence for differing levels of cognitive capacity, it seems unlikely that automaticity 
is the process responsible for media equation behaviour.  While automatic processing 
should not be ignored as a potential cause of media equation behaviour in future 
research, it seems more likely that the unexpected findings in the final study are a 
result of insufficient strength of manipulation as opposed to an inability to prevent 
people from responding to computers socially. 
7.8 Methodological Implications 
Given the lack of previous research exploring empirical evidence of the mindlessness 
explanation for the media equation, the current program of research provides valuable 
information in terms of refining a methodology for assessing the question of causes of 
the media equation. The research conducted provides strong support for laboratory-
based research as a useful means of exploring these issues. However, the process of 
conducting the research has also revealed several key challenges and issues, and the 
identification of these issues should be of use to future researchers in the area. 
Firstly, the research conducted shows that mood can be used to moderate 
media equation behaviour using the methodology described in study three. However, 
it is clear that a large sample size is needed to show evidence of the effect. This is a 
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function of the fact that the media equation seems to be a small effect and thus 
requires large sample sizes before it can be statistically identified. Furthermore, in the 
case of studies analysing potential moderating variables, the number of cells required 
becomes substantial. For example, drawing on the research conducted in Study 3, a 
standard media equation stereotyping study would employ 4 cells; 2 (gender of voice 
in interface) by 2 (gender of participant), the addition of the moderating variable, 
mood, doubles the number of cells required to eight. The further addition of 
experience, as a potentially moderating variable, leads to the study having sixteen 
cells and requiring a substantial sample size. This requirement for large sample sizes 
is predominantly a logistical issue, but can also be dealt with through careful selection 
of conditions (for example, running only male participants and assessing reactions to 
only the female-synthesised voice under different mood conditions). Another 
methodological issue identified in the third study is the need to ensure that the mood 
manipulation employed is sufficiently strong, and moreover that its effects are 
consistent across the sample that participate in the study. Although informal pilot 
testing was performed, insufficient data was collected prior to the study to allow 
identification of the disparity between male and female reactions to the mood 
manipulation. A more effective mood manipulation could be identified through more 
extensive pilot testing. 
Secondly, through the final study (Chapter 6), the program of research 
identifies the manipulation of cues as a potentially useful alternative means of 
assessing the validity of the mindlessness explanation of the media equation. This 
methodology circumvents the problems associated with introducing another variable 
as a means of indirectly manipulating levels of mindlessness (as in Study 3). Through 
changing (or supplementing) the cues presented by the computer, it may be possible 
to present sufficient cues to the user for them to become more mindful of the true 
nature of the computer (as non-human). However, as per the previously discussed 
methodology, a large sample size is required. This is, again, a function of the 
apparently small effect size and the need for a large number of cells with the same 
potential solutions applicable. The other methodological issue identified in the final 
study is the need to carefully assess the manipulations employed such that 
confounding does not result from the combination of different manipulations and 
from misunderstanding on the part of participants.  
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7.9 Implications for the Existing Literature 
7.9.1 Experience 
When considering the existing literature, the major issue raised by this thesis is the 
lack of previous research showing a moderating effect of experience. With the 
exception of the inconclusive findings of Takeuchi and Katagiri (1999), no media 
equation research has shown any relationship between experience and the tendency to 
treat computers as though they are human. The vast majority of research does not 
report participants’ levels of experience with computers. Where levels of experience 
are reported, it is only at a macro level, with a general description of the activities 
with which participants are familiar. For example: Morkes et al. (1998) and 
Rickenberg and Reeves (2000) describe their participants as knowing how to word 
process and manage UNIX email; Fogg and Nass (1997b) describe their participants 
as being familiar with computers in general, being able to use the mouse to navigate 
menus, word process and manage email in UNIX; Nass and colleagues (Nass, Fogg, 
& Moon, 1995; Nass, Fogg, & Moon, 1996; Nass, Moon, & Green, 1997) report that 
participants had extensive word processing experience; Nass, Steur, Henriksen and 
Dryer (1994) described their participants as having extensive word processing 
experience and having completed at least one course in programming; and 
participants in Nass, Moon and Carney’s (1999) study were described as having 
extensive email and word processing experience. It is apparent when reading these 
descriptions that the authors are giving a general overview of the sample. There is no 
evidence to suggest that any quantitative or qualitative measures of experience were 
taken. Given that many studies provide no information regarding experience of the 
sample, and that where such data is provided, it is very broad; it is difficult to draw 
conclusions as to exactly why the moderating effect of experience has not been shown 
in the past. 
Considering the categorisation of the literature detailed in Chapter 2, it can be 
observed that the evidence linking experience to media equation responses is limited 
to two of the four major categories identified. The research conducted has shown the 
moderating effect of experience in the areas of 'Social Rules and Norms' and 'Identity'. 
To date, there is no evidence of experience as a moderator in the areas of 'Traits' and 
'Communication'. However, given the lack of previous research in any category 
showing a link between experience and the media equation, it seems premature to 
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theorise that the relationship is limited to only those categories in which the 
relationship has, to date, been assessed. 
Potential explanations for the lack of prior evidence of the moderating effect 
of experience include the possibility that previous research tended to be conducted 
with fairly experienced participants. Where descriptions are provided, the level of 
experience of past samples is at least moderate, and in some cases, seems reasonably 
high. A second possible explanation is that often the samples used in previous 
research were large enough that a media equation effect was shown across the whole 
sample, even though those participants with greater experience generated most of the 
effect. Finally, it is also possible that the moderating impact of experience is unique to 
Australian samples, and hence, given that the previous research was all conducted 
outside Australia, there was no effect of experience to be found. 
Although some difference in media equation behaviour have been shown 
across cultures (Takeuchi, Katagiri, Nass, & Fogg, 1998, 2000), these difference have 
been reflections, in human-computer interaction, of differences that exist between 
cultures in human-human interaction. For example, as discussed in section 2.1.2, 
Japanese participants showed a collectivist attitude towards computers and American 
participants showed a more individualist attitude towards computers, reflecting the 
differences that exist in human-human interactions within these cultures (Takeuchi, 
Katagiri, Nass, & Fogg, 1998, 2000). In the absence of knowledge of any equivalent 
difference between Australian cultures and the rest of the world in terms of human-
human interactions, it is difficult to conclude that the moderating impact of 
experience on media equation behaviour extends only to Australian samples. It seems 
more likely that the lack of evidence for experience as a moderator in previous 
research results from the combination of the fact that some research was conducted 
with samples of high experience, and some research was conducted with samples 
large enough to show an effect, regardless of experience. Moreover, as the 
relationship was not hypothesised to exist by previous researchers, it was not tested in 
their research. 
Beyond these broader implications for the existing literature, the finding that 
people with less experience with computers are less likely to treat computers socially 
is also specifically relevant to the research conducted by Goldstein and colleagues 
(Goldstein, Alsio, & Werdenhoff, 2002). As discussed in section 2.5.1, these 
researchers argue that the media equation does not apply to small computers on the 
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basis that participants in their study were not polite to small computers. However, 
Goldstein and colleagues point out that their participants had no prior experience with 
a PDA and no experience with Microsoft CE, Palm or EPOC operating systems. 
Given that the sample tested were of low experience with PDAs, it is plausible that 
they were less likely to interact with the devices mindlessly and hence, less likely to 
show a media equation pattern of results. 
7.10 Applications 
7.10.1 Experience 
In terms of the identified applications of the existing media equation research, the 
current findings, with respect to experience, suggest some constraining conditions and 
contextual factors that should be considered. The finding that media equation 
behaviour is more likely to be shown by more experienced people in turn implies that 
the applications of media equation research are more likely to be effective with those 
of greater experience. The likelihood of the majority of a group of people who interact 
with a particular type of software or computing environment having a high degree of 
experience varies across domains. 
A great deal of media equation research is relevant to the field of game design. 
For example, some games might be improved by using stereotypes to determine the 
appearance of particular non-player characters. If the player is to be helped in their 
selection of a car to race, then the appearance of the non-player character that is 
advising the player could be made similar to the appearance of a stereotypical car 
expert (non-player characters are often presented in existing games with stereotype-
consistent appearances, presumably for reasons of verisimilitude, however, the current 
research highlights additional benefits of such design decisions). As shown in Study 3 
(Chapter 5) and in previous media equation research (E. Lee, Nass, & Brave, 2000; 
Nass, Moon, & Green, 1997), people tend to apply stereotyped attributes to voices 
and animated characters that sound or look like members of particular groups. This 
research suggests that players of racing games may similarly apply the stereotyped 
attributes of a car expert (such as an in-depth knowledge of cars) to a non-player 
character that looks and sounds like a stereotypical car expert. It seems likely that a 
player will enjoy being helped by a character that seems knowledgeable more than a 
character that does not necessarily seem to know a great deal about the topic being 
 190 
discussed. 
There is a variety of ways in which media equation findings can be leveraged 
in games; however the current research suggests that the application of these findings 
will be most successful with more experienced computer users. In the field of 
computer games, it is reasonable to assume that the majority of the population using 
the software is fairly experienced with computers. Computer games are more often 
played by people of high, rather than low experience, and hence, it seems reasonable 
to assume that media equation research applied in computer games is likely to be 
effective with a large portion of the target population.  
Much media equation research can be applied within the field of education.  
For example, media equation flattery research (Fogg & Nass, 1997b, Study 1) has 
shown that people who are flattered by computers tend to enjoy the task they are 
performing more than people who are not given positive feedback. Hence, where the 
goal is to improve the experience of people interacting with a computer-based tutorial, 
flattery is likely to be of value. However, in contrast to the field of computer games, 
where it can be assumed that the majority of users will be of high experience, no such 
assumption can be made when considering educational software. This is particularly 
relevant when considering educational software designed to teach users about specific 
software programs. In such cases, the majority of users are likely to have low 
experience with computers and hence be less likely to respond to applications of 
media equation theory. 
A final example area of application for media equation theory is e-commerce, 
or more specifically, retail websites. One goal of retail websites is to sell merchandise. 
Media equation research on similarity attraction (K. Lee & Nass, 2003; Nass & Lee, 
2000, 2001) has shown that people respond more positively to virtual agents that 
display a personality similar to their own. Thus, in an online sales environment, the 
creation of a sales agent that displays a personality similar to the user is a potential 
means of encouraging liking for the environment and the agent, which may translate 
into an increased likelihood of purchase. However, online sales environments are 
likely to attract users with a variety of backgrounds and degrees of experience and 
thus, the application of media equation theory in this field could be expected to vary 
in its degree of effectiveness. 
Consideration of the current findings with respect to experience, in tandem 
with contexts of application, provides an indication of when and where the application 
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of media equation theory is most likely to be useful. It should be noted, however, that 
no evidence has been found of the human-like cues displayed by a computer having a 
negative impact on less experienced users. That is, while low experience users may 
not respond socially to the computer, they do not appear to react negatively in 
response to the cues that lead to such behaviour among high experience users. Thus, 
designers seeking to apply media equation theory need only decide if a sufficient 
portion of their target audience is highly experienced, and thus, likely to respond to 
the application of media equation theory. Designers need not avoid such applications 
on the basis that they will lead to a negative reaction on the part of less experienced 
users. 
7.10.2 Mindlessness 
The findings of the current program of research in terms of mood and mindlessness 
are also relevant to the issue of applications of the media equation. While the findings 
with respect to experience identify a potentially limited scope of application, it 
remains possible that using positive mood to increase the tendency to mindlessly 
process, on the part of less experienced users, may lead to a greater propensity to treat 
the computer as though it were human. The current findings in terms of mood show 
that people in a good mood are far more likely to show a media equation pattern of 
response. While it wasn't possible to assess how mood interacts with experience in the 
third study, it could be that low experience users in a positive mood would show an 
increased tendency to treat the computer as though it were human. For example, in an 
educational setting, it may be that a combination of mood enhancement activities and 
flattery would lead to low experience users reacting positively to flattery (an effect 
only shown by high experience users in the first study). 
7.11 Broader Implications 
More broadly, the major implication that flows from the current research is that more 
experienced users are more likely to benefit from rich computer environments, created 
based on media equation theory, but, are also more susceptible to unethical 
applications of the findings. However, it is arguably better that high experience users 
are more vulnerable to unethical applications of the theory than low experience users, 
as it can be expected that high experience users are more likely to be aware of 
potentially dangerous environments than those with less experience. For example, a 
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situation could develop in which media equation research regarding assignment of 
roles (Nass, Reeves, & Leshner, 1996) was being leveraged in the form of an agent 
labeled as a financial expert. If such an agent were being used to elicit personal 
financial details from users of online services, then although high experience users 
might be more susceptible to mindlessly treating the agent as an expert (because it 
was labeled as such), they may also be more aware of the need to avoid sharing 
personal financial details in an online environment. Contrastingly, although less 
experienced users might be less aware of the dangers of sharing financial information, 
they would also be less susceptible to the labeling of an agent as an expert.28  
Furthermore, while less experienced users are at a potential disadvantage in 
terms of being less likely to benefit from the rich environments that can be created by 
drawing upon media equation theory, it is quite possible that this disadvantage will 
decrease over time. As computers become increasingly ubiquitous, successive 
generations are becoming more and more experienced with computers. It is 
theoretically feasible that at a certain point the majority of the population will be 
equivalent to the high experience samples involved in the current program of 
research. If this were to occur, a much larger proportion of people would begin to 
react to computers in a social and natural manner. 
7.12 Conclusions 
In addition to important domain specific findings and the associated software design 
implications, the current program of research has revealed the moderating impact of 
experience on the tendency to treat computers socially. It has provided initial 
empirical support for the mindlessness explanation of the media equation, and has 
progressed knowledge of the appropriate methodologies required for further 
exploration of the potential causes of the media equation.  
7.13 Future Research 
• This thesis provides the first reported evidence of experience as a moderator of the 
media equation effect. The link between experience and media equation behaviour 
has been shown to extend to the domains of flattery and team affiliation. Future 
research should explore whether the current findings in terms of experience can be 
                                                
28 It should be stressed that this argument is not an attempt to justify or condone unethical uses of 
technology or media equation research. Rather, it is intended as a discussion of the relative impact on 
different user groups if the findings being discussed were applied in an inappropriate fashion.  
 193 
replicated with other cultural groups and in domains within the 'Traits' and 
'Communication' categories of media equation research. 
• As discussed in section 7.8, it seems that the effect size of the media equation is 
reasonably small. This raises the question of the extent to which media equation 
effects shown in experimental environments will translate to real world settings. 
Future research should assess which of the social responses identified in this thesis 
(and the broader media equation literature) will be shown in a naturalistic setting, 
and the degree to which these social responses will be shown.  
• The issue of source orientation, that is, the component of the computer to which 
participants attribute a notion of ‘self’, is still partially unresolved (see section 2.2). 
Future research incorporating a variety of theoretical domains, multiple 
manipulations of source, and control for the possibility of cultural effects, is needed 
in order to resolve this issue. Such research is likely to be of value, as knowledge of 
the aspects of the computer to which notions of ‘self’ are attributed will impact 
upon many of the findings within the media equation. Moreover, the implications 
for design based on the use of social and natural rules differ greatly depending on 
whether (and under which conditions) multiple ‘selves’ can exist upon a single 
computer. 
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Appendix 1A – Study 1 (Flattery): Instructions to run file 
 
The file for study 1 is ‘Study_1.exe’. The file can be found in the folder named ‘Study 
1’. The file can only be run on a Windows operating system.  
 
The details of Study 1 are described in Chapter 3.  
 
The study was run on computers with the Windows XP operating system. The file 
was created using Macromedia Authorware. 
 
It is recommended that all files be copied to the local harddrive before they are run. 
 
 To view the control condition enter the subject number c201 
 To view the flattery condition enter the subject number a201 
 To view the praise condition enter the subject number b201 
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Appendix 1B – Study 1 (Flattery): Questionnaire 
 
(The questions presented here, were completed by participants on the computer as 
part of the study. Unless otherwise indicated responses were made on a scale from 1-
not at all, to 9-very much) 
 
For approximately how many years have you been using computers? __ 
 
On average, for how many hours a day are you using a computer for work related 
activities? __ 
 
On average, for how many hours a day are you using a computer for leisure activities? 
__ 
 
Which of the following activities have you undertaken on a computer in the past? 
 - word processing 
 - email 
 - spreadsheets 
 - databases 
 - programming 
 - internet 
 - games 
 - multimedia authoring 
 - other (please specify) _________________________ 
 
Which of the following activities do you commonly undertake on a computer in an 
average day? 
 - word processing 
 - email 
 - spreadsheets 
 - databases 
 - programming 
 - internet 
 - games 
 - multimedia authoring 
 - other (please specify) _________________________ 
 
In general, how experienced are you with computers? (1 not at all experienced 9 very 
experienced) 
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Below is a list of words that describe feelings people have. Please read each one 
carefully. Then click on one circle under the answer to the right which best describes 
HOW YOU WERE FEELING WHILE PLAYING THE 20 QUESTIONS GAME. 
friendly, tense, angry, worn out, unhappy, clear headed, lively, confused, sorry for 
things done, shaky, listless, peeved, considerate, sad, active, on edge, grouchy, blue, 
energetic, panicky, hopeless, relaxed, unworthy, spiteful, sympathetic, uneasy, 
restless, unable to concentrate, fatigued, helpful, annoyed, discouraged, resentful, 
nervous, lonely, miserable, muddled, cheerful, bitter, exhausted, anxious, ready to 
fight, good natured, gloomy, desperate, sluggish, rebellious, helpless, weary, 
bewildered, alert, deceived, furious, efficient, trusting, full of pep, bad-tempered, 
worthless, forgetful, carefree, terrified, guilty, vigorous, uncertain about things, 
bushed 
(0 – not at all, to 4 – extremely) 
 
Please click on the number that accurately describes the computer with which you 
have been interacting 
1 Bad - 9 Good 
1 Unhappy - 9 Happy 
1 Tense – 9 Relaxed 
1 Unimportant – 9 Important 
1 Weak – 9 Powerful 
1 Submissive – 9 Dominant 
1 Unhelpful – 9 Helpful 
1 Unintelligent – 9 Intelligent 
1 Uninsightful – 9 Insightful 
 
Please click on the number that accurately describes you (during the 20 questions 
task). 
1 Bad – 9 Good 
1 Unhappy – 9 Happy 
1 Tense – 9 Relaxed 
1 Unimportant – 9 Important 
1 Weak – 9 Powerful 
1 Submissive – 9 Dominant 
1 Unhelpful – 9 Helpful 
1 Unintelligent – 9 Intelligent 
1 Uninsightful – 9 Insightful 
 
How willing would you be to work on this computer in the future? 
How willing would you be to spend more time playing the game? 
 
How well did the computer perform? Not at all well – very well 
How efficient was the computer? Not at all efficient – very efficient 
How easy was it to work with the computer? Not at all easy – very easy 
How productive was the computer? Not at all productive – very productive 
How satisfied were you with the computer’s performance? Not at all satisfied – very 
satisfied 
How pleased were you with the computers performance? Not at all pleased – very 
pleased? 
 
 208 
How well do you feel you performed? Not at all well – very well 
How efficient do you feel you were? Not at all efficient – very efficient 
How productive were you? Not at all productive – very productive 
How satisfied were you with your own performance? Not at all satisified – very 
satisfied 
Compared to other people who participated in this study, how well do you think you 
performed? Much worse than other participants – much better than other participants 
Compared to the suggestions of other people who participanted in the study, how 
useful do you think the questions you suggested to the computer are? 
 
How much fun was the 20 questions task? 
How enjoyable was the 20 questions task? 
How rewarding was the 20 questions task? 
 
How sensible are the guesses the computer is currently making? 
How intelligent are the questions the computer is currently asking? 
How accurate is the feedback the computer is currently giving? 
 
After  you suggested alternative questions, the game gave feedback that was: 
- randomly generated 
- based on comparisons to an existing database of questions 
- other (please specify) 
 
How much did you enjoy completing this study (i.e., the 20 questions task)?  
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Appendix 2A – Study 2 (Group): Instructions to run file 
 
The file for study 2 is ‘Study_2.exe’. The file can be found in the folder named ‘Study 
2’. The file can only be run on a Windows operating system.  
 
The details of Study 2 are described in Chapter 4.  
 
The study was run on computers with the Windows XP operating system. The file 
was created using Macromedia Authorware. 
 
It is recommended that all files be copied to the local harddrive before they are run. 
 
       To view the control condition enter the subject number c101 
       To view the blue human-team condition enter the subject number b201 
       To view the red human-team condition enter the subject number r201 
       To view the blue human-computer team condition enter the subject number b301 
       To view the red human-computer team condition enter the subject number r301 
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Appendix 2B – Study 2 (Group): Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was presented to participants in three stages (each stage is 
identified by the request for participants subject number). 
 
SUBJECT NUMBER: _____________________ 
 
MOOD 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. 
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment. 
Use the following scale to record your answers 
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
very slightly          a little           moderately        quite a bit        extremely 
or not at all 
 
 ____ interested    ____ irritable 
 ____ distressed    ____ alert 
 ____ excited     ____ ashamed 
 ____ upset     ____ inspired 
 ____ strong     ____ nervous 
 ____ guilty     ____ determined 
 ____ scared     ____ attentive 
 ____ hostile     ____ jittery 
 ____ enthusiastic    ____ active 
 ____ proud     ____ afraid 
 
 
ATTITUDES 
 
How much do you think you might LIKE other people in the red team? 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                  Not at all        very much  
How SIMILAR do you think you might be to people in the red team in terms of your 
general attitudes and opinions? 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                  Not at all        very much  
How much would you like to GET TO KNOW other people in the red team? 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                  Not at all        very much  
How much do you feel you BELONG to the red team? 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                  Not at all        very much  
To what extent do you feel STRONG TIES to the red team? 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                  Not at all        very much  
How much do you feel the red team might HOLD YOU BACK? 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                  Not at all        very much  
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How PLEASED are you to belong to the red team? 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                  Not at all        very much  
How IMPORTANT is the red team to you? 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                  Not at all        very much  
How much do you IDENTIFY with the red team? 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                  Not at all        very much  
To what extent would you PREFER to belong to the blue team? 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                  Not at all        very much 
 
TEXT DESCRIPTION TASK 
 
How much FUN was the text description task?  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                  Not at all        very much  
How ENJOYABLE was the text description task? 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                  Not at all        very much  
How REWARDING was the text description task? 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                  Not at all        very much  
How SIMILAR were your INITIAL RANKINGS to the computers rankings? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
How SIMILAR were your FINAL RANKINGS to the computers rankings? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much 
 
DESERT SURVIVAL TASK 
 
How much FUN was the Desert Survival task? 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                  Not at all        very much 
 
How ENJOYABLE was the Desert Survival task?, 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                  Not at all        very much   
How REWARDING was the Desert Survival task?, 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                  Not at all        very much 
 
How SIMILAR were your INITIAL RANKINGS to the computers rankings? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
How SIMILAR were your FINAL RANKINGS to the computers rankings? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much 
 
 
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY COMPUTER 
 
How RELEVANT was the information the computer provided? 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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       not at all        very much  
How HELPFUL was the information the computer provided? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
How INSIGHTFUL was the information the computer provided? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much 
 
COMPUTER (across both tasks) 
 
How WELL did the computer perform? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
How EFFICIENT was the computer? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much 
 
How EASY was it to work with the computer? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
How PRODUCTIVE was the computer? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much 
 
How SATISFIED were you with the computer's performance? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much 
 
"How PLEASED were you with the computers performance? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much 
 
How much do you think the following ADJECTIVES apply to the computer you 
worked with? 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       Bad        Good 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
     Unimportant        Important 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
         Unhelpful        Helpful 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
    Unintelligent        Intelligent 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
     Uninsightful        Insightful 
 
 
COMPUTER INTERACTION 
 
How SIMILAR did you feel your APPROACH to the problems was to the computers 
approach to the problems? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much 
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How SIMILAR did you feel your SUGGESTIONS were to the computers 
suggestions? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
How SIMILAR did you feel your own interaction STYLE was to the computers? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
How much did you COOPERATE with the computer? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
How RECEPTIVE were you to the computers suggestions? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
How ACCEPTING were you of the computers advice? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
How much did you AGREE with the computer? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much   
How much did you WANT TO REACH AGREEMENT with the computer (in terms 
of rankings?) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
How much did you TRUST the computers information? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
How RESPONSIVE were you to the computers suggestions? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much 
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SUBJECT NUMBER: _____________________ 
 
ATTITUDE TO TASK 
 
How CERTAIN were you of your final ranking in the TEXT DESCRIPTION task? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
How CERTAIN were you of your final ranking in the DESERT SURVIVAL task? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
How willing would you be to do more TEXT DESCRIPTION tasks? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
How willing would you be to do more DESERT SURVIVAL tasks?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
 
RATINGS OF SELF DURING STUDY 
 
How much do you think the following ADJECTIVES applied to you while you were 
performing the tasks? 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       Bad        Good 
   
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
          Unhappy        Happy 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
               Tense        Relaxed 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
      Weak        Powerful 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       Submissive        Dominant 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
     Unimportant        Important 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
         Unhelpful        Helpful 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
    Unintelligent        Intelligent 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
     Uninsightful        Insightful 
 
In General: 
How WELL do you feel you performed? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
How EFFICIENT do you feel you were? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
How PRODUCTIVE do you feel you were? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much 
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How SATISFIED were you with your own performance? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
COMPARED to OTHER PEOPLE who participated in this study, how well do you 
think YOU PERFORMED? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
              much worse        much better  
 
 
FEELINGS DURING STUDY 
 
How much did you feel like part of a GROUP during the study? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
How much did you feel you were working COLLABORATIVELY with the 
computer? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
How much did you feel like you were working TOGETHER with the computer? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
How much did you feel like you were working on your OWN? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
How much did you think of the computer you were working with as a TEAMMATE? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
       not at all        very much  
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SUBJECT NUMBER: _____________________ 
 
Do you know or are you familiar with anyone else who completed the study at the 
same time as you did?             YES / NO 
 
What do you think the purpose of this study was? 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Were you on a team during this experiment?             YES ? NO 
If so, what colour was your team?  ______________________ 
 
What colour was the border of the screen on the computer you worked on? 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
How did the computer generate its answers for the tasks (Desert Survival Task and 
Text Rating)? 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Do you have any feedback regarding this study? 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 3A – Study 3 (Stereotyping): Instructions to run file 
 
It is recommended that all files be copied to the local harddrive before they are run. 
 
The files for study 3 are ‘Study3_F.exe’ (for the female voice tutorial) and 
‘Study3_M.exe’ (for the male voice tutorial). The files can be found in the folder 
named ‘Study 3’. The files can only be run on a Windows operating system.  
 
The mood induction videos are labelled ‘Positive.mpg’ (the positive mood induction 
video) and ‘Negative.mpg’ (the negative mood induction video). These files can be 
run on either Mac or Windows operating systems. 
 
The details of Study 3 are described in Chapter 5.  
 
The study was run on computers with the Windows XP operating system. The tutorial 
files were created using Macromedia Director. The mood induction videos were 
created using Final Cut Pro. 
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Appendix 3B – Study 3 (Stereotyping): Questionnaire 
The ‘computer tutorial questionnaire’ was presented to participants after completion 
and collection of the ‘video rating task’ questionnaire. 
 
Video Rating Task 
 
Thinking about the section of video you have just watched, please rate on the scales 
below how you feel right now (tick the appropriate box in each case): 
 
 Bad    Neutral    Good  
                    
  
 
 
         
 Sad    Neutral    Happy  
                    
  
 
 
         
 Negative    Neutral    Positive  
                    
 
 
 
Had you ever seen any of the video footage you just watched before this 
study?    Yes 
  
No 
 
 
If you answered “yes” above, how long ago did you last see any of the footage, before today? 
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COMPUTER TUTORIAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
  
MOOD 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and 
emotions. Read each item and then circle the appropriate number next to that word. 
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment. 
 
Use the following 
scale to record 
your answers: 
Very 
slightly or 
not at all 
A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
Interested 1 2 3 4 5 
Distressed 1 2 3 4 5 
Excited 1 2 3 4 5 
Upset 1 2 3 4 5 
Strong 1 2 3 4 5 
Guilty 1 2 3 4 5 
Scared 1 2 3 4 5 
Hostile 1 2 3 4 5 
Enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5 
Proud 1 2 3 4 5 
Irritable 1 2 3 4 5 
Alert 1 2 3 4 5 
Ashamed 1 2 3 4 5 
Inspired 1 2 3 4 5 
Nervous 1 2 3 4 5 
Determined 1 2 3 4 5 
Attentive 1 2 3 4 5 
Jittery 1 2 3 4 5 
Active 1 2 3 4 5 
Afraid 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
ATTITUDES TO COMPUTER VOICE  
The following questions are about your attitudes to the computerised voice used by 
the tutoring program. 
 
The computer voice 
sounded: 
Not at all 
 
 Very much 
 
Squeaky 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Soft 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Slow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Accented 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Nasal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Lively 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Like a human voice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Easy to understand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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While you were listening to the 
tutorial… 
Not at all  Very 
much 
How much did you feel as if someone 
was talking to you? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How involving was the whole session? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How vividly were you able to imagine 
the source of the voice? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How much attention did you pay to what 
was being said? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
The computer voice 
was: 
Not at all 
like this 
 Very much 
like this 
Self-reliant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Gentle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Understanding 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Friendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Truthful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Adaptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sensitive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Independent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Aggressive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dominant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Competitive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sympathetic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Reliable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Affectionate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Helpful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
 
Thinking about the computer 
voice: 
Not at 
all 
 Very 
much 
How pleasant was it to listen to? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How much did you like the voice? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How “male” did the voice sound? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How “female” did the voice 
sound? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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TUTORING PROGRAM 
 
These questions refer to your impressions of the whole tutoring program interface, 
including (but not limited to) the voice used by the program.  
 
 
The entire tutoring 
program was: 
Not at 
all 
 Very 
much 
Competent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Informative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Knowledgeable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sophisticated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Professional 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Educational 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Convincing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Reliable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Helpful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Intelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Insightful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Easy to work with 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
Thinking about the tutoring program: Not at 
all 
 Very 
much 
Were you satisfied with the tutoring program? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Were you pleased with the program’s 
performance? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How interested would you be in watching further 
sections of the car engine tutorial ? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
Overall, how would you rate the entire tutoring program? 
 
 Poor Moderate Excellent  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 
 
 
Thinking specifically about car engines: Nothing  A great  
deal 
How much did you know about car engines 
before watching the tutorial? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How much do you know about car engines 
now? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 222 
RATINGS OF SELF 
 
The following questions assess your impressions of your own performance during 
your interaction with the computer. 
 
How much do you think the following adjectives applied to you while you were 
performing the tasks? (circle a number for each pair of adjectives) 
 
Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good 
Unhappy  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Happy 
Tense  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Relaxed 
Weak  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Powerful 
Submissive  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Dominant 
Unimportant  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Important 
Unhelpful  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Helpful 
Unintelligent  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Intelligent 
Uninsightful  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Insightful 
 
 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
1. What is your gender? (please circle)  1. Female 2. Male 
 
2. What is your age? (please write in)                           years 
 
3. What degree are you currently enrolled in?                                                   
   
 
4. Is English your first language? (please circle) 1. Yes  2. No 
 
 
5. For approximately how many years have you been using computers?  
                             years 
 
 
6. On average, for how many hours a day do you use a computer for work related 
activities?                            
                             hours a day 
 
 
7. On average, for how many hours a day are you using a computer for leisure 
related activities? (e.g., internet surfing, game playing etc.)  
                              hours a day 
 
 
8. On average, for how many hours a day do you play computer games (on either a 
computer or a home console e.g., Playstation)  
                              hours a day 
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9. Which of the following activities have you undertaken on a computer in the past?  
(Please tick all applicable activities) 
 
  Word processing   Internet  
  Email   Multimedia Authoring  
  Spreadsheets   Games  
  Databases   Other   (please specify)                                     
  Programming    
 
10. Which of the following activities do you usually undertake on a computer in an 
average day? (Please tick all applicable activities) 
 
  Word processing   Internet  
  Email   Multimedia Authoring  
  Spreadsheets   Games  
  Databases   Other   (please specify)                                     
  Programming    
 
11. In general, how experienced are you with computers? (circle one number) 
 
Not at all 
experienced 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very 
experienced 
 
 
RECALL 
The computer tutorial you listened to contained information on seven separate topics, 
which are listed below. For each topic area, please write down, in as much detail as 
possible, everything you can remember from the content of the tutorial. This includes 
details of what terms were used, what diagrams were shown, and what points were 
made.  
 
 
1. What can you remember from the tutorial about the four-stroke cycle? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please use the back of this page if you need more space.
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2. What can you remember from the tutorial about cylinders? 
 
 
 
 
 
3. What can you remember from the tutorial about the valve train? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. What can you remember from the tutorial about the ignition system? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. What can you remember from the tutorial about the cooling system? 
 
 
 
 
 
Please use the back of this page if you need more space. 
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6. What can you remember from the tutorial about the air intake system? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. What can you remember from the tutorial about the fuel system? 
 
 
 
 
Please use the back of this page if you need more space. 
 
 
FINAL QUESTIONS 
 
Do you know anyone else who was in the room during this study?         Yes / No 
 
What do you think the purpose of this study was? 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
________________________________ 
 
Do you have any other comments about this study? 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
________________________________ 
 
 
Thank You For Participating in this Study 
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Appendix 4A – Study 4 (Cues): Instructions to run file 
 
Both Mac and PC versions of the files for study 4 are provided.  
 
It is recommended that all files be copied to the local harddrive before they are run. 
 
The file for the Mac operating system is ‘20 Questions.apm’. It can be found in the 
‘For Mac’ folder, which is located within the ‘Study 4’ folder.  
The file cannot be run unless the Authorware program is installed (alternatively, the 
‘Authorware player and packager’ can be installed. The ‘Authorware player and 
packager’ can be downloaded from: 
http://www.macromedia.com/software/authorware/productinfo/macplayer/form/index.
cgi , but requires an Authorware serial number for installation) 
 
The file for the Windows operating system is ’20 Questions.exe’. It can be found in 
the ‘For PC’ folder, which is located within the ‘Study 4’ folder. 
 
The details of Study 4 are described in Chapter 6.  
 
The study was run on computers with the Windows XP and the Macintosh OSX 
operating systems. The files were created using Macromedia Authorware. 
 
To view the ‘no positive feedback’ with ‘computer cues present’ condition enter the 
subject number c101 
To view the ‘flattery’ with ‘computer cues present’ condition enter the subject number 
a101 
To view the ‘no positive feedback’ with ‘computer cues absent’ condition enter the 
subject number c201 
To view the ‘flattery’ with ‘computer cues absent’ condition enter the subject number 
a201 
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Appendix 4B – Study 4 (Cues): Questionnaire 
 
(The questions presented here, were completed by participants on the computer as 
part of the study. Unless otherwise indicated responses were made on a scale from 1-
not at all, to 9-very much) 
 
For approximately how many years have you been using computers? __ 
On average, for how many hours a day are you using a computer for work related 
activities? _ 
On average, for how many hours a day are you using a computer for leisure activities? 
_ 
Which of the following activities have you undertaken on a computer in the past? 
 - word processing 
 - email 
 - spreadsheets 
 - databases 
 - programming 
 - internet 
 - multimedia authoring 
 - games 
 - other (please specify) _________________________ 
Which of the following activities do you commonly undertake on a computer in an 
average day? 
 - word processing 
 - email 
 - spreadsheets 
 - databases 
 - programming 
 - internet 
 - multimedia authoring 
 - games 
 - other (please specify) _________________________ 
In general, how experienced are you with computers? (1 not at all experienced 9 very 
experienced) 
 
 
The following details the questions asked during the study. The questionnaire is 
actually completed on a computer, but these are the items presented by the computer. 
 
Please answer the following questions in terms of how you were feeling while playing 
the 20 questions game: 
(1 very slightly or not at all to 5 extremely) 
1. Interested 
2. Distressed 
3. Excited 
4. Upset 
5. Strong 
6. Guilty 
7. Scared 
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8. Hostile 
9. Enthusiastic 
10. Proud 
11. Irritable 
12. Alert 
13. Ashamed 
14. Inspired 
15. Nervous 
16. Determined 
17. Attentive 
18. Jittery 
19. Active 
20. Afraid 
 
Please rate from 1-9 how well the following adjectives apply to the computer 
    Bad - Good 
    Unhappy - Happy 
    Tense - Relaxed 
    Unimportant - Important 
    Weak - Powerful 
    Submissive - Dominant 
    Unhelpful - Helpful 
    Unintelligent - Intelligent 
    Uninsightful - Insightful 
 
Please rate from 1-9 how well the following adjectives described you (during the 20 
questions task) 
    Bad - Good 
    Unhappy - Happy 
    Tense - Relaxed 
    Unimportant - Important 
    Weak - Powerful 
    Submissive - Dominant 
    Unhelpful - Helpful 
    Unintelligent - Intelligent 
    Uninsightful - Insightful 
 
How willing would you be to work on this computer in the future? 
How willing would you be to spend more time playing the game? 
 
How WELL did the computer perform? Not at all well, Very well 
How EFFICIENT was the computer? Not at all efficient, Very efficient 
How EASY was it to work with the computer? Not at all easy, Very easy 
How PRODUCTIVE was the computer? Not at all productive, Very productive 
How SATISFIED were you with the computer's performance? Not at all satisfied, 
Very satisfied 
How PLEASED were you with the computers performance? Not at all pleased, Very 
pleased 
 
 
 229 
How WELL do you feel you performed? Not at all well, Very well 
How EFFICIENT do you feel you were? Not at all efficient, Very efficient 
How PRODUCTIVE were you? Not at all productive, Very productive 
How SATISFIED were you with your own performance? Not at all satisified, Very 
satisfied 
COMPARED to OTHER PEOPLE who participated in this study, how well do you 
think YOU PERFORMED? Much worse, Much better 
COMPARED to the SUGGESTIONS of other people who participated in the study, 
how USEFUL do you think the QUESTIONS YOU SUGGESTED to the computer 
are? Much less useful, Much more useful 
 
How much FUN was the 20 questions task? Not at all fun, Very fun 
How ENJOYABLE was the 20 questions task? Not at all enjoyable, Very enjoyable 
How REWARDING was the 20 questions task? Not at all rewarding, Very rewarding 
 
How SENSIBLE are the GUESSES the computer is currently making? Not at all 
sensible, Very sensible 
How INTELLIGENT are the QUESTIONS the computer is currently asking? Not at 
all reasonable, Very reasonable 
How accurate is the FEEDBACK the computer is currently giving? (regarding the 
quality of the questions people suggest) Not at all accurate, Very accurate 
 
After you suggested alternative questions, the game gave you feedback that was: 
- randomly generated 
- based on comparisons to an existing database of questions 
- no feedback was given 
- other (please specify) 
 
What is your gender? 
What is your age? 
 
Which degree are you enrolled in? 
How did you hear about this study? 
 
How much did you enjoy completing this study (i.e., the 20 questions task)? 
 
Do you have any feedback at all about this study? 
 
 
